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ABSTRAc"r 
This arricle describes the evolution am/ key features of rhe 
centralized environmental regulatory sysrems thar emerged in 
rhe United Swtes and Europe during the latter half' of the 
nvcntieth century. It applies insights from the positive eco­
nomic analysis of regulatory centralization in an auempt w 
explain a striking paradox found in both the European and 
American centralized environmental regulatory regimes: rhar 
in borh systems. centralized environmental regulation lias 
been adopted nor as a solwion for mmsboundar_v pollwion 
(inter-jurisdic:rional externaliries). bill rather for pollution thur 
is primaril_v local. The paper explains rlwr rhe rendencv of 
centruli -:ed environmental regulation to focus so par(l(loxi­
cofly on focalized pollwion is due to inlzerenr pressures fiir 
regional prorecriunism and redistribwion within a lfcdera/­
i::.ed) pnliJicol svsrem. Normmivdy, we provide an up-ro-dare 
survey of rhe rheoretical and empirical work on race-ro-thc­
hortum rheury. and then apply normarive economics 10 
develop insight into the relative normative desirahiliry ofenvi­
ronmenral regulawry cerztmli::.urion in the U.S. n:rsus 
Curope. We hefieve !liar the relatively less cemmfi-:ed Euro­
pean svstem may IIave economic jusrificarion. On rhe other 
hand. the enlargenu:m and increased economic integration of 
Europe raise borh normarive ljuesrions regarding rhe desiru­
hifitv of centralized European l:'tn·iromnenrai regulurion. and 
posiri1·e qucsrions regarding the fiitun· of European Clll'irun­
lllentul luw 
In this article, we apply the tools of economic analysis to the task 
of explaining, and critiquing, two quite different systems of centra l­
i£ed environmental regulation: federal environmental Jaw and reg­
ulation in the United States, and European Union environmental 
regulation. Cultural and historical factors are undoubtedly impor-­
tant in explaining both differences and similarities between the 
' We arc �r�udul to Ryan llmwn (L!niv.:rsity of Pcnnsylvania) and Wanchi ·r.tng (M<t�s­
tricht Univ,:rsity) fur useful rese;Jrch assistance and to Anna Rit�t (i,·rm;tni. as well as to 
the participants in thc annual conference of the Eurnpc:tn Assuciatiun fnr L�\w and Ecu­
nnmic; in C<lpcnhagcn (Seprcmhcr 2007). for usdul Ctlllllllents. 
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European and American systems of e nvironment a l  regulation. 
However, in our view, fundament a l  economic forces- such as the 
relative stage of development and degree of capit a l  and l abor 
mobility across different U.S. states and European countries - not 
only l argely explain how and when environme ntal  regulatory cen­
tralization took place in Europe versus the United States but a lso 
determine the economic desirability of such centralization. 
This article seeks to extend two important schools of legal schol­
arship. T he first is law and economics. Economic analysis of law 
constructs both positive and normative theories. Positive l aw and 
economics attempts to both explain why particular legal rules and 
institutions have arisen and been maintained under certain histori­
cal circumstances, and to predict the effect of such legal rules and 
institutions on the behavior of people subject to them. Norma­
tively, the economic analysis of law can evaluate the efficiency and 
distributional consequences of alternative legal institutions. Both 
positive and normative economic analysis of law have focused on 
particular legal systems- common law or civil, for example1 - and 
the economic approach has not been extensively applied in the 
kind of comparative endeavor that we undertake below. 
The second area of scholarship that we build upon is compara­
tive l aw. Traditional ly, comparative law is by and large atheoretic; 
like botany, it is content for the most part to simply observe and 
describe differences in national legal systems or particular areas of 
l aw.2 Such work is valuable, for it revea ls the complexity of alter­
native legal systems, and also revea ls their similarities and differ­
ences. Clearly some differences are cultural ly and historically 
determined, but when differences persist even as cultures change 
over time, the question is whether there may be an economic 
explanation for persistence and difference. That is, the persistence 
of difference suggests a functional explanation, that the differences 
retlect fundame nt a l  and systematic differences in national eco­
nomic systems, which in turn determine the relative efficiency of 
alternative legal rules and institutions. On the other hand, one 
might ask, what explains similarities across national legal systems? 
Because there are similarities in economies that are otherwise 
1 For a sustained application of economic analysis focusing on common law systems. see 
RoBERT D. CuoTER & TIIO!>.tAS ULEN, LAw AND EcoNOMICS (2007): for a sustained appli­
cation focusing on civil law systems, see H,'\NS-BERND ScHAFER & Cu,t's OiT, THE Eco­
NO\!IC ANALYSIS oF CtvtL LAw (M. Braham trans. 2(X)5). 
2 See, e.g . .  Pt·nuc ENVIRONMENTAL LAw IN THE EuROPE-\N UNION AND THE UNITED 
STATEs: A CoMI'.-'\RATivF ANALYSIS (Rene J.G.H. Seerden et al. eds .. 2002). 
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quite different, such similarities provoke the search not only for a 
positive explanation of how such differen t  diverse systems came to 
have similar legal rules and/or institutions. but also the natural 
question of how the same or similar legal rules could persist in 
diverse economic systems. 
Economics provides a rigorous positive and normative frame­
work to explain and evaluate legal systems across nations and fed­
erations. In this article, we describe the evolution and key features 
of the centralized environmental regulatory systems that emerged 
in both the United States and Europe during the latter half of the 
twentieth century. We then apply insights from the positive eco­
nomic analysis of regulatory cen tralization to explain a striking 
paradox found in regimes: that both systems have adopted central­
ized regulations not as a solution for transboundary pollution 
(inter-jurisdictional externalities), but rather for pollution that is 
primarily local. Drawing from recent economic work on regulatory 
federalism, we argue that fundamental political-economic i ncen­
tives account for the otherwise economically counter-intuitive 
focus of such federal environmental regulation on pollution 
problems that are largely intra-jurisdictional. Furthermore, we 
argue that centralized environmental regulation has had such a 
paradoxical focus on essentially local environmental problems. 
instead of evolving in  response to global problems as one might 
assume. because there are inherent pres ures for regional protec­
tionism and redistribution within a political system. 
Of course. normative public finance theory supplies economic 
justifications for environmental regulatory centralization other 
than transhoundary pollution.  One of these is the race-to-the-hot­
tom story, which describes situations in which jurisdictions may fail 
to set locally optimal pollution standards because they are "'racing" 
to attract mobile capital. We survey recent theoretical and empiri­
cal wurk on the race-to-the-bottom story, and then apply norma­
tive economics to develop insight in to the relative nonnative 
desirability of environmental regulatory centralization in the 
United St ates versus Europe. While we believe that the relatively 
k�s centralized European system may have economic justification, 
the enlarge ment and increased economic integration of Europe 
raises some interesting questions about the value of environmental 
centralization policies, including normative questions regarding the 
2 1 0  Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 27:205 
desirability of centralized European environmental regulation.' 
and positive questions regarding the future of European environ­
mental law. 
In comparing environmental policy in the United States with 
environmental policy in the European Union (EU), we recognize 
that, in the words of one leading author, ''the European Union ... 
does not enjoy the prerogatives of a state: it may act only where it 
has been expressly so authorised by the [Maastricht] Treaty [that 
created the EU]." so the comparison is not entirely apples-to­
apples.·� Nevertheless, we do not view this fundamental difference 
-the retention of full sovereign status by the Member States of the 
EU- as something that precludes comparative analysis.5 but rather 
as a crucial factor in both explaining and evaluating the efficiency 
of environmental regulatory centralization. For example. because 
EU Member States are sovereign nations with distinct cultures and 
languages. there have been, until very recently. substantial barriers 
to mobility of capital, labor. and residency within the EU that do 
not exist in the U.S. Based on the race-to-the-bottom theory. the 
existence of such barriers significantly weakens the case for envi­
ronmental regulatory centralization. Similarly. to the extent that 
European nations have greatly divergent national preferences over 
the "·environmental protection versus development" tracleoi'L the 
case for environmental regulatory centralization is significantly 
weakened relative to the U.S., where there exists at the very least 
strong regional similarities in environmental preferences. Hence. if 
the retention of sovereignty by EU Member States has entailed 
relatively less effective environmental regulatory centralization 
than in the U.S .. it may be more efficient from the point of view of 
having environmental policies that reflect citizen preferences. 
\Ve do nut write on a blank slate. Existing work has compared 
environmental policy in Europe and the U.S .. '' and compared envi-
·' Our analvsis here is thus consistent with previous works 111 law ;1nJ eu>nc•mtc:-. :trgutng 
th:tl far t<>o much :tulhority has been allucated to the Eurclpcan level nwre than would he 
neccossary to cure transhnundarv externalities. See Roger Van den Bergh. /he .\uh.l;dwrir•: 
Principle 111 European Em·irunmenlal Lmv: An Fcnnomic llna!rsis. in L.,,, .·''' 1 '  F< 'lN• >\I 
1< s ,,,. !IlL [:-;vJI«lN\JLNI l21 (Ehrling Eidc & Roger Van Jen 13c:rgh c:ds. i'!'ih). 
•1 l.udwig Kr;imer. Thirrr Years of EC £n,·ironmeniaf La11·: /'crspcuivn ,:nd /',·r·'P•'< til·,··'· 
2 T111 YJ:,\l{IHHlK \ll E1 RuPb\N E·:N'.IIZON\If,N!O\L L\W 155 (2002). 
' l1nlikc Kr:i111er. supra note 4. therdur�·. who has �aid that because the F.U is not :1 
staW . .. Any compari:-nn with domestic environmental law in the �kmher Statc·s. or with 
that of the USA is therefore necessarily mi:;leading ... 
h .\et'. e.g .. CfHLL:N CitANTS'! ENVII..tU!'.:\li·.�·t .. \L P{>uc·tt·s ,_q- trn .. LJ,rll·f) St.-\il� .--\'�P 
ill!. EI·J{oi'L\'- LiNI<lN (Norman .l. Vig & Michad G. Faure cds .. . 200-l): F:, KH.\I<Il 
R1 Hill"-' JLH & Rt• 1 1.\Hil s·, EW,\Hil. E'.vm• '"·'nsr..\L PR', 11 1 ·1,, ,N p," j( , l 1 qss ) : s. �.," 
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ronmental federalism in both locations generally.7 Moreover, 
political scientists have attempted to identify the reasons for differ­
ences in E uropean versus American environmental federalism." 
These previous works differ from ours fundamentally, in that they 
do not systematically apply both positive and normative economic 
analysis. Our approach allows us to identify the likely political­
economic origins of fundamental differences between the Euro­
pean and the American systems. to normatively evaluate the rela­
tive degree of regulatory centralization in Europe versus the U.S .. 
and to make some tentative predictions about the impact of Euro­
pean political and economic integration on future changes to Euro­
pean environm ental law . 
I n  the second part of this article, we highlight similarities and 
differences between the central features of American and Euro­
pean environmental laws and regulations, paying attention to the 
division of authority between the central authority and the Mem­
ber States. In the third part of this article. \Ve provide the appro­
priate l aw a n d  economics background for our analysis by reviewing 
the economic literature with respect to environmental federalism, 
a n d  drawing some normative and positive conclusions from that 
body of work. In the fourth part, we apply the relevant economics 
to explain and evaluate differences and similarities in European 
versus U.S. envi ronm e nta l law, and to make some tentative predic­
tions about the future path of European environmental l a>v. 
Finally. in our conc l uding remarks, we address the fundamental 
normative issue of huw the European and American systems effec-
R1 ,,,-._\, 1-:1 f{\1 v '· ( ·, 1.'-' 1 ;,, •u L'-'•; F'' lR< >NMI'0 LvL p, n 1c Y: Tille LIMITS uF Puuuc L'w 
10 (iLi''-t,\'C\ \c-IJ Jill !.''.lilT> S1.vns (l\195). For a critical appraisal of U.S. environ­
mc:nt;d p<llin froill :t European perspective. sec Ludwig Kr�imer. The Routes of Diver­
gence: .-\ Fun>J!i'illi 1'.-r<fJCOitc. 111 GRLLN GIAI"Ts'' Fl"VIR<l�'<\li·NT.\1 Pnunrc,; or TilL' 
l''-'111- I J  St vii:-. \'.;D THE E1 R<ll'L,\N U'-'1<>0. supra. at 53. 
• .\'re. e. . Cic<'rgc A fkrmann. Tiil-;ing Suhsidiarin· Seriously· Fi·dcralism in rite Euro· 
;wan CntnJillillit\ .md the /;'nlf(:d Srmes. Y4 C"U'tvL L RFv .'\.\1 ( IY94): Denis J. Edwards. 
/-(•a ring Fi·dera!ism \ Fiulure. Suh.,idiaritv in the Eumpean Uninn. 44 AM. J. 0 >MI'. L. ).'\7 
(I 9')6 ) : !-':lUI D. \hrqu:trdt. .\u!Jsidiaritv and Sol'creignrv in rhc European Union. 1 K F< >RI>­
IIc\\.·1 J:..: 1'1 LJ. 61h ( )')t)4). For general comparisons of federalism in the United States and 
in Europe. o;cc· abc> C\i(>!l:J J. M. K11nhcr. A Comparison of Environmenrnl Fi!dera/ism in 
rhe Uni!t'd S!u!C.I und rile F.'umpcan Union. )4 MIL L R1-v. lbSK ( 1995): Koen Lc·nac·rts. 
/he l'rinnple o( Suhsidiunt1 and rhe Enl'imnmelll in rite European Union: Keeping rhe 
Lia!ancc uf h·d,•rali.•m. 17 roRiliJ.\\.1 lNr'l. LJ. K-16 (1994). 
' 5<'<-' R. D;miel Kelemen. F.'l;t·ironmentnl Fedaa!ism in liw Uniret! Swres antl!he l:::uro­
{J<'<II! Union. in G1'1 r:-.: (iJ,\''Is·: ENVII«>NI>.!ENTAL PounFs OF'II!I· UN!TFD ST.\TLS ,\ND 
rill' Et '" >1'1 , ., li'-'1<>0 . .>Upm note 6. at 1 13: R. D.vNIEL K I'CF\IEN. ·ritE Rc:t.LS Ot· Fun-R­
\1 h\1: h·>�llt 11>�0, ·"I' Ru<� IA!o!ZY f>ouTtcs IN 1111' EU ANI> RFYONn (2004): R. 
Danic·l K<:Ic·mcn. Fl.,·.�u!aron h•tf,·ralism: EU Environmcnral Regufarion in Comrwmlil'<' 
Perspnin e. 2U J. p, H. p, >I·, Ln-67 ( .?000) [hereinafter Kelemen. Regu!morv Fedcrulismj. 
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tively balance the costs and benefits of environmental protection 
measures. 
2. SJMILARJTJES AND DIFFERENCES IN THE KEY FEATURES OF 
AMERICAN vs. EuROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND REGULATION. 
2.1. European vs. American Paths to Centralization 
During the 1970's - dubbed the "Environmenta l  Decade" - what 
has been called a '"new· environmentalism" arose i n  the Un i ted 
States.'> At its core, it was a new and massive federal pollution 
control regulatory structure.10 To many people. American environ­
mental regulation means federal environmental regulation . I n  
t urni ng to Congress rather than the states. environmentalists of the 
1960s and 1970s were simply reilecting the dominant view about 
federal-state relations that prevailed from 1945 until 19RO: that any 
serious change in policy could only occur through actions by the 
federal government.11 In this preference for federal action. 
environmentalism was hut another form of what may be called 
Regulatory Centralism - the view that i n  any hierarchical govern­
mental system. the regulatory ideal  is to transfer as much authority 
as  possible to the highest level of government. 
American environmentalists enjoyed unprecedented success i n  
passing environmental laws. For those accustomed to legislative 
gridlock, it is worth recalling that within just a few years. Congress 
passed the National Environmental Policy Act.12 the Clean Air 
Amendments, 11 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend­
ments.'·' the Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act.15 the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 the Noise Control Act, 17 the 
" R< H<ER r Go ITLIEIJ. FnRCINCi IIIIC SI'R!Nfi: TilE TR,\;o.;SH >R.Mr\TI<JN < .>I· THE A�tUUL\N 
[;o.;VIRUN.\IEN!Al. 'v!tl'.-E\11·;-..:T l-!X-..\9 ( J<)<)_l). 
1" lrl. at I )7. 
II As ..:nvironmental historian Samuel P. 1-Iayt:s has said. when it carne Io air and water 
standards ... envimnmentalists were convinced th<ll slate and local gov. :rnments wert.: unr..:­
liable . . . Hence th..:y chusc to usc the federal government for Ievcrage against the 
; tatc:s.·· Samuel P. Hay>. Tlte Polirics of l:"ln·ironmt'nlul Administration. in T11r: NLw A,\!f R­
IC.·\;-.; STJ\IT.: Bt11{1·,\I'<"R.-\( II-'S ·'·"" Plll.Wil:s SINCE Wu!U.D \V.-\R 21. ..\..\ rLouis (ialamhos 
cd . . 19X7) 
12 Puh. L. i'h lJl-191!. X.' Stat. 852 (l<J70). 
L\ Pub. l.. Nu. 'Jl-61l-+. X..\ Stat. lo76 (l<J70). 
t-1 Pub L. Nc>. 'J2-500. 86 Stat. Xl6 ( 1972 ) . 
t' Pub. L. N(\. 92-516. S6 Stat. 973 ( l <)72). 
''' Pub. L. No. 92-5:22. 86 Stat. lll27 r ICJ72). 
!7 Pub. L. Nu. 92-57..\. R6 Stat. 1 :23..\ ( 1972). 
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Coast a l  Zone M an age me n t A c t � >' and t he E ndangered S pecie s  A c t  
of l l)73. 1 "  l t  i s  fa i r  to say t h a t  ! '>ven ty-fi rst  cen tu ry A m e rican envi­
ron me n t a l  law is p r i m a r i ly fede ral. But t h is i s  not  to say that a l l  
federal en v i ro n me nta l regu l a to ry sche mes a re t h e  s a m e .  There i s  
s ign i fican t  var iation a m o n g  t he various federal statutes. and va ria­
t i on too i n  t h e  court  · role i n  de t e rm i n in g  how e n vi ro n m e n t a l  regu­
latory federa lizat ion has p layed o u t .  J ndeed,  the role of the courts 
in i-\ n1erican env i ronmenta l  federalization hJs been paradox ica l :  
on t he one h a n d .  the cou rts h a ve been a n  i m porta n t  forum for ci t i ­
ze n p a rt i c i pa t ion i n  fede r a l i ze d  A m e rica n e nv i ro n m e n t a l  govern­
ance d ue to c itizen suit  prov i s ions in  the s t a t utes :  o n  t he LH h e r  
h a n d .  the cou rts  h ave ac t i ve l y  e nc o u raged env i ronmenta l  fed e ra l i ­
z a t i o n  e v e n  a t  t h e  expe nse o f  s t a t e  a n d  l oca l regu l a t i t H1S  t h a t  m ay 
have more effec t i v e l y  p Hnect c d  t h e  e nv i ro n m e n t. 
As i n  t h e  U n i te d  S t a tes .  many E uropean cnvir�rnmenta l  l aws 
were e n ac t e d  i n  t he l i.J70s . .co Howeve r .  at t he l e v e l  of t h e  E u ro p e a n  
Com m u n i ty ( EC ) , there w a s  a s  yet  no for m a l  l e g a l  a u th o r i t y ,  or  
com pe tence .  to  i ssue e n v i ron m e n t a l  reg u l < l t o ry meas u res.  E ven t u­
a l l y . t h e  E uropean Co m m i ss i o n  fou nd t h e  a u t h or i t y  fur e n vi ro n ­
m e n t a l  regu l ati on i n  A rt i c le s  lOO a n d  235 o f  t h e E u ropean 
Eco n o m ic Com mun i ty  ( E EC )  Tn: a ty . 2 1 A rt icle I 00 a l lowed for 
European measures to h a r m o n ize n a t i o n a l  le gis la t i o n i n  order  to 
re mo ve o r  preve n t  b a rr i e rs for t he i n ternal  m a r k e t .  A rt i c l e  2�:\ t u  
the  cont r a ry. w a s  t he ( l i m i te d ) kga l basis fo r iss u i n g legi s l a t i on 
\V i t h  a ' "pure "  e n v i ron m e n ta l  g1)a l .  s t at ing t h a t  i f  act i o n  by t he 
Com m u n i t y  s h l ) u l d  prove necessa ry t o  obta i n  one o f  t h e  object ives 
of the Com m u n i t y . a n d  t h e  Tn: a t y  has not p ro\ i d ed t he necessary 
powe rs . t h e n  Th...: Cou nc i l ·: � s h a l l .  o n  a proposa l from t h e  Com m is­
sion n n d  after consu lting t he E u ro pe a n  Parl i a m e n t. take t h e  a p p ro­
pr iate m e asures.  The E u ropea n Cuurt  o f  J ust ice ( [('J )  bro<l d l y  
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i nterpreted Artic le 235 i n  1 9R5. stat ing that  e nviron mental  protec­
tion is one of t he Com m u n ity's essen t i a l  object ives.�-' H owever. i t  
was only  with t h e  e n t ry i nto force o f  the S in gle  E uropean Act i n  
1 987 t h a t  the EEC Treaty was revised t o  i nc l ude p rovis ions2·1 t h a t  
specifical ly  a u thorized t h e  E C  to promulgate  e nvironmental  d i rec­
t i ves.25 S in ce t h e n ,  t he European a ut horit ies h ave i ncreas ing ly  
used t h e  competences gra nte d  t o  them by these Art ic les  to i ssue a 
great m a ny d i rectives w i t h  respect to environm e n t a l  pol icy. 
2.2. States vs. Nations: American Cooperative Federali:mJ, 
European Community Federalism 
22. 1 .  U.S. Cooperative Federalism 
The American syst e m  of fede ral envi ronm e n ta l  regu l a t i o n  does 
not  complete ly  d isplace state regu lat ion .  Rathe r, in the A m e ri c a n  
system, regulators at  t h e  fede ra l  E n v i ron m e n ta l  Protect ion A ge n cy 
( E PA )  set  m i n i m u m ,  technology-based e mission standards,26 and 
state regulators then genera l l y  assume the a uthor i ty  to  i mp l e m e n t  
g e n e r a l  standards by writ ing p lant-speci fic perm i ts.  and to moni tor 
and enforce comp l i ance w i th pe rm i t  terms.  A l though t he re a re 
i m port a n t  except ions ,27 for the  most p art. s tates are free to set state 
e m ission standards that  a re even tougher  than federa l  standards:'8 
Furth ermore, in t rans la t ing  nat ion a l  stan d ards i n to s i te-speci f ic 
pe rmits .  states are o ften l egall y  a l lowed to give more we i g h t  t o  t h e  
cost o f  com p l iance t h a n  a re federa l  reg u lators. ·"' However. state 
2.\ Case 240/83 A D B H U  ( 1 985) E C R  531 .  For a comme n t a ry. sec J"" H. J .-\ >,;s & HA>,;s 
H. B .  VEDDEK,  Et  i K<H'EAN El'VIR ON\l El"T-\ L LAW 5-6 (2008). 
24 EC Treaty arts. I JOR-T 
25 ·n1esc provisions h ave since be<:n ren u mbered. See EC ·rrc·aty ar ts .  l 74- ·7n. 
2<J ll1c purest example of  t h is system of regu lat ion is  fou n d  under the Clean Water i\cL 
For a d iscussion. see Jason Scu t t  Johnston. Tradable Po/lwion Permits and 1he Rcgulnwn 
Game. in McJVING ro iVL\ RKFTs IN E"V IR <  >N:>t ENTAL Rr:r;t " L Ann-.: ·'�3 .  :'\)S . .)'il) ( Jody 
Freeman & Charles D .  Kolstad eds . . 2007 J .  
27 Perhaps most pro m i n e n t ly. emission l i m i ts for  mobi l e  sources u nder the Clean Air 
Act are n a t ional ly u n i form. except t h a t  Ca l i forn i a  can set tougher standards under cer t a i n  
c i rc u mstances i f  given a waive r  by t he E PA .  i n  which case other  states may fol low C a l i for­
n ia 's  s tandards. Sec RJcJ L\RD L REvEsz. E N vt R<lN:<.tENTAL L;w AND Poucy 3 1 4. 4:'3 
( 2008 ) .  
2s  For example.  states may se t water-q u a l i ty based effluent  l i m i t s  tha t  <trc· tuugher than 
u n i form federal tchnology-basecl effluent l i m i ts. See U S  Steel  Corp .  v. Train. 556 F.2d 822 
( 7 t h  Cir. 1 977), and may set ambient  air q u a l i t y  standards that  a rc more str ingcn t  t h a n  
federal N at ional A m b i e n t  A i r  Q u a l i t y  Standards. See U nion E lcc . Co. v. E PA.  427 U S  
246 ( 1 976). 
29 Th is is true, for example. under the Clean Air Act. a stat ute that .  according to t h e  
U.S.  Supreme Court. gives to t h e  statcs t h e  " i n i t ia l  a n d  pr imary rcsponsibil i t y  for deciding 
what  emissions reductions w i l l  be required from wh ich sources." Whitman v. Am. Trucki n g  
Ass'ns. 5 3 1  U.S. 4 5 7  (200 1 ) , a responsibi l i ty t ha t  m akes s t a t e  environment a l  agencies the  
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e nvironmen t�1l regulators can be overridden by the  fed e r a l  E PA .  
b o t h  i n  sett ing perm i t  terms for part icular  p l an ts. a n d  facil it i es,10 
and in the ir  e n forcement  decisions.3 1 
Al though states are given regul atory authority b y  federal  e nvi­
ronmental  s tatutes,  i n  a few instances, t hrough judicial  i n t e rp r e t a­
t i o n ,  the  p assage o f  federal  environme nta l  legis lation has  d irect l y  
d i m in ished t h e  role  of  state l a w  i n  t h e  e n vironm e n ta l  are a .  I n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  interstate w a t e r  pol lut ion,  the  S upreme Court he ld  that  the  
p assage of  t h e  federal Clean Water Act  pre-e mpted b o t h  the  fed­
e ra l  and state common law o f  i nterstate water  pollut ion .-'2 As 
i nterpreted by the d issen t i ng j us tices i n  the first o f  t hese cases, lv!il­
waukee v. Illinois, t he Court made i t  imposs ib le for sta tes 'vvi th  
strict water q u a lity s tan dards to req uire neighboring states ·  pol­
l uters who d ischarged i nto shared,  i n terstate waterways to comply 
with  t hose same standards; instead.  t h e  Court i ndicated t h a t  states  
only needed to require their  pol luters to m e e t  federal ,  technology­
b ased water pol lut ion standards u n less the p o U u ters · home states 
require d  more .'·' 
Perhaps the most tro u bl i n g  example of j udic ia l  preem p t i on of 
state and l oc a l  e nviron menta l  regulat ion comes in t h e  area o f  n oise 
pollut ion.  The federal Noise Control Act (NCA ) gave the federal  
E PA power t o  regul a t e  a vast  a rray o f  m a n u factured products, t o  
require labe l i ng for noisy consumer goods, a s  wel l  a s  a u thorized 
e n forceme n t  mechanisms from ci t ize n su i ts to cri m i n a l  p rosec u t ion 
and f ines. '·1 The legis l a ti o n  had the potent i a l  to  change m a n u fac­
t ur i ng s tandards for products in a broad range o f  i nd ustr ies,  includ­
ing a v i ation . rai l roads.  trucking. motorcyc l es .  a utomobi les .  
i nd ustr ia l  equipment.  and home and workp lace a p p liances:'" 
. .  most i m porta n t  forum for coosiJerat iGn of claims (l[ econ omic anJ technological 
i n feasi b i l i ty.'· U nion Elec. Co. v.  E PA. supra n ote 28. 
·'0 See ,-\ I aska Dep·l of Envt !. Conservat ion v. E PA. 540 U .S. 46 1 (2004) ( i n vo l v i ng t h e  
feJeral E PA ·s reject ion of the s t a t e  nf Alaska's chosen pol l ut ion control tcchnologv for 
generator used in  m i n ing).  
-
'� The federal EPA h ;s the auth ority to i n i t ia te  e n forcement action on !ls own when i t  
bel ieves that  st ates have fai led t o  take aclequatt: e n f(lrcement st eps . See Harmon I ndus. v .  
B rowner. ! 9 1  F.3d Xl)..\ (Sth C i r .  1 990 ) . 
. '1 Set> [nt  ·1 Paper Co. ' . Ouel let te .  470 U . S  . ..\;:)1 ( l lJS7): City ol \I i i  waukee v. I ll inois . ..\5 1 
U.S.  304 ( l lJ8 1 ) . 
·' '  See genemllv C i t y  <lf Milwaukee. supra note 32. 
q 42 U.S.C. §§  49U 1 el seq. ( 1 972 ): see al.w Jason A. Lief. insuring Domestic Tranquitin· 
Through Quietrr f>rvducrs: A Pmposed Product-Nui.\anct• 7iJrf, 1 6  C-'< 1-WOzo L. REv.  595. 
62 1 ( 1 '!9..\ ) . 
. '.; Set· 42 U.S.  C. § 49Ul ( b) (2000) (authorizing "the cstahlishmerH of federal noise em is· 
sion standards for products distribu teJ in commerce") :  id. § 4905( a )( l ) (A) ( requir ing rqw­
Jat ions for products classified as a " major sourc.: of  noise' ') .  For a ircra ft.  the NCA 
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These standards were nat ional  standards which expl ic i t ly  prec l uded 
state and local regulations of manufactured products that were not 
" ident ica l '' to federal ru les.36 Local rules ostensib ly  were sti l l  per­
mi t ted to regulate l i censing, use ,  and movement  of these products 
to  control environmenta l  noise.37 
The E PA,  however, promulgated very few noise emiss ion stan­
dards, and the few that were approved merely cod i fied the s tatus 
quo without imposing str icter standards.38 Congress reacted by 
passing the Quie t Communities Act of 1 978, a law t hat authorized 
grants for state and local noise con trol  programs.39 This very mod­
est start to federa l  noise regu lation abrupt ly  ended, however, when 
in 1 98 1  the Noise Control Act was "effectively gutted" by the 
Office of Management and B udget ' s  decision to terminate funding 
for EPA 's Office of  Noise Abatement and Control .40 The decision 
to phase out NCA activities was based on a ' 'detem1 i nation tha t  
the benefi ts of  noise control are highly local ized ami that the  func­
tion of noise control can be adequatel y  carried o ut at the State and 
local level .  "4 1 
Thi s  apparent  return to  state and local regul at ion , however, was 
undone by impl i ed preemption. The federal NCA may have no 
funding,  but  it remains on the  books. and in  City of Burbank v. 
Lockheed Air Terminal Inc. , t he S upreme Court quoted from the 
legis lat ive h istory of that law in ho ld ing that  ·' [s ) tates and local  gov­
ernments are preempted from estab l ish ing or enforcing noise emis­
s ion standards . . .  u nless such standards are identical to standards 
prescribed in the b i l l . "42 As one commentator predicted in 1 98 1 ,  
t he end result o f  such j udicial statutory in terpretat ion has been that  
proviJed for joint cont rol over regulat ions between the EPA a n d  t he FA A .  w i t h  the FA A 
reta i n ing power to reject E PA reguhll ions. which they did freq u e n t ly. See John J. Jenkins 
Jr . .  The A irpon Noise and Capaciry Act of 1()1)0: !las Congress Finally Solved 1he A ircrafi 
Noisl:' Probll:'m ?.  59 J .  Am L. & Coi'-1. 1 ()'23 ( l lJ9.:1). 
'" -+2 U .S C. � 4905 ( e )( l )( A )  (2000) . 
. '7 ld § ..!905(e)(2). 
:Is Sa CoMM. ON ENv·T & Pt;u. \YORKS. ExTENT > IN< ;  ., H E  Notsf. C< )NTROL Acr: 
R EP<WT ( To Acn.lMP.-\ N Y  S. 1 �80) .  S. R E I'. No. 98-l'\6, a t  I ( I W\3) [hen.:i na ftc-r ExTF:O.DING 
THE N< HS E  CoNTROL Acrl;  see also U.S. Gu,· ·T Au:ou:--: rt:->G OrTitT. Nnts!· P< >LU 'TI< '" :  
fEDl'HAL PRut; R,\1\f To CoNTROL IT H .--..s BEE'> Su " v  .·\ N L>  lNHFEl TIVE. CE D-77--12 ( Mar. 
1 9 77 ) .  ovailab/1:' ar h ttp:/iarchive.gao.gov/f ! l  02a/ I 00237 .pdf ( in four years. E PA issueJ only 
four regulat ions deal ing with products ). 
"1 See Aaron C. Dun lap. Com� 011 FN!i the Noise: The Problem with Municipal Noise 
Rcgularion. 15 U. M IAMI B us. L. REv. 47. 59 ( 2006 ) .  
� 0  See it!. at  AU . 
. n See ExrENDIN\; THE NoisE CuNTRuL Acr. supra note 3�. at 2. 
42 City of Burbank v. Lockheed A i r  Terminal I n c  .. -I l l U.S.  624. 634 ( 1 973 ) .  
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'·the curre nt [federal] regulat ions apparently wil l  go une nforce d .  
but local authorities wil l b e  prevented from stepping i n .  · · ·L' 
2.2.2. European tVationa! Implementation 
U n l ike the U.S. ,  European · 'states'' are sovere i gn nations. and in 
Europe today substantial e nvironmental regulatory aut hority 
remains with the Membe r  States. U nder the so-cal led p ri nciple  of  
attribution , European ins t i tutions' powers e xtend o n l y  as far as has 
been expressly confirme d  by the t reaty.44 Despite this principl e ,  
t he powe r o f  t h e  European bureaucracy ( that i s ,  the European 
Comm ission )  has steadi ly increased a n d  led to a steady shift of 
environmen ta l  regulatory competences to the E u rope a n  level .4� 
[ ndccd, a large portion of  domestic e nviron mental l aw in the Mem­
ber States today is effectively European J aw.  and consists of Euro­
pean e nvironmental directives which h ave been imple mented 
(transposed) into national law:-H' For e x amp le . sixty-six perce nt of  
e nvi ronmen t al law i n  t h e  Net her lands i s  based on E uropean direc­
tives a nd regulations:17 As Europea n  e nvironme ntal law is effec­
tive on ly indirectly th rough Member State environme ntal l aws 
which h a ve come into be i ng or been revised to meet E uropean 
s t a n dards,48 t he actual  s trength of European e nviro n m e n tal  law 
also crucial l y  depends upon the e n forcement o f  E C  e nvi ronmental 
l aw by that  Member Sta te . 4l) St i l l . in  the landmark Froncovich case 
of N ove m ber 1 9 , 199 1 .  the E CJ h e l d  that unde r ce rtain circum­
stances. citizens who have suffered damage as a result of a l ack of 
i mp l e mentation by a M e m ber State can be entitl ed to compensa-
"' See f:PA Wi£hdru"·al frum Noi.\t: Rules Would Le,n·c Loud (;up. N a t · !  J. Ma!!azinc 
( J une U. ! 'IS ! ) .  ul'llilabl.: ut h t tp : i/www.n�l tion aljournal .cum/nJ magazi nc/n j _ l 9S 10 6 U  _ _  l 2 .  
php.  
-'-' .. The Com m u n i t y  shal l  ;_h:t  w i th i n  the l i mi t s  of the powers conferred upon i t  bv t h is 
t reaty and l)[ t he objectives assigned to it the re in . . .  EC Treatv art . .'i Se.: olsu J .. , ;-.; s  & 
V u>DER. Sllpru llt.)tt: 2323. at JU- 1 3. 
�' On t h e  increasing shift of cnrnpetenci..:s for the environmental pol icy tu t he E urnpc a n  
\cve l .  sec J ANs  & Vr'DDEI<. supra not..: 23::!3. at  3-9. 
"6 In addi t ion ro direct ivc·s. E u ropean law can abo consist of rcg uli! ! i tms which a n: 
di rcct l v  applicable. As L 1 r  a' regula tions :1re concerned. the re is hence� kss of :m imple­
men t a t ion problem. However. t he pr imary inst rumen t < > f  envi ronmen t a l  l a w and policv is  
s td l  the· Jirecl i v c. Scr.· J ,\."S L'<.: VFVlJER. supra note :.12.1. a l  127. 
·17 Wyhe Th . Douma <.: I  a l . .  Eurupese in doed up regef;<.:1·ing JJI<'t'i/JIIar / Eurupmn In flu­
ence 011 Legisluti<m Can Be i'v/easun:dj. 29 N EDERl.A:"LlS J l i R IS i l:" BL\D I R2S ( !.0{)7 ) .  
" '  I n  t h e:  worJs o f  Jans a n d  VeJJcr: ·· ·From a kgal puin c  of vi..: w. once n a r innal impk­
men t i ng legislat ion has en tered i n t o  force. the d irect ive i s .  i n  gen<.:ral. Jh' longer uf i n te r ·  
est. .. J ANS & V EUDFH.  supra note 2323. at 1 29. 
�·1 ;\Luw CC>mmentators llescribe dom�·stic enforcement  as tou wea� S,·e Krii mcr. supra 
rwtt: 4. : 1t  l 7R--S2. 
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t ion for th is  damage by the  Member State concerned.5" For Mem­
ber States that  do no t  implement E U  law, the  Francovich decision  
creates a form o f  potent ia l  l iab i l i ty  t ha t  goes fa r beyond t he  const i ­
t ut ional ly permissib le  l iab i l i ty  of  American s ta tes.5 1 
Even more sign i ficant i s  the principle of direct e ffect ,  accord ing 
to which any ci t izen can i nvoke European l aw on his  beha l f, even i f  
he is cha l lenging the pol icies of  h is  own Member State .  [ f  the 
Member State fails t o  im plement t h e  EU directive within t h e  
required t ime,  and the  provisions o f  the d i rective are uncondit iona l  
and suffic ient ly precise, an  i ndividual  can direct ly invoke the d irec­
t ive's provisions, which then takes priori ty over nat ional  law.52 I n  
subsequent decisions, the ECJ has used t he  principle o f  d i rect  
e ffect as basis for  enforceable sanctions against  Member S tates .  A 
few years l ater. the  ECJ i mposed a financi a l  pena l ty on Greece for 
fai ling to take necessary measures to comply wi t h  an ear l ier E CJ 
judgment o f  1 992.:�3 The direct e ffect principle a lso exerted i n flu­
e nce upon a Septembe r  2005 decision, whereby the ECJ held t ha t  
d irectives can inc lude an obligation for Member States to crimi ­
na l ly sanct ion non-compl iance wi th  domestic legis lat ion tha t  imple­
ments a E uropea n  direct ive .5� 
Although many such decisions could be viewed as evidence tha t  
t he  ECJ h as at tempted to further sh i ft regulatory au thori ty to  t he 
Eur opean leve l ,  we again emphasize that  European law ( un like 
federal law in  the U.S . )  is not d i rect ly enforceable against c i tizens 
or enterprises. E uropean law operates, as far as d irectives are con­
cerned, only via implementat ion by the Member Sta tes/' This fol­
lows from the division o f  competences in  the E U ,  \vhereby the EU 
'"  Joined Cases C-6 & C-LJNO, Francov ich v. I ta ly. l LJLJ l E.C.R.  1-5357. 
'! I ndeed. in Seminllk Tribe llt Florida v. Florida. 5 1 7  U.S. -1-1 ( l LJLJh). the t.: .s .  Supreme 
Court  he ld  that Congress cannot a l ter  the states' i m m u n i ty frum suit  by private ci t izens 
that is gra nted by the Ek:vcnth Amcndmenl of the U.S. Consti tut ion.  u n less i t  makes ils 
i n tent io n  to th) so .. u nm istakeably ckar .. in  !he language of t ht.: stat u te .  
52 The pri nciple emerged i n  I %3 from the  ECJ 's holding i n  the wel l -known Hill Cend & 
l.ooy c;1se t h a t  ! h e  E u ropean Com m unity conslitutes a new legal order which conkrs righ ls 
not only 10 the  Member States. b u t  also to their cit izens. Cast: 26/62. N. V.  Algemenc 
Transp<>rt- L�n Expedit ie  O ndt.:rm:ming van G e nd & Loos v .  Neth. I n land Revenue Admin . .  
1 963 E.C. R .  3.  The q ut.:stion whether indiv idual  rights could be fuu n d  d i rectly i n  Commu­
nily hi\v was.  according to the court . dependent solely u po n  the con te n ts and wording  of 
the E uropean legislation concerned. with nationa l  legislation playin g  n o  role in t his q ues­
t ion. /d. 
53 Case C-387i97, C:omm·n v. Greece. 2000 E.C.R.  1-50-17 ( J u ly -1, 200\J) .  
5-l Case C-1 76103. C:omm'n v. Counci l  (Sepr.  13 .  2005 ) .  
'' According to art ic le  2-ILJ of the EC Treaty. a direct ive is aLldrcsscd Ill and binding for 
the Member  States but it does not d i rectly resul!  in obl igations for privale individu a ls. 
L;NS & VEDDER.  supra note 2323 at  1 x9. 
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is primarily responsibl e  for the formulation of  the rules, while 
M e m be r  S tates are responsible for t h e  rules'  i m p l e m e n t a t i on and 
e n force m e n t.51' Hen ce ,  the E CJ 's case l aw is l a rgel y  on ly  a n  
at tempt  t o  guara n t e e  e ffect ive e n forcem e n t  o f  E uropean law 
aga i nst  the M e mber S ta tes, for example by sanct ioning their  l ac k  o f  
implementat ion.  The prim ary decision t o  s h i ft powers t o  t h e  Euro­
pean leve l  w i t h  respect to a part icular  topic is  undertaken by t h e  
E urope a n  legis l ator, i .e . ,  t h e  E u ropean Parli a m e n t ,  t h e  E u ropean 
Comm ission,  and the Coun ci l o f  Ministers.57 Wit h i n  this s t ructure 
of competences t h e  role of t h e  ECJ is t o  guaran tee t h a t  s t ric t  rules  
set  by B russels  a re a lso i mp l e m e n te d  b y  the Member Stat es.5" 
One might  be tempted to analogize t h e  j udic ia l  pre-e mpt ion o f  
state  a n d  local environ m e n ta l  regulat ion i n  t h e  U . S .  t o  t h e  E CJ 's 
role i n t h e  s hift ing o f  e n v i ron menta l  com pet ences to E ur opean 
central a ut horit ies.  1 t  i s  t rue t h a t  a fter  a E u ropean d irect ive h as 
dealt  w i t h  a ce rtai n m at t e r  ( fo r  example ,  s h i p m e n t  o f  hazardous 
wastes ) ,  n a t i o n a l  M e m be r  S t a tes not only have a n  ob l igat ion to 
adopt t he i r  environm e n t al l a ws to the con te n ts of  the d i rect ive,  b u t  
- u nless t he d irect ive spec i fical ly  p rovides o t h e rwise - Member 
States  actu a l l y  l ose t he power to take i ndepe n d e n t  lega l  act ion w i t h  
respect  t o  t h a t  s a m e  area.  Th us, b y  regula t ing  a cert a i n  subject  
matter  a t  the E uropean l e ve L E u rope i n  fact pre-empts t h a t  part ic­
u la r  issue.59 
Hl1wever.  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  A m e rican doctii ne o f  i m p l ied pre-e m p­
tion,  if t h e  ECJ fin ds t h a t  t he are a  concerned h as not  been regu­
l ated by a E urope a n  d i rect i ve i n  an exhaust ive manne r,';o then a 
'" s�,· Luke \V. G oodr ich . lmp!ememing Environnl.l'nw! La�<· in 1he Eurupean Union: 
Lessons from 1he B111hing Wafer Direcrive. l t'i G Fo. l NT.L ENVtL. L. RE \. .  3U I ( :?.004 ) :  Kele­
m e n .  Rfgu!arorv Federalism. supra not e 0. at 1 53. 
57 Accord i ng to Jrticle 2.:!<) of the EC: Treaty. the E uropea n  Parli a men t  act i n g  Jl > int ly 
with th.: Counci l  u nd the Commission shall make regulat ion s  anJ i ssue di rect ives. take 
decisions. make recommendations or dL'li ver opin ions . 
'� .According to article 220 of the EC ·rrea ty .  the Court of Just ice and the Court of First 
Instance. each wi th in  i ts j urisdiction. shal  ensure that  in  the i n terpretat ion anJ applica tiLm 
of the Treaty the law is observed. Hence the Commission can bring a case before t h e  
Court  l > l' Just ice i f  i t  considers t h a t  a Member Sta tc  h as fa i led 10 fu l fi l l  an obliga t i t m  lHH.kr 
the Trea t y  ( nrt ick 226). and i t  has j u risdict ion to give prel i m i nary rulings concerning th e 
val idity of acts of other insti!Lit ions a n J  conce rn i ng t h e.:  i nterpre tat ion of t h e  Tn.:;;ty and 
u l h c r  acts  ( ar t icle 234 ). 
5'> Sara D illon . The f\'lirage of EC En vironmental Federalism in a Reluctanl Melllber Suue 
Jurisdicrion.  8 N . Y. U .  ENVTL. L.J. I ( 1 999). 
''1 1 For exam ple. in the well-known Council D irective 2004/35/CE. 2004 O.J. ( LI -U)  56 
concerning e n viron m e n t a l  l iab i l i ty. various importa n t  issues such as l i abili ty in case of 
mult i -panv causation . the just ificative effect of following regula t ion . a n d  compulsory i n sur· 
ance arc explicitly \eft to the �·!ember States. See E:-<V\ROt'ME:-;T,,L LtA!3\UTY 1:-; rilE EU:  
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Member State m ay issue addit iona l  legal meas ures.6 t On  the o ther  
hand ,  i f  a E uropean d i rect ive exh a ust ively regulates an area, then  
Member  S tates lose the i r  power to issue addi t ional  regulat ions 
beyond the  measures of  discret ion al lowed by the d i rective. Some 
hold that  t he i ncreasing sh ift o f  powers to the E uropean level may 
have an adverse e ffect that ,  for Member States w i th  l i t t le  nat iona l  
tradi t ion o f  environmen ta l  pol icy ,  they w i l l  expect most standards 
to issue from Brussels, and Member States may cease to generate 
the i r  own nat iona l  e nv i ronmenta l  protection  measures.62 That per­
ceived danger of  centra lizat ion m ay to some extent  p lay a role 
today in the E urope of twenty-seven Member States as  far as  the  
new Member States are  concerned. I t  certa in ly  played less of  a 
role i n  the old fi fteen  Member States which had a l ready p assed far­
reach ing env ironmenta l  protecti on  measures wi thout  wa i t in g  for 
E uropean  actio n.�>-' 
Despite these s imi lar i t ies ,  t he re are some notable d ifferences 
between pre-empt ion o f  state and local regulat ion in t he U .S .  and 
the  s hi ft ing of  env i ronmenta l  com pe tences to central  au thor i t ies in  
Europe . In  Europe, t he re i s  no r i sk  comparable t o  noise control 
regula t ion i n  the U .S . ,  where powers would be t ransfe rred to a 
E uropea n  agency that  could pre-empt  nat ional  env i ronmenta l  law 
and then leave the issue  unregulated. To begin wi th .  t here is no 
such th ing at the  E U  leve l  as regulatory en forcement  o f  env i ron­
mental  law.''·' In environmental  matters, the EC does not send 
inspectors to check whether the law is actual ly appl ied on  the 
ground.  At the E U  leveL once a specific area i s  regul ated, i t  i s  the 
duty of  the Membe r  State to implement the law. This  is ,  as men­
t ioned above, the resul t  of  the unique cooperation between E urope 
and the i'vlember  S tates, whereby the rules are set at the E uropea n  
leveL bu t implementat ion and enforcement  are ent i re ly  l eft  to  the  
Membe r  States. The e ffect iveness o f  E uropean environmental  l a\:v 
i s  hence dependen t  upon coope rat ion between the EU and the  
T H F  2 004  D l l{E( "I IVE  CoMPARED WITH U.S. ,,:-.� o  tv!EMBER STATE L,,w ( Gerrit Betlem & 
Euward B rans .:ds . . 2006 ).  
6 1 Ca,;e 2i78. Comm ·n v. Belgi u m .  ! 979 E.C.R.  1 76 1  ( .. I n  the absence of a Com m unity  
svs tem �uaran teeing for consumers the authent ic i ty  of Llesignat ions of orig in .  I the EC 
Trc;�ty does!  not  prevent  a Member State from t a k i ng measures to p revent  u nfair practices 
in that  j arca j . . .  ) . 
''2 See D i l l o n .  supra note 59. 
' ' '  On the s t a te of environmental  law i n  the olu fifteen Member Sta tes, sec Gecrt van 
Calster. Puhlic l:'nvironmemal Law in 1he European Union. in P u B LIC E'-.;V!RO'-.;stEN IAL 
Lc\W t"  T i l E  E t ' ROI'Fi\N U N ION AND I H E  UNt l Lll S JAi l's. supra note 2. 
,,.. There is a E u ropean E n forcem e nt Agency, but it has nu .:nforccme n t  tasks. St:e 
Kriimcr. supra note 4. 
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Member States.<•-' Th e danger i n  E urope . a n d  t h e  rea l weakness of 
E uropean e n v i ronme n ta l  law.  i s  not  so m uc h  t h at E u rope wou ld 
take spec i f ic powe rs a n d  precl ude M ember S t a t es from reg u l a t i ng 
i n  t h e  same area ( wh i l e Europe hypo t he t i c a l l y  does not h i ng ) .  b u t  
rat h e r  t h a t  M e mber S tates may fai l t o  implement  a given d i rective.  
TI1ere is m uch debate between E u rope a n  legal  scholars about 
the  p recise q ua l i fica t i o n  of the European model .60 All agree t h a t 
t he e ffect ive ness of E uropean e n vi ronme n t a l  l aw is dependant 
upon cooperat ion between t h e  E . U .  a nd the Member S ta tes .  S ince 
E . U .  law is not direct ly  applicable to t he Mem be r  S t a tes  a n d  t he 
E . U .  is also missing a few o t h e r  l egal-pol i t ica l  features.r'7 E u rope a n  
legal scholars usua l ly  has te n  to argue t h at E urope i s  n o t  a U.S.  type 
fede ration.6"' One U S  a u t hor refe rs to the E urope a n  system as 
" E u ropean com m unity federal ism . .. r,•; 
2.3. The Substance of Federal Swndards: Uniform. Tec/uzolog.I · ­
Based Command and Col/ {rol versus Market-Based 
h !Sf runz e tits 
M ajor federal  environm e n t a l  s tand a rds i n  t h e  U . S .  a rc u n i form 
and technology-based. for example,  t he C l e a n  Wa t e r  Act - w h i c h  
is pe rh a ps t h e  most s uccess ful  and p urest form of  such a regu l a t ory 
regime - req u i res tech no l ogy-based e ffl ue n t  reductions t h at arc 
u n i fo rm for a l l  plants  or fac i l i t i e s  i n  the same i n d us t r i a l  ca tcgury 
a nd of c he S<1 m e  age . �0 Such s t a n da rds re prese n t  t ile E P/\  ·s e xpert  
j udgme n t rega rding t h e  leve l o f  e fflu e n t  red u c t i o n  that  p a r t i c u l a r  
k inds of  indust r·ia l  p lan ts can ach ieve i f  t hey i nstal l  certa i n  end-of­
p i pe po l l ut i on abate m e n t  tech nologics 7 1  The C l e a n  A i r  Act  · ­
which i n  i ts orig ina l  v e rsion re l i e d  on sta l e  i mpl e m e n t a t ion ( more 
n 5  See l) i l lnn . supr,r llt ltt: 59. Ciu<ldrich . ,·upra nqJc :'n: Kc· kmc·n .  l<.cgulalun· hrfa,i /i."" ·  
supru nnk � -
''" See. e.g . . U l rich Ever l ing.  Cnn.\liluliunr�l [>ruf,fems of 1hc 1-•. il rO[If'i iJl l ininn - ;\  1 - < r l l · ­
n>r's l:'{cw. i�t ( '< 1:--.: . ..,· l rn ·Tin:'\: .. \L L.-\\\.' A �·, ,  Ec ·( J�":( , ,\ U<:..; c tF Tf H: E t ·l·.:J I{' ! .-\ -..: l .; _,' l\ 1.'-" )90 
( Dicto:r St.:hmidtehcn & R,,hen Cooter cds .. 1 <)')7 ) :  John Pindt:r. f.edera!i.\ln. n t  Et l{< l i ' t· · ,\ 
Cn"-i < . l st' E , , ·ycLi ll'lc i J I ,, "F THE EI ' R"P"''" l i :-< 1 < >:-: ( r><.:�mond D in;lll ..:d . .  l tJ':i':\ ) .  
,,- ll1e E U  :>t i l l  lacks  a form;d u nh t i t u t i o n .  l ilt: ( ·uuncil  '> t i l l  Jornin�tks hui h lcgis i : l l i >c­
;lnd e xccul i,·o: funct iuns wh id1 wt>u ld he· im pp,;s ihk in  a l r u l\· fcder; , \  ,vskm. : 1 1 1d t he Ccl!ll· 
missiun i,; nul mert· lv a kder;d exccul ivc bui  h:1, .  f, ,r cx: 1 111pk. the ( e xclusive ) r i,: ln l <l t : t k<: 
i m t ia t i \ t:S lor legisl a t ive pr\\pnsals. 
1'·' Koc:n L t: n at:rts.  h•r lemlism: 1-.\sen riul ConCI'JIIs in j:', ·o//l (inn Ihe Case u( lite l·.'uro� 
pean Union. 2 1  FntU l l l .-\ � 1  1:--� ( L LJ . 7411. 747 ( 1 9t)S ) .  
,,., See l:krrna n n .  wpra ll l \tc  7 .  at  JJ I .  
'" :n { ! .S C. Ii\i L\1 1 -17 r 2oou ) .  
7 1  For :1 fTI<1 r·c ck t :1 ikd dc-;cription of t h i s  type , , f  rc').W I ; t t ion.  <:cc J:1'-'on Sc11rr  ./c l l l l l , f < H I .  
Tradable Po/ilf(ion l'ennils and !he R,·guluron· Gumc. ' lf{ltu note 26. a t  .':'iS-6.;. 
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forma l ly,  State I m p l em entat ion Plans)  of National Ambient  A i r  
Q u a l i ty Stand a rds ( NAAQS) - h a s  l ikewise become m uc h  more a 
system of uniform , technology-based, plan t-specifi c  em ission 
reduct ion standa rds.72 
The re i s  variat ion in the extent  to which federal  environm e n t a l  
stat u tes i n  the U . S.  al low federal  regul a tors to consider compl i ance 
costs i n  sett ing e m i ssion standards. A t one extreme are the  Clean 
Ai r Act NAAQS,  where federal  environmen t a l  regul ators can con­
sider onl y  heal t h  e ffects - giving no weight t o  compl i a nce costs.73 
A t  t he other extreme a re t h e  Safe D ri nking Wat e r  Act and Toxic  
Substances Control Act ,  w h i ch respective l y  requ i re the  E PA to set  
dr inking water standards so as t o  "maximize [ ] hea l t h  r isk reduc­
t ion bene fits  a t  a cost  that  i s  j us t i fied by the  benefi ts' '74 and to reg­
u l at e  any chemical s u bs tance that ''presents or will presen t  an 
u n reasonable risk of i nj ury to h e a l t h  o r  the environment .  "75 These 
s tatutes not o n l y  permi t  b u t  require the E PA to consider com p l i­
a nce costs i n  standard-setting. In the m iddle o f  t h e  spectrum.  as i t  
we re , a re s ta t u tes such as the Clean \Vater  Act t h a t  do. not  req u i re 
but al low the E PA to consider com pl iance costs ( a t  l east for i n d us­
try groups. i f  n o t  for part icu lar  faci l i t ies)  a n d  other  econom ic costs 
o f  regul ation.76 
A stri k i ng fe ature of federal  e nvironmenta l  law i n  t he U n i te d  
States is  t h e  c o m p l e t e  a bse nce o f  any federal e nvi ron m e n t a l  e m is­
s ion tax and t he rare use o f  l i ab i l i t y  as a reg u latory instrument .  
Even under  the  federal  Comprehensive Envi ron m en ta l  R esponse. 
Compensat ion and Liabi l i ty Act ( CE RCLA) - better k n own as the  
S uperfund law which  sets  up a n  onerous j o i n t  a nd several l iahi l i ty 
scheme .  l iabi l it y  is  o n l y  for the costs of  site c leanup and remedia­
t i o n . 77 l n  t he U n i ted S ta tes , while there is po ten tia l l iabi l i ty for 
n a tu ra l  resource damage. there i s  no federal  e nvironmenta l  l ia b i l i ty 
·: Th is is a consequence i n  large part of Tttlc V which was aJJed in t h e· 1 990 amc·nd­
rncn ts and  w h ich :>c ts  up a n a t ional  permit program for an est i mated 22.000 m;�jor sources 
of  a i r  pol l u t ion .  See 42 U.S.C. � 766 1 ( 2000): RoHEH r V. PERl - ,vAt. t:r .-\ L  . .  EN' 1 H< " ' \I F � ­
r.-\L R u ; t ; LA II < > N :  Lw<, S <  tE�CE. A N L J  p ,  ' u c v  :"32-.J(, (--lth cu.  2003).  
n The S upr�mc Court reiterat�d th is  lnng �stabl ishcd principle i n  Whitman v . . ·\111 . 
Tmcking A,., ·ns . . )3 1 U .S. 457. 46--1-65 (2 0t J I  ) .  
7·' Safe Drink ing Wa ter  Act.  42 U.S.C. � 3D0g· l ( h ) ( 6) 1 A l  ( 2000 ). 
'' Tm: ic Substa ncc·s Control Act � fJ( a ) .  15 U.S.C. � 2605( a )  ( 2000). Sec alsu Cmrus ion 
Pnll>f Fi t t i n gs v. E P.A. . 947 F.2d 1 20 1 . 1 2 1 5  ( 5t h  Cir .  l 9'J I ) ( ho!Jin); t h a t  t h is statut u rv l a n ­
guage requires t h a t  the E PA adopt '" least b u rdensome'' cost-hcndit j u s t i fic·d regu l atorv 
;J i tcfJl i l l i Vt' ). 
7" See Cass R. Su nstc i n .  Cost-Benefit Dt!fuult Princip!i!s . 99 M 1 n L  L RFv.  1 65 1. 1 6711-77 
( 200 1 )  
7 7  42 U S.C. * lJfJ07 ( 2000 ) .  
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for personal  111J Ury d u e  t o  e nv i ro n m e nt a l  p o l l u t i o n  or  
con t a rn i n a tion . 7" 
Traditionally in E urop e ,  emission s t a n d a rds were i nd ust ry-spe ­
c i fic ,  b u t  were based o n  a d m inis trati ve e nviro n m e n t a l  s t a t u te s  
p romulgated by t h e  M e m be r  S t at e s.79 From t h e  1 970s o n , E u rope 
has t a k e n  i n i t i at ive t o  h armonize e miss ion s tandards ( fo r  exampl e .  
i n  D i rect ive  76/464 w h i c h  p ro hi b i ts t h e  d ischa rge of  spec i fic  so­
ca l led grey and b lack l is t  s u bs t a nc e s ) ."0 In t h e  1 980s, q u a l i ty s t a n ­
dards e m e rged w h i c h  were a lso s e t  a t  t h e  Europe a n  l evel .  The 
com m a n d  and con trol  a pproach i s  m o s t  cle a r  i n  D i rect ive 96/6 1 / EC 
con ce rn i n g  I n tegrated Pol l u t i o n  P reve n t i o n  a n d  Cont rol  (a bbrevi ­
a te d  as I P PC ) ." 1  Thi s  d i re c t i ve holds  t h a t  e m iss ion stand ards 
( re fe rred to as e m ission l i m i t  va l ue s  i n  t h e  d irect ive )"2 h ave t o  take 
i nt o  accou n t  t h e  target  s tanda rd ( r e fe rred t o  as  t he e n v i ro n m e n t a l  
q u a l i ty s tan d a rd )." ' The d irect ive provid e s  t h a t  t hese e m i ss ion 
l i m i t  va l u e s  s h n l l  be  based o n  b e s t  ava i l ab le  technology ( BAT). but  
a lso provides  t h a t  th i s  BAT can be fi xed E urop e a n-wide ( in  other  
words. h armon i zed) ." �  ll1 lls .  E uropea n  e n v i ronme n t a l  law i s  
undoubtedly st i l l  re l i a n t  on tech n ology-based, u n i form s t a n d a rd s  o f  
t h e  t rad i t i o n a l  com m an d  and con tro l  type .  1l1 i s  pol i cy deci s i on has  
hcen c r i t ic ize d  b y  l a w  a n d  economi cs s c ho l a rs w h o  argue that .  s i n ce 
local  circumstances  m a y  d i ffer .  BAT s h o u l d  n o t  be h a rm o n ize d."� 
The v  a lso cri t ic ize the I PPC d i re c t ive for cons i de r i ng t h e  perm i t  as 
-,  Se1 c:ral t · . s. e n v t rnn m e n t ;d s ta t ute's e s t abl ish l i a b i l i t y  for i n J u n· to n a t ural resuu rcc'\ 
such as t h e  O i l  Pol l ut ion ,\ct ,,r l 'Fll l _ _  -; -, l J .S .C ��702 f h ) ( 2 ) ( A )  ( �000 ) .  Sec also Jamc·s 
Bunl. A ,1/arkcr-Bu.,·cd " \ na/_1 11s ' 'f Financw! lnsuranu� ls.llln A'soci,:rerl >l"iilt U.S. :Vall/rill 
l<c.\ollt'CI' D,,mage Liahilirr. in Dt·. I L RRE:o; <  T . . I :-;,;t ·R .-\ lliiiTY. x-.: 1 '  Cn\!f'L:o;sA n o '-i  1 N E '-i  \ ' 1 -
R< >'- -'l i · :" L\ I LI,\ H I I I J ; :  Ft · n · R ,  D t l t· I < > I ''- I l:.'-' 1 '>  I '-i n i L  E t! R< >I'L\': U '-i i n:--: ( 'Vl i c h a e l  
Faure c'd . . ::'OOJ ):  !\ !be rt Vc:rhcij.  Shiji.l I l l  Gm·ernwtce · Oil Pnl/wion. in S l i ii' I S  1 :--: Co\11'1.:--: 
s.\ 11' '" n w  E:-;YIR• ' '-' ' I rsr,\ I D \ '- 1·\ < i i  UJ ( 'V! Ic h :Jd Faure & A lbert Verheij eds . . 2007 ) .  
'" See /\ i > \ 1 1'- I S II<A I I \ I  L.''' ut l l i L  E t Hnr·rc .·\ '-'  U o..; In:-; .  I Ts \J i.\I IH .J.<  S J .-\ J Ls A:-.;1>  rHr  
{ i :--: 1 n- D S 1 "  r E s .  ,1\ C< J\I J ' ,\ H l i  1 1  r ;\ :-.; . \1 'iS I S  ( Rene· .J .G . H .  Seerdcn ee l  . .  l mersen t i �I 
\ ' i !�ci Crs ?" V 2d. <.'d .  2007 ) .  
" '  Council D i rc:e!l\e 76/M>-+/EEC. I 'J7h OJ.  tl. l .::' lJ ) 23. 
" Council  D i rect 1 1 e  \)0/ll l iE C. l lJ'Ih O J . ( ! _  2.� 7 )  :'h I !Jcrc: i n ; t fler  t he I I ' PC Di recl i1e j .  
' c  .�\ruck ::: ( 6 )  of t h ,;  I PPC D i rc:ct i 1 e  . 
. : ;  f\ rlie lc 1 ( 7 )  uf t h e: I PPC' Dircct i l c . 
Sec art icle 16 ( 2 )  of t h e  I PPC Directive. w h ich sta t es that  t h <.:  Comm issiun s h a l l tlf)!an­
r z e  an exchange o f  i n formation on h6t a v a i lable tec h n i q ues. and article l o  ( l ). which pro­
\ i des for the possibi litv to set com mumtv e m i ssion l i m i t  v a l ues on t h e  basi,; uf t h e  exchange 
nf i n fllrm a t i on prt lv ided for i!1 < t rt icle I ii .  
'·' ,\oi JC I I .-\ F L  F . \  I Rl & G < m ,, -... SK• H i l l . THI EcnN< >\l!( ' ANALYSt> ' '�' E N Y IR (J :-.; :o.r L N I . \ 1  
P<. l} ]<  y ,\ :-.; ]) L\W: ;\:-.; h i  J< ( )l ) !  , ,  TIIJ'-1 I 'JS-202 { 2003 ) .  
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the central instrument, and not mentioning economic instruments. 
such as envi ronmental taxes or emission trading.86 
Notwithstanding this criticism, the notion of BAT in the I P PC 
D irect i ve is interesti ng. It holds, on the one hand, that this is the 
m ost e ffective and advanced stage in the development of act ivities 
and their methods of operation;87 on the other hand, the definition 
o f  "avai lable" refers t o  the fact that the technique should be availa­
ble " under economically and technically viable conditions, taking 
into consideration the costs and advantages. ''88 Hence, BAT seems 
to call for cost-benefit analysis. 
Market-based instruments in European environmental law are 
sti ll the exception. Environmental taxes (l ike e f1luent charges )  are 
widely applied in the Member States but not at the European 
leve\.89 Similar to the U.S., there is one notable exception, s ince 
EU D irective 2003/87 of October 1 3 ,  2003 installed a greenhouse 
gas e mission t rading market.'xJ T he European Greenhouse Gas 
Trading Scheme commenced on January l ,  2005, and covers the 
main sources that emit C02.'1 1  Hence, it is fair to state that Euro­
pean env ironmental law is a lso large ly relying on technol ogy­
based, uniform emission standards, with the C02 e m ission trading 
scheme being the exception. Another point of similarity w ith the 
U.S. is that liability is rarely used as a regulatory instrument. 
While it is true that D irecti ve 2004/35 of April 2 L 2004 introduced 
a European-wide scheme for environm ental liability,9� liabi l ity i s  
( simi lar to C E RCLA ) only for the costs o f  preventive measures 
and for site c lean-up and remediation. Just like the U.S., the Euro­
pean D irective provides for liability for natural resource damage . 
�" 1\.'lichat.:l G. Faure & J . G . J  Lefevere. lmegrared Poll11rion Prevention and Cuntrof: A n  
Economic ,\f>praisaf. in 1:-<trc d<.AJED PuLL\ JTtUN PRLVENTIO!' i\ND CoNTROL Tt !E E C  
D t RHTIVF FROM ,, C< lMPAHATIVE LEGAL ANU EcuNo.,t Jc PERSPH Ttvr 93 ( Chris Backes 
& Gerri t lktkm eds . .  I 99'J) .  
R7 A rt tcle 2 ( I I )  of t h e  f P PC directive. Note t h a t  t he not ion of  ·act ivit ies'  is as such not  
defined . hut refers undoubtcdlv to the industr ia l  activities subject to the appl icat ion ,,r the 
I PPC d irl·ct ivc. 
t<S fd. 
"'' Michad E1ure c t  at . .  Economic flls!n<menrs: s·uir<'d ro Dn·e/nping Cow11rics� .  in E>;v ; 
R O N M F N T A L  L.,w IN D L V L tC IPMI'N·I : L�cssuNs FH"'l THr ! N J H >'H· S I A N  E x P L R i l 'NCF 2 ! 8  
( l\1 ichacl Faure & Nicole Ni.:sscn .:ds . .  2006 ) .  
• x >  Counci l  Directive 2003/87/EC 2003 O.J.  (L 275 ) 3:2. 
9 1 Marjan Peeters. Enj(Hcement of the EU Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Schemt'. 
in EU CLIM,Yt E Cll,\"1<  a: Poucy: THE C H A LLENGE ( '�' Nr:w RE(iUL\TORY IN IT t r\TIVFS 
1 69 ( M:uyHl Peeters & Kurt Dcketclaere eds . . 2006 ). 
92 See ENVJ RO"',\1£ 0Tc\L LL\ Il i LI T Y  IN TH F E U :  T i ! E  200-l D t RLCI!VE Co\JP,\Rt:D W i l l i  
U.S .  AND MDtll L R  SrATF L\w . supra note 60. 
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but expressly excludes env ironmenta l  l i ab il i ty  for persona l  mJury 
due to environmental po l lu t ion or contaminat ion.9' 
2.4. The Role of Litigation and En vironmen tal !merest Groups: 
U S. Standard-Seaing vs. European Permitting 
A deep structura l  fea ture of  Ameri can federal environmental 
l aws i s  the importance tha t  they p lace o n  c i t izen l i t igat ion as an 
inheren t  par t  of  the regu latory process. Thi s  is  refiected in  the 
envi ronmental  impact statemen t  requirement set ou t  in  the 
Nat ional  Envi ronmenta l  Pol i cy Act ( N E PA )  of  1 970Y4 Rather 
than creat ing a substant ive legal  right  to e nv ironmenta l  p rotect ion 
or natural  resource preservat ion , N E PA requires federal agencies 
to fi l e  an envi ronmenta l  i mpact statement  ( EIS) for a l l  major  fed­
eral actions s ign i ficant ly a ffect ing the  environmen t.95 Indeed.  as 
the Supreme Court said, ' 'NEPA does not mandate part icu lar  
resu l ts. but s imply prescri bes the  necessary process. "90 Some legal 
commentators have despaired that whi le N E PA 's E I S  requiremen t  
may del ay some projects, i t  does not  actual ly change federal agency 
behavior. '17 It i s  d i fficu l t  to  c lear ly  measure the impact of a law i n  
causing agencies to not pursue projects that t hey  would otherwise 
have p ursued.  but t here i s  some systemat ic evidence suggest ing 
that N E PA has had an importan t impact i n  s lowing the pace of 
federal development activ i t ies .08 
l11erc are many famous cases i n  wh ich ,  by con t i nua l ly  pressi ng 
for deta i led considerat ion of env ironmenta l  impacts, environmen­
ta l i st s  have caused so much de lay that  p roject  developers even tu­
a l ly  gave up. i\ case that  is often cal led  the first modern American 
e n v i ronme n t a l  law case ,''') Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference 
v. FPC. i nvolved a su i t  by a number of local non-profit organiza­
t ions and mun icipa l it ies seek ing to halt  t he construct ion of  a l arge 
pump storage p lant  on the shores of the Hudson River.  HX l  
'1·1 Council Directive 2004/35iCE. art.  J .  * J.  2004 O.J. (L 1 43 )  56. 6 1. 
'14 National E n vi ronm..:ntal  Pol icy A c t  of 1 ')69 * l02 ( 2 )( C ) .  42 U.S.C �4332i2 ) ( C )  
( 2000 ) .  
" '  !d. 
'''' Ruhcrbon ' ·  :Vlcthuw Val k y  Citiz..:ns Counci l .  49() U . S .  332. 350 ( 1 989) . 
. , ,  Sl'<'. e.g . . Joseph L. Sax. The ! Unhappv) Truth A lww NEPA . 26 OKtA. L. Rr:.v .  23'J. 
245 ( 1 973 ) .  
'lk Sec Jason Scott Johnston. A Game- Theoretic /inalysis of A lien1<11ive fmlinllions .fi >r 
Rcgulil/orv Cosi·fJcnetir A nalvsis. 1 50 U.  PA. L. REv. 1 343. l389 ( 2002) ( discussing cmpiri· 
cal cvickncl: ) .  
'19 R< t!H· H r L. (i r t<  r-;��!AN r r  .-\ L . . ENV IR< >NMENT,\ 1.  PrH n u ·t ro:--: :  L,\W .'\ N ll  p, , ,  , , ·y 4 
(4th  cd. 2003 ) .  
''" :l � !  F. 2 d  W 0  ( 2cl .  C i r. 1 965 ) .  
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A l th o ugh fi led  i n  1 965, befo re t he passage of N E PA ,  the p la int i ffs ' 
strategy esse n t i a l l y  ant ici pated N E PA requirements :  t hey attacked 
the agency 's  p rocess for fa i l ing to  give them an opportun i ty  t o  p re­
sent  evi dence o f  e nv i ronmental  degradat ion caused by t he pro­
posed plant ,  and feas ib le  a lternati ves t o  the proposa l . 10 1  In th is .  as 
in many other cases , 1 02 i t  was a s uccessful s trategy: t he plant was 
never  b u i l t .  Perhaps the s t rongest i ndicat ion t hat  N E PA's proce­
d ural  req u i re m e n ts can actually i nflu e nce and re-direct federa l  
development act iv i t ies  can be found in  a B ush adm i n istrat ion pro­
posal ,  which a imed to "stre am l ine"  t h e  N E PA process by l imi t ing 
t he a bi l i ty of ci t izen groups to chall enge NEPA E ISs' legal ade­
quacy i n  court ,  and t o  a ll o w  age ncies to categorica l l y  exclude e n t ire 
c lasses of  smal l proj ects from the E IS req uireme n t . 1 03 
A d is t inguishing feature o f  American federal  environ m e n t al 
i mpact review i s  t h a t  only  federal, p ublic proj ects are req u i re d  t o  
fi le a n  E I S . I n  E u ropean countries,  t h e  1 985 Co unci l  E nvironmen­
t a l  I m p act  Assessment  D irect ive requires  e nvironmental  assess­
ments  for a l l  m ajor  publ ic  and private proj ec ts . H l-l  The re is 
general ly  considerable  variation in the extent  t o  which Member  
S ta tes  have  i mple me nted Counci l D i rectives in t he i r  domest ic  
laws, 10:; and the  E nvironmental  I m pact Assessme n t  D i rect ive is  
sim i l a r  in  t h is regard, wi th  a 1 993 stud y  fin d i n g  sign ifica n t  cross­
nat ional  variat ions i n  the  number and type o f  environm e n ta l  
assessm e n ts carried o u t . w6 insofar a s  s uch assessme n ts m u s t  now 
be cond ucted i n  many E uropean countries as pa rt of al l  m aj o r  pri­
v a te p rojects '  pe rmit t ing process, E urope an local publ ic  part ic ipa-
1 n1 See G u <KS\LV-. f �  1 \ ! . . .  supra nntt: 'N. at  7 .  
H J 2  ! n  add i t i on to SCfntc lftlilson. discussed i n  t h e  t c .x r .  sec . c: .g  . . :Vl : t rsh v .  Orcgnn Natu­
ral  Res.  Cou n c i l .  4l)() U . S  . .1110 ( l l)8l) ) ( p roposed dam never buil t ) :  Rt>bc·rtson v. Mct how 
Valley C i t izens Coun c i l .  490 U.S.  332 ( 1989) ( proposc:d Sandy B u t te ski  resort nc:vcr 
dcvel<lped ) .  
1 o _;  Tl1e i n i t i a l  report . N E P A  T..vsK FoRCE. C< 11 ; --.;< � � � - ' '" Esv IR< '"'\ ll'-' Lv L (h : .-\ 1 . 1 1  Y .  
Fxr-cu n v 1.  On wr: 0 1  t H E PRESI DLN I .  Mum· R '-i l / 1 '-' < ;  l" L P/\ hii 'L t.\lLN ! A llO'. ( 2003 ) .  
'" ''"/able at h ttp:/!ccq.h�,;.doe.gov/nll!n:por1/t'ina1report.pdL h:t' hcc:n folloll'cd by illlothcr. 
T.\SK FoR< 'E < '" bl l'R< > \  1 '-' < ;  TH E NA no--.;,\ l .  [NVI HONMIN I ..vL l't > I  t <  Y A< ·1 .-\ N n  T..vsK 
FuRCE i l N U PPA l! '.; ( ; 1 1 1 1 .  N.-\TlON.-\ L ENVIRO;,\IENT.-\l Pt ) t l ( ) A< · r. c ·, )\ J\1 l l"! EF 0:"' 
Rl " > I : f{ (  I s .  lJNITEl) S L\TFS HuusE UF Rl·. I'IU'SEN I c\ rt V L S. IN I l l c \ l  Fl' I ) !N f ; ,  .-\N D  DHAF! 
R l t , •\I'-If  --.;D.vT!o--.;s (2005 ) . m·oilahle w h l l p://repuhlicans.n.:snurccsL"tHn m l t il:c.housc.gm·i 
a rchivcsii iOO/nc pa I ask forcc/rcport/neparcport_fin a  ldra ft .  pdf. 
l i '" Cuu nci! D i rect ive S)/3}7/E' EC. ;:rt. ! .  9 1 ,  1 9X5 O..J . ( L.  1 7 � )  40. 
'"' See genemllv A n d rew Jordan. EU Environmemal Pultcl  ar ..?5: lhe f'oli!ics of Jlu/­
!tlel·e/ Govemance. ENVIRO:"''I ENT 14 ( Vol.  40( I ) . J;m. i Fe h. l 9')S) ( discussing such 
varia I ion ) .  
l i �l R E PORT FR0'-1 Tl i L  Cov1M !SS1DN 01· ! H E  I M f' U . \ I l' NT.\Tl< '"' Ul D I !< H ' l ! V l: ss:_'\.071 
E F C  ON T l !l'. AssLissvtLNT 01- l!H' El·FEC! s OF Cr. R l ;\ ! N  Pt · nuc :\ N i l  P R J \  A It PH< UH ' I s  
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t ion i n  determin ing loca l ,  fac i l i ty-specific envi ronmenta l  standards 
is potenti al ly m uch m ore s ignificant  than i n  the  U n ited States. On  
t he  other hand,  j ust as under NEPA, l ocal  pub l i c  participat ion i n  
envi ronmental impact assessment ( E I A )  i n  E uropean countries 
does not mean that development projects are not u lt imately 
approved. 
Moreover, i t  seems tha t  i n  E u rope, p roject opponen ts h ave a 
much more l im i ted righ t  to seek j ud icial review of ElAs lead ing to  
project approval than do Americans under  NEPA. 1 07 I f  th i s  is  
i ndeed t he case, t hen the  pattern o f  project approvals and d isap­
provals under European E I As,  compared agai nst American NEPA 
reviews .  might be used to gain i nsigh t in to  t he  i n fluence o r  i mpact 
o f  j udic ia l  review of  env ironmenta l  assessmen t  req ui rements upon 
project approval rates. The emphasis on regu latory process found 
in NEPA is a much m ore general and dist i nctive fea ture of Ameri­
can e nvironmental l aw.  To i l l us trate, the Admin istrat ive Proce­
dure Act ( A PA )  requires federal agencies to give formal public 
not ice o f, and provide an opportun i ty for publ ic  comment  on ,  a l l 
proposed regulat ions. J tl�> Moreover, i f  after  such not ice and com­
ment. the agency promulgates a regulation ,  then any person ··suf­
fe ring lega l wrong . . . o r  adverse ly a ffected or  aggrieved'' by t he 
regu la t ion 's promulgat ion may seek j udic ia l  review . 1m  The scope 
of such  j udici a l  review is both substant ive (ask ing, " Is the regula­
tion consistent  with t he  statute wh ich it ostens ib ly  i mplements?"' ) 
and p roced ura l  ( " ' Did the  agency provide adeq uate no tice o f  i ts 
regulat ion.  give opportun i ty  for pub l ic  partic ipat ion, and 'deal 
expl ic i t ly  with the evidence presen ted to  [ i t ]  and provide a rat ional­
i zab le l i n k  between the  evide nce and [ i ts ]  decis ion ' " ·n 1 1 0 The 
Supreme Court has i n terpreted the scope of  substant ive j udic ia l  
review of  agency regulations in a way that  requ i res courts to 
uphold any agency regu la t ion that is  a "reasonab le" i n te rpretat ion 
of the s ta tute i t  implements .  1 1 1 A l though i t  may seem highly de fer­
ent iaL there are s ign i fican t examples of agency regul at ions bei ng 
vacated  by t he courts under th i s  stanclard. 1 1 2 
1 ' 17 Sec. e.g . . Paul  Grace. UK Enviromnemal Impact .1\ssessmen!.l: Fhe Ba//le Continues. 
in 20 N ,\T .  Rbi l t > K< ES & ENY'r 63 ( 200:'i ). 
"'' ,\dminisrrat ivc Pro<.:cdun.: i\ct "i 4. :'i U.S .C. � :'i53 (2000). 
1 "'1 Admin istrative Proced ure Act � l O(a ) .  5 U.S.C. � 702 (2000). 
1 :o Mathew D. McCubbins et a!..  tl dministrarive Procedures as lm!nunents of Pulilical 
Co111rol. 3 J .L E< oN. & Ot<<i.  243. 258 ( I  W\7 ) .  
1 "  Chc vrun v .  Natur:Jl  Res.  Def. Council.  467 U.S.  ::>37. R44 ( 1 984 ) .  
l l 2  S.:e 111omas W . MerrilL Te.mwlistl! and cite Fwltrc of che Ctv�vron Docrri11c. 72 
W.\SI I .  U. L.Q. 35 ! ( ! 9Y4).  
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I ndeed, some commentators on American publ ic law be l ieve 
tha t  t he  combined r isk tha t  courts  wi l l  overturn federal agency reg­
u lat ion as e i ther  procedura ll y  or substant ively flawed is so great 
that such agencies have become paralyzed. 113 Whi le a recen t  
empirica l  study does n o t  support t h e  thesis o f  complete regulatory 
paralysis, 1 1 4 whether the  EPA is  set t ing new safe dri nking w ater 
standards for arsenic ,  or  new Nat iona l  Ambient  Ai r  Qual i ty Stan­
d<:n-ds for fine particulates and mercury, national interest groups 
are act i ve ly  i nvolved a t  every s tage of American federal regulatory 
standard-sett ing.  
I n  contrast, the possibi l i t ies for i ndiv iduals or  Non-Governmen­
ta l  O rganizations (NGOs) to cha l lenge European Comm un i ty 
measures ( l i ke  Di rect ives) are very l i mi ted.  Under ECJ case law, 
direct act ion ( based on art ic le 230(4) EC) i s  only possib le  if the  
measure at  hand i s  of ' 'direct  and indiv idual  concern . '' 1 1 5 I n  most 
cases, t h is means that N G Os or i nd ividuals have no locus standi to 
cha l lenge European regu lat ions o r  d i rectives d i rect ly  a t  the Euro­
pean leve l . 1 1 6 Moreover, few E uropean countr ies ( i f  any) a l low c i t ­
izen groups to d i rect ly chal lenge proposed nat iona l  env ironmenta l  
regulations i n  court . 1 1 7  In  such countries, i ndividual  lawsuits are 
brought not a t  the na t ional  standard-se tt ing stage, but  a t  the local 
permit t ing stage , where cit izen groups can cha l lenge the app l i ca­
t ion of generaL nat ional  environmenta l  s tandards in determi ning 
the  s tandards for a part icular p lant . 1 1 8 At l east one prominent  
1 u Thomas 0 .  McGarity, Some ThougJus on "Dcossifving " the R11lemaking Process . ..) I 
Dt ' K ic L.J . Ux:). 1 ..\ ! 9-20 ( 1 992) .  
1 1 � I n  a recen t  study.  Ca ry Cl)glianese fimls t h a t  t h e  expansion of j udicia l  review d i d  not 
a p pn:ciahly s low the pace nf regu lat ion by the N a t i on;d H igh way Transportat ion Safctv  
Agency { N HTS.'\ ) .  Ca rv Cogl ianese. The lmpacl of Judicial Review on Regularory Policv: 
R.:e.ramzning N!-! TSA ·s H.ulemaking {�elreal {Jan.  200o) ( un p u b l ished work in p rogress ) .  
One reason t h a t  agencies have not been paralyzed is because j u dges have never fu l l y  
muved to a completely  dcfen: n t i a l  postu re . Cf Robert G l icksm an & Christopher H .  
Sch roeder . EPA and the Courts: 7iventv Years of L<iw and Po/itin·, 5 4  L,,w & CoNTEMP< , _  
Hr, R Y  PRnlll.E.\IS 2..\lJ ( 1 99 1 )  (d iscussing possi bl e  reasons w hy j udges have not  moved t o  a 
cnm pletely defere n t i a l  pnsturc ). 
' 1 5  Case 25162 !'Iaumann v. Com mission ( 1 96 3 )  ECR 95. 1 07. For a commentary sec 
L\NS & Vu)J)LR.  supm nute 2323. at 2 1 1 .  
' I " Sl'e. r·.g . . Case C-32 1 195.  St icht ing Green peace Cou nci l ( G reen peace l n t ' l )  ' .  
Cnmm· n .  I <J'JX LC. R. l - l h5 l :  Case C-50i00. U nicin de Pequdios Agrieultores v. Coun<.: i l  ol  
the European { j n ion. 2002 E.C. R. 1 -6677. 
1 1 7 See ;\c< 'L:-.s 1 0  J u sTICE IN ENvmu:o;ME?" I'AL M,, rrERS IN THE E U (Jonas Ehbesson 
cd . . 2002): A D ,I I N i s  I H,\ nvE L�w OF TH E E1 !ROI'l·.AN U N I C>N, I I 'S MEMBER S lATEs ,·\ N D  
n IF  U NITED S 1 _ , I T s: A ( \  >MPARATIVE ANAL YsJs ( Rene Secrdcn & Fri ts Stroink cds . . 
2002).  
1 1 5  Th e  I ta l i a n  Cude of Criminal  Procedure of 1 9K9. for example.  allows approved 
NCiOs to part icipate in e n forcement.  Douglas L. Parker. Swnding to Li1igme "A bstract 
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A merican sch o l a r  has bee n  h a rs h l y  cr i t i c a l  of t he fai l u re of E ur o­
p e a n  system s  to allow p ublic p artic ipat ion i n  a n d  j udicial review of 
reg u l a tory s t a ndard-se t t i n g  processes. 1 1 9  It may we l l  be,  however.  
th a t  the E u ropean model al lows for m o re act ive public i n volve­
m e n t  i n  t h e  fac i l i ty-spec i fi c  perm i t t i n g  p rocess t h a n  does the A m e r­
i ca n  system. 1 20 I f  this  is true, t he n  a n  i nteres ti ng a n d  i mporta n t  
topic  for fut ure research i s  w h e t h e r  t h i s  d iffe re nce - more act ive 
p ub l ic part ic ipation in  l oc a l  p e rmi t t i ng in  E urope. com pared 
again s t  pub l ic particip a t i o n  by n a t i o na l  NGO's in s t a n d ard-se t t i n g  
i n  t h e  U . S .  - h as l e d  t o  systemat ic  d iffe re nces i n  n a t i o n a l  e n v i ro n ­
mental standards and local permit conditions. 
2.5. The Paradox of Centralized En virorunental Regulation for 
Local Po!lllfion and the Failure of Cenrra!i::.ed 
Regulation to Ef]ectively A ddress lnrer-
jurisdicrional Pollution 
I n  t h e  U.S . . federa l e n vi ro n me n t a l  regu l a t i o n  is not  targeted a t  
i n terstate pol lu t i o n .  Federal  e n vi ro n m e n t a l  laws passed d ur i n g  t h e  
e a r l y  1 97\J's - t h e  heyday o f  t h e  Enviro n m e n t a l ist  e ra - were 
t a rgeted a lmost e n t i r e l y  a t  l oca l ized a i r  a n d  w a t e r  pol l u t i on . 1 � 1  
Indeed.  i n  some i nstances,  t hose laws s uch a s  the Clea n  A i r  Act 
of 1 970 - actua l l y  crea te d  a n  i nce n t i ve to exte rn a l ize pollu t io n  
------ ---- --------·- -- -- - ----- - --·-
s,Jciol /nil.'rt'S(.\ . . in the Unired SraiCS and IW/1·, Hee.rwllining .. ,tij / 1 /"V in hie! ''. 33 C{ )u \.! .  .1 . 
Tt.:,,:-:sN,\ r · J .  L. 2:19. 290 ( 1 995 ) .  In Germany. w h i l e  e n vi r,mmen ta l  ;tssoc: i a t ions h a ve rela­
t ivelv l i m i ted acc:ess 1 0  the  c:ou rts. p<.:-rS< >llS a ffectuJ d i rectly by a proposed faci l i t y  h a ve a 
right to part ic:ipa t e  i n  t h e  iac i l i ty-specific perm i 1 1 i n g  proc:ess. \Iichael R od i . Puhlir r:m ; ­
runmentti! l . tnv i n  (;erman v .  i n  Pt ' fll l< l:'N\ IH < lN\ J I· N f . \ 1  L \\\ l c' l ll F  t: < ' l< < lf'E'' ·" t --.. u '" 
.·\ N O  n n·. U .'-.I ! J:.Il ST,\ I J·.s: A Co\tf'.·\H,\ 11 \ L  A :-: s 1  Y s ! s .  supra ! Jok 2. ;t t ! 'J9. 227.  i n deed. 
i n  C iermany t here an: nn forma l procedures for t he· prnn1 u l ga t ion , ,f  e xecut i ve rcg.u l a t inn\ 
and admin ts t ra : i 1·e ruks. but t h e re arc q u i t e  fonn a l  procedures pn>, i d i ng for pul1 l ic part i<:i­
pat iPn i n  maJUf em· i ronrnental  permi t t ing deci-, ions.  ! ! :I ns  D. Jar�:ss & Josc· p h  D i M cn t l1. 
Through Comparmivc f.aw vers · Cogg!e.': A !'ri111er un Gamwt Em irunmenral Lwv. 6 
Gro.  L-..:·( r .  E N ,n l . .  L. Rn . 47. 67-6;) ( 1 993). Such cha l kng<:s a rc ;malugnus. i t  seems. w 
tl��: Amc:rican .. citizen suit. .. umk.r wh 1cil urclinarv -�i\ iJ.cn� C<H\ bring bws.uits in \c�kra\  
cou rt seek i n g to en force per m i t  terms aga i nst reg u l ated f;,ci l i t icc>.  The ana logy i s  far from 
perfect. however. for E u ropean pcrmi r  c h a l k nl!cs m us r  genera l l y  bcc brought ht.: fon: an 
i\ d m i m s r ra t i v e  t ribuna l .  
I I <> .\ee RfJsF · A<  K L R '-' 1 ,\ N .  supra note  6 ( cr i t iquing t h t s  aspect uf G e r m a n  pulicy ) .  
: �n  F or  e x a m pk. in  t h e  U .S . .  � �  ci t izen cannut ch;l lknge a :.ite-specific permit th; • t  
i n cororporates the requ i red federal �<:chnulogy-hascd stancL1rcb an d nthcT re levant stale" 
s tandards.  l t  is u nckcr r  whcth<.:r t h is i s  al ;:o t rue in Eu ropean cc>U!l l r.ies. 
; ; ;  l ndc:c:d. as e\pi<J i ned J.)y R ich ard L. Rc:,esz. [ :-: \  I J{o'O :. trNL\ 1 .  L-\W . \ N D  p, > LJ (  Y .  
mpru note 27.  ; J t  -l23. the ma i n  tools of laws l ike: t h e' ong:nal  Clc:m A i r  A c t  of 1 970 
a m b i e n t  q u a l i t v  s tandards and e m i ssion standa rds S ! lllp ly  d,) not "ddress i n ters t a te ex t er­
n a l i t ies. bec:;wse they do nul ft1rcc sta tes ur soun;cs to  t;.ke ! fl i P  iJCCUllll t pol l u t ion caused in 
oth·�r states. 
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problems across state  bord e rs . 1 22 i n t e rs t a t e  t ranspor t a t i o n  o f  su l ­
fur dioxide e miss ions - the  acid r ai n  probl e m  - was  n o t  identi fied 
as a problem u ntil  years after the Clean Air Act was passed. a n d  
was not  e ffecti ve l y  regul a t e d  u n d e r  t h a t  l a w  u n t i l  i t  was a m e n d e d  
in 1 990 to  create a n at i o n a l  su l fu r  d i ox i de e m i ss ions  t r a d i n g  sys­
t em . 1 23 U n l i ke acid ra i n ,  the paradigm a t i c  proble m s  d e a l t  w i t h  by 
the E nvironmen ta l ist  era fed e r a l  environmen ta l  laws - w a t e rway 
poll u t io n  by m un i c i p a l  sewage and i ndus t r ia l  wast e , urban smog 
( urban air pol l ut i o n  due primar i ly  t o  a utomo b i l e  emiss i o n s ) .  s a fe 
drinking w at e r  standards, str ip  m i n i n g  l a n d  recla ma t i o n .  h aza rdous 
waste s i te  c leanup ,  even t h e  pro tection of wet l a n ds fro m  devel op­
m e n t  - al l  i nvolved pri ma r i l y  local pol l u ti o n  rather than i n t e rs t a t e  
spi llovers. 
ll1i s  m ismatch - a n at i o n a l  response t o esse n t i a l l y  l oca l p ro b l e m s  
has been crit i cized o n  a v a r i e ty of grou n cls. t 2·1 O n e  such cr it ic i sm 
i s  t h at the extens ion o f  fed e r a l  regul a to ry a u t hori ty t o  cov e r  l oca l 
pol l u t io n  a n d  n a tu r a l  resource d e v e l opmen t  i s  uncons t i t ut i o n a l  as 
i t  goes beyo n d  the Congress i o n a l  power t o  regu latt; i n te rs t a t e  com­
m e rce . t 25 I f  o n e  w e re unfami l iar  with t h e  way t h a t  the S upreme 
Court  has i n t e rp re te d  Comm e rce C l a use a u thor i ty to regulate .  
then o n e  m ight  n a t ural ly  th ink  that  the  reg u l a t i o n  o f  local ized pol­
l u t io n  o r  land deve lopm e n t  a c t i v i t i e s  has  n o t h i ng to d o  w i t h  i n ter­
s tate comme rce , a nd is t he re fo re beyond Congressional author i t y .  
Ye t \vhen con fronted w i t h  s u c h  argum e n ts ,  t he Supreme Cou rt has 
had l i t t l e  d i ffic u l ty in fi n d i ng a con n ect i o n ,  a l be i t  oft e n  ten uous a n d  
creat i v e l y  i m agi n e d .  betwee n l ocal  pol l ut i o n  a n d  i n t e rstate  com-
·--- ·-- -------
1 22 See Rt<:hanJ L. RcVc·sz. h·deraltsm and lnrerswre Environmentul Lxrernulirin. l -1--l l ;  
p,\ L REV.  234 1 .  2352 ( 1 996 ) .  
1 2 '  J,>im P.  Dwv;.:r. The Pracrice uj ft:der,!li:;m Under rile Cleun :\ir Au.  54 MD. L. RFv . 
l l �.'l, 1 220 ( l �N5 ) .  To say t h a t  the  AciJ Ra i n trading program effecti vely dealt  with t he 
problem of in terstate  s u l fur  dio., ide pol l u t io n  is an overstateme n t .  A;, arguc:J llv Richard 
Revesz. the in tcrstatc  trading svstcm suffers from a serious d e fect in t h a t  i ts n�H innal mar­
ket for permits  fai ls to account  for the  iact that pol lu tion from sources i n  upwind M i dwc·sJ­
ern st <Jtes causes h arm to Ull\'.:nwind Northeastern states ( so t hat : i l lowi ng M idwestern coa l 
burning e l ectric u t i l i ties to s i rnp lv  buy perm i ts may cxacc:rbate the acid rain problem 111 
downwind Nort heastern sta tes ) .  Richa rd L. Revesz. h'demlism 1111d f111cr.Hait' Em·iron­
menral Extemalirie.> . supra note 1 22 .. a t  2360-6 1 .  
i c� Sec HENRY N .  B t ' IU:R & J c JN;\ ll l A:--i R .  Mi\LEY.  U sJ N < >  FFJ)UC·\LlS\1 I < >  i stl'H< )VE 
ENV! RON.\1ENT!\L p, > Ll C Y  ( 1 996):  D.-\ vtr> Su-tOE:--IBHuu. S .·\ VI:-<< > ( ) t  ' J.t  E:--:'cmo:--;s! F :-<T 
FROM vVASHJ:"(;TON: Hi >W CoNGRESS GRABS PowER. Si l l  RKS R ESP! l"-SJB!Lit Y . . \ND 
S HoHTCHANGES THE PEUl'LE ( 20 6): Jonathan H .  AJ!er. Jurisdic!iona/ Mismatch in Em·i­
romnental Federalism, l 4  N.Y.U.  E:--: vrt. L.J. 1.30 (2005 ) .  
1 25 See Jon athan AJ!er. lilt' Ducks Srop Here? The Environmenwl Challenge 10 Federal­
ism. in 9 St!l'. Cr. EcoN. R Ev.  205 1 200 1  ) .  
2009 ] En vironmenra! Federalism: Europe & U. ,)'. Compared 23 1 
m e rcc: . L'" Fol l ow i n g  t h e  S u p re me Cour t 's l e ad .  fed e r a l  c ourts have 
in  gen e r a l  h ad an e asy t ime j usti fy i n g  the const i t u t io n a l i ty o f  fed ­
e r a l  e nv i ro n m e n ta l  reg u l at i o n :  somet imes t hey fou n d  t h e  con nec­
t i o n  between i n t e rstate  markets  a n d  l oca l p o l l ut io n  i n  t h e  theory 
t h a t  loca l  p o l l ut i o n  i s  ca used by i nt e rs t a t e  competi t i o n  for mobi l e  
c a p i t a l  ( t h e  i n t e rstate  race-to- t h e-bottom) : 1 ='7 a t  o t h e r  t i m e s  t h e y  
h ave sa id  t ha t  a n  act iv i ty  s u c h  as h azardous waste d isposal h a s  a n  
aggrega te e ffec t  o n  i n terstate  com m e rce . e v e n  t hough i n d i v i d u a l  
i ns tance s  of  d isposal  d o  not . 1 28 
The p a radox o f  fed e r a l  e nv i ro n m e n t a l  l a w  i n  t h e  U .S .  i s  t h a t  v e ry 
l it t l e  federa l  e n v i ro n m e n t a l  regul a t ion  i s  act u a l l y  d i rected o r  e ffec­
t i ve a t  con t ro l l i ng i n t e rstate  p o l l u t i o n .  For i nstance.  t h e  only  fed ­
e r a l  regul at io n  o f  i n t e rstate  w a t e r  p o l l u t i o n  i s  t h a t  w h i c h  comes 
about t h rough t h e  n a t i o n a l l y  u n i form,  t e c h n ology-based w a t e r  pol­
l u t ion s tand ards i m p osed o n  p o in t  sources of wate r po l l u t i o n .  The 
E PA h a s  a regu l a t ion t h a t  for b i d s  p o i n t  sources from po l l u t i o n  d is ­
ch arges that  v i o late the a m b i e n t  water  q ua l it y  standards o f  a n o t h e r  
s t a t e  w i t h  w h o rn  i t  s h a res a watcrway; 1 2'� however.  i t  i s  ge n e ra ll y  
impossi b l e  t o  estab l i s h  t h a t  a s i n g l e  p o i nt-source d i s c h a rge i n  o n e  
s t a t e  causes p o o r  wate r q u a l i ty i n  a n o t h e r  s ta te  ( t ypica l l y  d o w n ­
s t rca m ) , L"o and t h e  E PA h a s  yet  to a ct u a l ly req u i re a p o l l u t e r  i n  a 
" d i rt y "  s tate  to c u t  i ts pol l ut ion i n  orde r to m e e t  water  q ua l i t y  s t a n­
d <n cls ( in c l u d i n g  a t ta i n m e n t  o r  l a c k  t h e r e o f  u n d e r  t he Cl e a n  Wat e r  
Act ) o f  a n  adj o i n i n g  " c l e a n · ·  s t a t e .  S i m i l a r ly .  w h i l e  t h e re \Vas o n ce 
a n  i n te rstate  fed e r a l  common l a w  of a i r  pol l u t i o n . 11 1  for ove r two 
decades.  t h e  o n l v  e ffec t  o f  the C l e a n  A i r  Act betwe e n  1 970 a n d  
1 990 w a s  to e l i mi nate a n y  c o n t r o l  o v e r  i nt e rstate  a i r  p o l l u t i o n . 1  '�  I t  
For t h e  Cuurt '�  most si1!nific a n t  e a r l y  statement <>n t he c,mst i tu ! Jonalm ul tcder;J I 
1 2 - �)'('t' id at .\2 1 <>J . 
Fur an cx<�mpk:  o f  t h is ag1!rcgation t heorv ;q,plied. sec t: n i tcd States v. O l i n  C"rp . .  
l t J7  F .<d 1 506 ( ! ! t il Cir. ! lJ97 ). 
1 2'1 S .. ·e 40 C.F. R .  � i l:!A( d l  ( 2U03 ). 
L'" This was indeed precise� I>  thc pwhlcm Ill the only rcporr.:J ca:;c inYolvlng t h is rc•gub­
l lon.  :\ rkan>;as v .  O k lahoma. 50:1 L .S.  'J l .  l l l - 1 2  ( 1 '!92 ) .  when: t h e' E PA found t h a t  dis­
ch;t rgc·s from an A rlun sas rnull lc i pai  se wage t reat me n t p ia n t  did nut cause a dt.:tectahk 
\ tulat ion o f  w�Jtc'r qual i tv s iMldards i n  O k la homa. the duwnstream state. t h is despite t h<.: 
opin ion uf Oklah01na t>ificials 1 h at the discharges from 1\ rkansas had turnc'd t h e  
Okla homa ponion ,,f  t h e  R i v e r  i n t o  a n  "open sewer." 
1 1  Georgia v .  k ntL Copper Cu . .  20o U .S.  230 ( l CJ07 ) .  
132 See Thomas W .  Merril l .  Golden Rules for Trw1shourulary Pu!lurion. 46 Dl'KE LJ. 
Y:l l .  Y59 ( 1 997 1  ( discussing how no s ta k' had ever succccdcd in getting rclicf against 
another s ta te  under a pro vision of the Clean Air Act forbidding pol lut ion frum one state 
t h a t  "cun trJbutcs significant ly"  to another state's fai lure t o  atta in  nation a l lv u n i form air  
q u a l i t v  standards ) .  
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was on ly with the adven t  of  regiona l  cap and t rade regimes tha t  t h e  
acid ra i n  (su l fu r  dioxide ) and  ozone (n i t rogen oxides and  other  
ozone pre-cursor s )  i nterstate a i r  po l lut ion problems have begun to 
be e ffect ive ly redressed i n  the  lJ.S . 1 Y1 
Like federal  envi ronmenta l  l aw i n  the  U .S . ,  a str iking feature o f  
E uropean environmenta l  d i rect ives i s  t h a t  many o f  t h e m  do not  
dea l  w i th  t rans-boundary or  in ter-jurisd ict ional  po l l ut ion problems, 
but with problems that involve either both local and transboundary 
po l lut ion,  or  even ent ire ly loca l  pol lu t ion 1 3" ( l i ke Direct ive 76/464 
concerning  the  discharge of dange ro us substances i nto the  aquat ic  
e nvironment) . 1 35 Like U.S .  federal  env ironmenta l  law,  E uropean 
regu lation aiming a t  loca lized po l lut ion problems has been cri t i ­
cized from a n  economic perspective; name ly .  on the  basis o f  i ts 
costs being disproportionate to  the  benefi t s  rece ived. u6 
Of course, t he ECJ i s  not  d i rect ly responsib le  for such "'over­
centra l ization'' :  i t  is rather the  European Commission and the 
Member States ( brought together  in  the Counci l  of Min is ters )  tha t  
decide to  regulate poll ut ion problems at  t he E uropean leve l .  even 
if the economic rat iona le  for doing so may be l acking.  S t i l l ,  i n  a 
n umber of decisions, the E CJ has e i ther in terpreted European 
environmenta l  competencies broadly or has more genera l l y  faci l i ­
t a ted the enforcement  of  European env i ronmental d i rect ives 
agains t  Member States .  There is ,  for example. t he a forement ioned 
Decis ion of  February 7 ,  1 985. wherein the E CJ he ld  tha t  env iron­
menta l  protection is  one of the  Comm uni ty 's essent ia l  object ives. 
th us j us t i fying Commun i ty act ion for the envi ronment .  u7 Hence. i t  
1.\.l For resu l t  o n  t h e  r�-rformance of  t h e  acid ra i n  a n d  N O ,  t r a d i n g  programs. respec­
t ively. set: U.S. E PA Acm RAIN AND R u.A tTD PtU)( > R \:.. Js.  �(}()() PrU >! > H I'Ss Rn·• mr 7-':1, 
( 2(Hl7)  and U.S.  E PA .  NO, B u DGET T H A I> ING PHu< d<. . v \ 1 .  ::'006 PR( J ( ; R..>.M Co\1 1'1 1 . \ N <  F 
,\ N i l  E N V I RON�! ENTAL RES I J L I S 1 3  ( 2007 ) .  
1 .'4 Examples nf  t h e  latter art: t h e  Bathing Water Direct ive .  Coun c i l D irec t ive 76! 1 (1( ); 
E EC. 1 976 O.J.  ( LOJ l )  1 .  the Habitat Directive. Cuuncil D irect ive 92/43/E EC. I 992 O J .  ( L 
206) 7 ( even t hough t h a t  d i rect ive docs not mcr1 1 i nn pui l ut ion s tandards .  it deals w i t h  -;p.:­
c ies and h d b i tat  protection. which is typical ly  a mos t ly lucal problem ). and the D r i n k ing 
Wa ter D irective. Counc i l  D i rective 80/778/E EC. ! 980 O..J. ( L  229 ) I I . Nut surprisi ngly. 
t here arc many pwbh:ms more particu larly wit h the practical i mpleme n t a t ion of the bat h ­
i n g  water d irecti ve. See Goodrich,  supra note 56. 
U:i Direct ive 76/464 of 4 May 1 976. 1 976 0.  J. ( LI 2'.l ) 21.  
1.1 6  See Lucas B crgkam p . A Furure Environnlni!Lil l..iahi!irv Regime. 7 E ' ' " ·  ENv n .  l.. 
REv. 20U ( 1 998): ivi ichaci  Faure. Harmonismion of Eln·Jrunmmw! l.a''' and Marker lllle­
gnilion: l/onnonising f(>r rhe 1-Vrong J<easom 1.  7 EI!R. ENv n .. L. R L v .  1 69 ( 1 99S): 'VI ichacl  
Faure & Kristcl  de Smcd t.  Should Europe Harmonise Environmemal Liabilitl' Legt.,fa · 
rion1,  9 E N V ! L.  Li,\ B I I IT Y  2 1 7-37 (200 1 ). 
1 .17 Case 240'S3. Procurcur de Ia Repu b l iqu c v A�socia 1 ion <.Jc defense <.Jcs bru !c u rs 
d ' h u i lcs usagccs. 1 9S5 E.C. R. 53 1 .  For a commen t ary. sec J .·\NS & Vt-.DDLR. supra note 
2323.  a t  5 .  
2009] En vironmental Federalism: E'urope & U. S. C'ornpared 233 
can be a rgued t h a t  e v e n  i f  t he E CJ d i d  not i n i t i a te t he ce n t ra l iza­
t i on o f  e nv i ro nmen t a l  powers, i ts r u l in gs prov i d e d  t he s t a m p  o f  
approv a l  for broad i n te rp re t a t i ons  o f  t re a t y  a r t i c l e s  t h at fac i l i t a t e d  
such ce n t ra liza t io n .  UK 
2. 0. Free Trade versus En vironmenrai Protection 
[ n  both E urope a n d  t h e  U . S . ,  courts  r 8 t h e r  t h a n  regul a t o rs h ave 
had to det e rm i n e  w h e n  n a t i o n a l  enviro n m e n tal protec t i o n  mea­
s ur e s  t a k e n  by Member States a re consis t e n t  w i t h  the economic 
goa l  of  fre e  t rade w i t h i n  a n  i n tegr a t ed eco n o m i c  market In  bo t h  
p laces. state legi s l a tu res h a ve a tt e m p t e d  t o  i n t roduce s t r ict  a n d  fa r 
re ach i ng e nv i ro n me n t a l  protecti o n  m easures w h ich m a y  i n  so m e  
c i rc umstances h i nd e r  free t rade. 1l1i s  a l most  c l assic free t rade ver­
s us e n v i ro n m e n t a l  protecti o n  confl i c t  h as b e e n  dea l t  w i t h  in t he 
U.S.  u n d e r  t he Com m e rce C l a use a n d  i i1 E urope u nder t he A rt i c l e s  
2 R  e t  seq. o f  t h e  EC Trea ty, which a i m  a t  t he p ro m o t ion of  eco­
nomic  i n tegrat i o n  i n  t h e  E uropean m arke t .  
O v e r  t h e  period from 1 940 t o  ! 995 ,  A m e r i c a n  fed e r�ll co u rt s  
r a re l y ,  i f  e v e r .  s a i d  t h a t  a n y  se t o f  act i v i t i e s  \Ve re b e y o n d  the cons t i ­
t u t i o n <l l  l i m i ts o f  fed e r a l  regu l a to ry a u t h or i t y .  'Illrough cJ u t  t h i s  
period . t h e  federa l cou rts acted as i f  they· we re advoca tes for. 
rath er t h a n  j u dges o f, t h e  cons t i t u t io n a l i ty of fe d e ra l regul a t ory 
e x p a n s i u n i s m .  Incleecl , in t h e  S up re me Court 's  j ur isprude nce d ur ­
i n g  t h is t i m e ,  t he s i g n i ficance o f  t h e  cons t i t u t i o n a l  a u t h o r i z a t i o n  o f  
federal  reg u l at i o n  o f  i n t e rstate com me rce was n o t  t h a t  t he cla use 
l i m i ted federal  powers.  b u t  t hat  s tate  reg u l a t i o n:; i n terfe ri ng wi t h  
t h e deve lo p m e n t  a n d  o p e ra t i o n  o f  i n t e rs t a t e  m a rkets  were t h e m ­
se l ves unconst i t u t i on a l . 13" U n d e r  t h is i n t e rp re t a t i o n  o f  t h e  C o m ­
m e rce C l a use - k nown a s  t h e  d o rm a n t  Comm e rce Cla use -- t he 
S u preme Court  s truck d o w n  as uncons t i t u t io n a l  s t a te l aws t h at l i m ­
i ted the i m port a t i o n  o f  sol i d  m u nicipal  and indus t ri a l  waste i n t o  
t h e  s t a te 1 .w a n d  l oca l l a ws t h a t  req u i re d  l oca l d i sposal o !  loca l ly 
ge n e r a t e d  s o l i d  waste . 1 1 1 The Court  reasoned t h a t  such s t a t e  a n d  
... ; ( ,•(' Kc' k llil' i l .  1\egu{aror.v r�:'flerolis!!L \llfJrtl t1(ltC ?\, <It l )  l 
: '" For �� ckLn lcd d i ,;cussiu 1 1  ,,f h<ilh the U . S  Supreme ( ·nurt",; ck rc-rmin: l l lun  t h a t  kckral  
e n v i ronmc:n t :i l  rq:ulat ion is broadly j ust i fiable u nder t h e Cummt.:rcc ( " lau:-;c:. : tnJ it:-; cor rc·· 
spnn J i nt: clctc·rm ina t iun that  t h e  dormant  Curnrncrcc Cl:lllse dooms muO'I st: t tc rcgui:H i(ln 
that  a t t cmpb to crc·atc s tale or local self-sufficicncy in managing natural  rcs,>urces and 
\\ ; . s tc ,  sc'l' J:tsnn Scutt  Johnston. lhe hugcdy <4 Cemmli::mion: Tlu: Fu!iucal Fu>nomics ul 
.· \mnican :\ awmf RC.\ I i / / 1"\"/' Fedl!rulism . 7-+ U .  C< > t  < > . I . . R t .v. -+07. f, l J-63:--: ( ? l ll i3 ) .  
i Jii .'icc h 1rt G r: l l iot San i tary Land fil l .  I nc. v .  M ich.  Dcp"t  of \J a t ur:d !<:cs . .  SU-+ l S . .  i53 
t l '19..:: ) ;  ( (}) PhiL!tklphia v . .  '-'cw Jcrscy. 137 U.S. 6) 7 ( l 97o) 
(",\: .\ C:t rhunc. I nc .  v. Tuw n ol Clark-;town. \J.Y . .  S l l l S . .  �:-n ( l 'N·� ) .  
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local l aws had e ffect ive l y  created barr ie rs to the i nterstate market 
i n  sol id waste. A s  a factual  matter th is  i s  correct, given that  an  
i nterstate market i n  so l id  waste d i sposal c learly exists and  d id  ex is t  
at the t ime of  the Court's decis ions:  waste from t he dense ly popu­
lated state of New Jersey, for example i s  carried by truck and rail 
for d isposal i n  l arge, ''mega- landfi l l s" located in the less dense ly  
populated states o f  Pennsylvania and O hio. Hence ,  i f  states l ike  
Pennsylvania t ry  to  ban the importat ion o f  waste and states such  as  
New Jersey preven t  sol id waste exportat ion, they obviously inter­
fere wi th the i n te rstate marke t i n  sol id waste d isposa l .  
Such state and l ocal l aws, however, were designed to achi eve 
local se l f-suffic iency i n  so l id  waste d isposal .  In the 1 980s, at a t ime  
of widespread concern that landfi l l  capacity would soon be  
exhausted, there was  i ndeed a nat ional  goal of  encouraging state 
and local governmen ts to assume responsib i l i ty for local d isposal o f  
loca l ly generated sol id  waste .  B y  encouraging and even forcing 
sub-nat ional governments i n  l and-poor states such as  New Jersey to 
fi nd a l ternatives  to land d isposal o f  sol id  waste .  waste import and 
export bans were a way to achieve that goal of waste d isposal sel f­
suff ic iency. Prominen t  among a l ternatives  to land d isposal were 
waste reduction and recyc l ing. which were genera l ly  v iewed as 
superior to landfi l l  d isposal on e nvironmental protect ion grounds.  
S t i l l ,  there is  p len ty of  room for landfi l l s  in  states that  a re l ess 
densely populated. and .  d ue in part to the adven t  or  strict federa l  
regulation. there are significant economies of scale i n sol id waste 
landfi l l  construction and operat ion .  Beginn i ng in the 1 990s. the 
cheapest way for N ew Jersey towns to dispose of the i r  munici pal 
waste was to transport i t  out of  state for d isposal in l andfi l l s  located 
in the re lat i ve ly  l and-r ich sta tes of Pennsylvani a  and Ohio. 111 is  
i n terstate d isposal opti on severe ly weakened the i ncent ive for New 
Jersey towns to reduce and recyc le .  Hence,  by ru l ing that the fed­
eral Consti tution forbids state and local laws from b anning solid 
waste imports and exports, the Supreme Court has to some degree 
undermined the once-national goal of creat ing l ocal i ncent ives for 
the reduct ion and recycl i ng of mun icipal  solid waste . 
Taken toge ther, the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause and 
dormant  Commerce C lause cases s uggest that in interpre ting the 
Commerce Clause to furt her  the development  of the  nat ional mar­
ket .  the Court has often sacrificed environmental protect ion.  1 -\2 
1-12 In th is  we agree with  Richard J. Lazarus. R!!storing Wha(s En vironmenw/ A bow 
Envirolllnental l.mv in the Supreme Court. 47 UCLA L. R l'.v. 703 (2000). 
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From the point  of view of furthering  interstate commerce.  federal 
envi ronmenta l  regulat ion,  wh i l e  o ften m isguided, is  superior to 
sub-nat iona l  regu lat ion  because i t  rep laces what might  otherw i se 
be a we l ter of  varying and  somet imes con fl ic t ing s tate env i ronmen­
ta l  l aws and regulat ions w i th  a system based on  nat iona l ly  un i form. 
tech nology-based standards. Such na t iona l ly  un i form standards 
decrease the t ransact ion costs of i nt erstate i ndustr ia l  expansion 
and are.  on th is  v iew of  the world, des irable .  Even if  i t  is arguably 
more env ironmenta l ly  p rotect ive,  s ta te  and l oca l  environm enta l  
regu la t ion is  viewed as  i nhere n t l y  suspect ,  not  on ly  because sub­
n at iona l  var iat ion i ncreases regulatory comp l i ance costs for busi­
ness, but because of  the s t rong suspicion that sub-nat ional  e nviron­
menta l  laws and regu lat ions are actua l ly  a disguised form o f  local 
trade protect ionism. 
Of  course. one might argue that the re was no th ing  that the 
Supreme Court could have clone  to avert or s low the pace of  feder­
a l izat ion anyway. In  the extreme case. i f  Congress, i n  passing  one 
federa l  regu la tory statute after another ,  was  s imply do ing wha t  the  
vast majori ty o f  Amer ican voters wanted them to do.  and i f  the 
courts h ad t ried to hold such statutes unconst i tut ionaL Congress 
and the  people may have amended the Const i tu t ion .  e i the r  to spe­
cifica l l y  authorize federal  env i ronmenta l  legis lat ion of a par t icular 
sort ,  as occurred in  Germany , ' -� '  or to d im in ish the const i tu t iona l  
authori ty  of the courts. In  the a l ternat ive.  perhaps such j ud ic ia l  
i nterven t ion was unnecessary. because the A merican pol i t ica l  sys­
tem i tse l f  creates pol i t i ca l  i nce n t ives that  l im i t  federal  regula tory 
i ntrusions i n to  matters where states and  local i t i es rea l ly do \\'an t  to 
preserve t he i r  regulatory autonomy . 1 •1·1 
Quesrions such as these con t in ue to occupy American const i tu­
t ional  theorists. ' ·'' In the meanti me ,  the Supreme Court has t aken  
a new look  a t  i ts j urisprudence o n  t he authori ty o f  Congress to  
regulate i n terstate commerce, and has  cleciclecl tha t  t he re are after 
a l l  some l im i ts on  Congressiona l  author i ty under  the Commerce 
� '-1 The German federal con � t i t u t i on has  more speci fic and stronger ,tares rights protec· 
t ions t h a n  docs the American cons t i t ut ion.  and comprehen>ive federal  air po l l u ti on legisla­
t ton in Germany did not pass until  l Y74. after t h e  federal const i t ution h a d  bt:cn amended 
t o  specifical ly  a u t horize such federal regulation.  See RAYMOND H. Do-..1 tN tnz I I I . TH E 
EN\"I RON\!E NIM. Me > V E �I E'-:T 1 :--: G E RMA'-:Y: PROPHETS A'-:D P I ONEERS, l i\7 ! - 1 97 1 .  at l lJ3 
( 1992 ) :  Rodi. supra note l l il .  at 20 1 (describing the: const i tutionally concurren t  powc:rs of 
the: Federation and Ltillller). 
,.,., For a thorough explicat ion of th is  possibi l i ty ,  see Larry D. Kramc:r. Pulling rhe Polir­
ics Back inro rhe ?olirica/ Safeguards of Federalism. lOO COL.LM. L. REv. 2 1 5  ( 2000) .  
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C l a u se . 1 "' !\'l os t i m porta n t l y for pu rposes of th i s essay.  t h e  Cour t 
has d e c i d e d  t h a t  t he federal Comme rce C l a use does no t pro vi de 
carte b l a n c h e  au t h ori t y for fede ra l e n v i ro nrne n ta l  regu l a t ion . 
Re ce n t ly . i n  Solid Waste 1\gencv of Northern Cook Coum_v 
(S �VA iVCC) v. United States A rmy Corps of Engineers . 1 47 t h e  Court 
h e ld t h a t  j ust because i n t rastate  wet lands i solated from navigable  
\Vaters happened t o  provide habltJ.t for birds \vhic h  crossed state 
bo u n da ries in their a n n ua l m igrat i ons . i t  d i d  no t  mean there was a 
s u ffi c ien t l y  s t rong nexus t o  i n t e rs ta t e  com m e rce to p rov id e co nsti­
t u t i onal j us t ificat ion for federal  reg u l a t io n  o f  developme n t  i n  i so­
l a t ed wet la n ds ( t h ose n o t  cl osel y  con n ected t o  navigable wate rs ) .  
This dec is ion i s  i tse lf i ro n i c ,  i n  t h a t  \v h i k  m an y  l ocal  deve l o pm e n t  
decis ions  do not h <.JVC i n te r-j u risd i c t i o n a l  spi l love r e ffects. t h e  
a ggregate e ffect o f  l o c a l  Jecis ions  t o  develop w e t l a nds ca uses a l oss 
uf h abi ta t t h at se riously i mpZ� i rs the  hea l th  o f  m i g ra t o ry b i rd popu­
l a t ions .  ge n e ra t i n g a ne ga t i ve exte rn a l i t y t h a t  c rosses n o t  o n l y  s t a t e 
l i n es but  a lso n a t ional  borders. I nd e e d .  fede r a l  n a tu ra l resou rce 
re gu lat ion mav fa i r l y be sa id to h ave heg u n  w i t h  t h e  1 906 M igra­
tory B i rd Trea t y  be tween the U n i t e d  Sta tes.  G re a t  B ri ta i n  ( o f  
which Canada was t hen s t i l l  a p a rt )  a n d  lvl e x.ico. tloweve r ironic  i t  
m :1y be . for pu rposes o f  t h i s  essay. t h e  n tost s i g n i fica n t  t h i ng a bou t 
t h e  S H'.-\ NCC decision is t h at i t  has be e n vie>vcd by Fed e ra l  rcgu l a ­
t l l rs :IS r e ,; t ric t i n g  t h e i r  regu latory j urisd ict ion . a n d  put t i ng t h e  reg­
u Lt t idn of  isol a t e d  we t l a n ds back in t h e  ha nds of s t a t e  a nd loca l 
rcgul : t to ry amhorities. ·n1e lesson or t h is case is t h at. if i t  proceeds 
i n  a s u i tJ b l y  c a u t ious a nd c;tse-by-ctS<..: m a n ner.  t he S u preme Co u rt 
c a n  i ndeed i m pose s i g n i fi ca nt c o ns t i t u t i o n a l  !im i t a t io n s  o n  t h e  
SC\ lre of  fe de ra l e n vi ronme n t a l  rcgu l a t iu n .  l i m i t a t io ns t h a t  do n o t  
t r igge r a n  a t t e m p t  to a m e n d  t h e  const i t u t io n  t o  crea t e  smne t h i n g 
l ike  a fedcr�1l cons1 i1ut ional  right or tu snmchow repl <lCe or reform 
t h e  S u prcll1L' Court .  
Above wc a rg ue d that  t he E u rop�..·a n leg isblll re h o lds most o f 
t h e  decis io n - m a ki ng au t hor i t y over t h e  s h i ft of powe rs to t h e  E ur o ­
p e a n  l eve l .  There i s .  however .  o n e  a re a  i n  w h i c h  t h e  E CJ has 
cl ea rly b c c n  the dominant acwr: its  c ase bw on de t ermini ng wbe 
n ;1t i on a l c n v i ro n me n t a l  p ro tec t io n m easures by Member States ar 
i n co n s i s t �..· n t  \\ i t h  t he Treaty's o\·err i d i n g  goal o f  E u rope a n  ceo 
!Will i e  i n t egra t io n . Li k e  t he U . S .  S u preme Court i n  i l s Co m m e rc 
Clau:se cases. t h e  ECJ i s  t h e  a u thor i UHive ins t i t ut i on i n  dec i d i n  
� ' ru h.:J S t a h .:"- \ Ln�'t.: / .  _'1 1 4  L . S .  )4\) { l �)\)5 ! { huklin� t h a t  t h e  �un.-.; - ,;.:huoh c�: 
t ! t  ! n�u C! i l' ! c n t  ! t i  j t> . t i t �  fcJt_'Ld inh:n c n i i • H1 unJcr tht.' C� >nlnlcfL�t: C!.tusc L 
l :-; \ ;q \ � ( i( ) \  \ 
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whet he r  M e m b e r  State l aws a nd regu l a t io n s  v io late  t he go:l l of 
economic i n tegrat ion i n  t h e  E u ro p e a n  U n ion.  The basi s  for t h is 
case l aw c a n  be fou n d  i n  t h e  E C  Treaty :  accord i n g  to t he p r ov i s io ns 
of A rt i c le 2� er seq. of t h e E C  Trea ty . a l l  qu ant i ta t ive i m port  
rest rict ions and me asures h a v i n g  equ i v a l e n t  e ffect a rc prohib­
ited . 1 4·" A Me m be r S t a t e .  t h e re fo r(:' .  can no t  i m pose a b l a n k e t  
res t rict i o n  on or p roh i b i t  t h e  i m po rt a t i o n  o f  va r io us products o n  
t h e  grou n d  t h a t  t hey are e n v i ro n m e n t a l l y  h azardous. S uc h  rt.. s t ri c­
t ions may be j us t i f i ed by o n e  o f  t h e  var ious  p u b l i c  i n t e re s t  e xcep­
t ions c re a t e d  by the  Treaty i tse l f. 1 49 l f  such a rest r icti o n  does n o t  
fa l l  u n d e r  o n e  o f  t he p u b l i c i n te re s t  e xcept ions.  t he n  t h e  ECJ 
j udges its lega l i ty u nder a . .  rule of reason . .  \.Vh ich perm i ts n a t io n a l  
l aws t h a t  may have an e ffect  on t h e  free m o veme n t  o f  g.oods . .  i n  so 
far as t hese provisions m a y  be recogn i ze d  as be ing necessary i n  
orde r to sa t i sfy m <t rH.ia tory requ i re m e n t s . " ' '" To survive scru t i n y  
u n d e r  t h i s  t est .  n a t io n a l  t rade-res t r i c t i ng m e a s u res m us t  1 )  a pp l y i n  
a n o n -d i scri m i na tory wJy t o  bot h  n a t io n a l  �md i m ported p rod ucts.  
2 )  create a ma nda to ry req u i re m e n t :  :1 )  h ave a t r a d e - re s t r ic t i n g  
i mp a c t  p ropor t ion a t e t o  t he i n t erest s t h e  m e a s u res sec k  t \ J  p ro t e c t .  
a nd .  4 )  n o t  a p p l y  t o  a n  e n vi ro n me n t a l  i ssue to w h i c h  a speci fic 
t re a t y  p rov is ion appl ies. ' ' ' The g.oa l  of t h i s  case law is to pwtect  
rhc  fu n c t i o n i ng of t he common m a r k e t  hy preve n t i ng .\l c m bc r  
S t ates  from u s i ng l oc a l  e n v i ro n m e n t a l  re g u l a t i o n  t l )  t iHO\V u p b<HTi ­
e rs t o  free t rade . 1 5 �  
Th u s .  in  a ppl y i n g t h i s  r u k  o f  r�..·ason tes t .  t he ECJ places suhsl < l l 1 -
t i a l  we i gh t o n  t h e ove r a l l  E C  Tre �u y goal  u f  frec i n � t he L u ro p e < t n  
m a r k e t  from t rade rc.q ri c t i on'i .  Howc\·c r. i t  h a s  : ! ! so g ivcn  we i g h !  
t u  t h e  v a l u e  o f  h a v i n!l- !\ k m b c r  S t a tes  t ; t k .._, respon s i h i l i t \  fur t h e i r  
\ l Wl1 po l l u t i l ll1 .  p l a c i n g  i t  i n  a m u rc rt-: x i h k  ro�t u rt.: t h < t n  t h �: l : . s .  
" r c  Tr<.::HY : rrts.  2 S  , ., .\<< f. 
"'' One: P'''' lhil i t \· i >  tu u'..: :\ r l rclt.: _)() of the: FC ' l r<.:: i l \' which t:"\c" l l l l 'h th·�,,· p t u h 1 b 1 · 
t lu!b. inttT uliu. t }n t�fPllrh.b 1 \ l . . . l b....: pr, lh:Ci iun of ht:;t l t h  : l l h . l  l i ic  , l f  l i U l lL !n� .  : i l l ! IH �d" t H  
l)iLtnts··. 
L '• '  C:t'<' 1 2\ J:/:�. R..: w ..:-/.c n l r:il :\l i ' - H u nJc,!ll< > I H >J'< •h·c r w :tl ! u n_l! lur B L ! Il l l l \\ <.: 1 11 . l < i"i•i 
L .C-. R .  6-�ti. For a dt..:L t ikd dJ,l:u�  .... ion. -.. : •. : .\ t ich; l�i  Duhc rt�· . ilurd (�lf,,t ' '- : ul � l  i·_ ,n·iron n ;, ·n 
ret! Pnlh. lf1/t•\: .-\ 11 .·\ ul (O !nil rr>rt'f!lfiO!I .' . tn _-; T i l l  ) I \ H . I H  I( , ..._ ( lf  F t f(( l l ' t ·\ · .  , . '\. I I � ( )". 
' l l· :-: t .·\ 1 1 . .-\" ':>7 ( l l . t n  \t >nbc·n d "d . c•ck . ::: I K J-l ). 
l ' l  Set' Rt:ll c·/.en !ra l _,\ t i .  J <l ? l l  f.:. (  · . K  h-)'.1. lhv t h rc·,· l 'l < l l l;!ed , ,_. , 1  nut  l inn) i ; l  ! he  I t: \  I 
" ''s t ile result nt' l: ll..:r (.l\t.:S rdll l l l l:! th.: r,·,uli  1 n  t h ..:  ,·nc:d C:bc. .\, ·, · \ l i t : u,·l l '< • i : n· ..:, 
.\ Ltdu ru. florniun_\ tUTti f)I ") \'rJtli.lf i t ' t '  in Frc{· tlo\'t 'lfi t 'tll , in S i . !{ \  J ( ! ,;,;  \ '\ i }  Fl� J i.· \ l r  �\ L \H :-.. t 
'"' ElJ LAW .\ 1 ,  .\:2--lS ( \1 .td' :\nd<.:nas & \\'ulf- Hc n nin!' Rut h .  t.:Lk, 2fH I� J  ! l , m·,· , c· r " 
Jctai k:d version of the t �st i� l a id  <)Lit in t lw (>pi nion nf the .-\d v<>cak ( i .:nd:d Opin <Pil  "' 
.. \JH1Catc General Sir ( i urdun Sh nn .  Ca,;..: .10:2/Sb. ( ·,)I I J ! l l . l l l l f  the Fur< > ! 'C :Hl ( < l l 1 1 11 1 ll l l i t ro 
' ·  Kinguom of  Dt:nmark.  l lJ:->;-> E C R  l6if7.  --lt • �2 .  
1 "'.! Set· Kl..' fcrnc..:n .  R,·t:ultiton· rt·<lr·r(;{;"\,n. "'HflrtJ nnrc c-\ .  : 1 t  i �U. 
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S upreme Court .  For instance,  i n  a n  early appl icat ion o f  the r u l e  of  
reason test ,  t h e  so-c a l l e d  Danish Bottles case, t h e  E CJ he ld  that  
D e n mark's m a n datory system of returnable containers for beer 
and soft drinks could be j us t i fied under " e nv i ronme n t a l  protec­
t ion" even t hough that  system h a d  trade restricting effects . 1 53 I n  
1 990, t he E CJ strengthened t h e  va lue o f  e nvironm e n t a l  protecti o n  
u nder  t h e  ' 'rule o f  reason "  w h e n  i t  decided t h at even though a b a n  
o n  t h e  i mportat ion o f  foreign waste i mposed b y  t h e  D utch Wal loon 
region was clearly d iscrimi na tory, i t  was nonet h eless j ust i fi e d  by 
the principle o f  "preven ti ve action at  [ the]  source. "  1 54 The E CJ 
was roundly crit icized for i ts ru l ing that  the  principle o f  preventive 
act ion at  the source - esse n t i a l l y  a waste se l f-sufficiency principle ­
e ffect ively had priority over t h e  fre edom o f  trade a n d  non-disc rimi­
nat ion principles that  were central  to t he concept o f  the EU . Crit­
i cs not  only q u estioned whether the  Wal loon m easure met  t h e  
proport ion a l i ty requ irement,  but  a lso argued t h a t  u p h o l d i ng 
i mport bans under t h e  prevention-at-source princ ip le  could cau;>e 
the l oss o f  economies  o f  sca l e  in waste transportation and d ispo­
sa l . 1 55 Perhaps i n  response to such crit icism, in 1 996 the  E CJ reaf­
firmed that  the goal o f  free trade wi th in  E u rope could trump t h e  
prevent ion-at-sou rce principle w h e n ,  i n  the  D usseldorp c ase . i t  
i n v a l idated e xport restr ict ions o n  o i l  fi l ters i m posed b y  t h e  D ut c h  
gove rnment . 1 5n The E CJ found t h a t  t h e  c lear ly  t rade-restrict ive 
nature o f  the l a w  outweighed the  D utch government's  j usti ficat ion 
t h a t  the D utch e n terprise responsible for waste m an(lge m e n t  ( AV R  
Chem i e )  cou l d  o n l y  operate i n  a profi table m a n n e r  i f  a suffic ient  
supply  of waste could be guaranteed. 1 5 7  Thi s  Dusseldorp case 
h e nce makes c lear  that  t h is · 'prevent ion at t h e  source " pri nc i p l e  
coul d n o t  j us t i fy t h e  D utch regu lat ion which i n  fact proh ibited t h e  
D utch producers t o  l o o k  for cheaper solut ions abroad and forced 
t h e m  to supply t h e  oil fi l ters '" a t  the source''  to t he D utch waste 
management company.  
1'·' Case 302/86. Comm·n v .  Denmark. 1 9o8 E . C . R  4607. 
1'-' Case C-2/90. Cornm'n v. Belgi u m .  1 992 E.C.R.  1 -443 1 .  
J'c See Peter vnn Wilmowsky. Waste Disposal in the lmema/ J!arke1: The S1a1e of Pla r 
Ajier 1/ie LCJ's Ruling on 1he Walloon lmporl Bun . 30 Co�t�tON \IL"RKF"I .  L. R r  v .  54 1 
( 1 993) .  
1 ' "  Case: C-203!96. Chemische Afvalstofkn D usseldorp B V  v. M inister van Vo!kshuis­
vest ing. R u im t e l ijke OrJening en M i l i eubehcer. 1 998 E . C. R  1 -4075. 
15 7  Moreover, the ECJ remarks that t h is is so .. even if the national measure in q uest ion 
could be just i fied by reasons rc l a 1 i ng to the pwtection of the environm e nt . ·· Sa Harrie 
Tem rllln k .  From Danish Bon/es 10 Danish Bees: The Dynamics of Free Movemell/ of Goods 
and Environmenllll Protection-a Case Law Analysis. in I THE Yt:.-\!UH.>OK < >!- E 1  :Rui'L\N 
ENVI RONMENT;\L LAw 73 ( Ha n  Somscn et al. cds . . 2000 ) .  
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The ECJ ru l ing in the Dusseldorp case seems to make sense fro m  
a n  economic  perspect ive:  b y  forcing a l l  producers o f  used o i l  fi l te rs 
to use the faci l it ies o f  AVR Chemic,  the Dutch law d id i ndeed p ro­
mote local waste se l f-sufficiency. On the other hand.  prod ucers 
were preven ted from using cheaper  a l ternat ives abroad and were 
forced to pay monopol i s t ic  prices for waste t reatment  by AVR 
Chemic. TI1e Dusseldorp decis ion o f  the ECJ t h us can be seen as a 
way o f  exposin g  h igh cost faci l i t i e s  l i ke  AVR t o  compet i t ion and 
enabl ing producers to look for more cost e ffective a l ternatives on 
the competitive European market. 
3. THE Two ECONOMIC A PPROACH ES TO 
ENVlRON!VI E NTA L FEDERA LISI'vl 
There are two great theoretica l tradit ions in  publ ic  economics. 
TI1e first, neoclassical pub l ic finance theory, is  concerned primari l y  
wit h  t he norm at i ve quest ion o f  how socia l -welfare-maximizing gov­
ernments should set pol ic ies so as to provide and fi nance op t ima l  
levels of publ ic goods. The second, pub l i c  choice theory i s  prima­
ri ly positive, with a focus on exp la in ing how economic self- in terest 
can explain pol i t ica l  as we l l  as economic behavior_ l :'K Whi l e  there 
are overlaps between these two schools - wi th  the tools of publ ic  
finance increasingl y be ing used to look a t  posi t ive quest ions. and 
much of  the work in  publ ic  choice carry ing a t  least  impl ici t norma­
t ive implicat ions - the d iv is ion be tween normative publ ic f inance 
and posi tive publ ic choice analysis i s  especia l ly useful i n  o rganizi ng 
our discussion of  t he economic analysis of environmenta l  regula­
tory cen t ra l izat ion.  On the normative s ide, there is  a l a rge eco­
nomic l iterature on the question of whe n  re gul atory ce n t ral ization 
may be socia l ly desirab le .  On the posi t ive s ide,  the economic q ues­
tion is when and why we ohserve environme n t a l  regulatory ce ntral­
izat ion .  In t h is part of the art ic le ,  we survey the normat ive a nd 
positive economics of regulatory centralization. 
I '' For a comparison of these t wo tradi tions hy two foundational figures. see J ,\.\ll s l'v1. 
B t  ' C H A N .-\ N  & Rl< ·HARD A. M t  'S< • R A '  E.  Purn. tc FtNANCF ,\ND Pt : H u e  Ct I <  >I< · r.: Twu C< '"·  
ri<AS I !Nt ; V!SI< >NS ( )}- l f ! E  S J..\ !F ( J <Jl)9). 
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3. 1 .  Normative Regulalory Federalism 
3. 1. 1 .  The A1atching Principle and its Assumptions: 
[Vo l .  27 :205 
Decentralization versus Cemralization and A lfocative 
Ejflciency in Public Good Provision 
Like economics i n  genera l ,  the  normat ive publ i c  fin a nce t heory 
on  regu latory federal i sm beg ins  from a defau l t  pos i t ion  that favors 
regula tory decen tral izat ion and i nter-jur isdict iona l  compet i t ion .  
Oates'  s em ina l  " ma tch i ng pri nc ip le"  says tha t  i f  pre ferences over 
pub l ic good leve ls (and types) vary across local  1 �') j ur isd ic t ions .  
then t he  overa l l  g loba l  opt imum requ i res  vary ing  l eve l s  (and types )  
o f  pub l i c  good across j u ri sd ic t ions, and th i s  goa l  can  be best 
ach ieved by g iv ing  control  over pub l i c  good provis ion to such loca l  
j ur isd ic t ions. 1 60 On th i s  v iew, decen tra l i za t ion i mproves a l loca t i ve 
effi c iency .  
Recen t  theoret i ca l  work has shown that  decen t ra l izat i on  may 
h ave t he add i t iona l  bene fi t  o f  improving  gove r nmenta l  i ncen t ives 
i n  prov id ing the publ ic  good . Essen t i a l ly. this i ncen t ive e ffec t  is 
d ue to contractua l  i ncomple ten ess: when  regul ators cannot  be con­
trac tua l ly rewarded o n  the  basis o f  how wel l  t he i r  pol ic ies  sa t i s fy 
c i t izen preferences, t he  best way to mot ivate them to adopt po l i ci es  
that  match c i t i zen  pre fere nce i s  to  g ive  such ci t ize ns the  r ight  to  
vote  out  unsat isfactory pol i t i c ians ( and publ ic  good provis ion 
pol i c ie s ) .  1 " 1  
�f11e match ing pr inc ip le  rests upon a n umber of assumpt ions,  v io­
l at ion  o f  anv of  which weakens or  e l im i nates t he case for decen tra l ­
ized pub l ic good provis ion .  Tha t  i s ,  by  re lax ing i ts under ly ing 
assumpt ions. the match ing pr inc ip le  gene ra tes advi ce as to when 
regu latory cen t ra l iza t ion may improve i n ter -j urisdictiona l  a lloca­
t i ve e ffic iency .  
I ><I We: w i l l often usc: " loca l "  tn refer to a n y  decc:nt r; t l iznl k v c l  ol gove rn m e n t ,  i n d ud i ng 
both statc:s and loe:J l i ties wit h i n  .:oun trics and,  i n  the Europe a n  con text, to n at ional  j u ris­
d i c t ions. Wh e n we wish to distinguish  bLtwecn ,  fur example. state or provinc ia l  gove rn­
m e n t  a n d  n : l l illn:ll governme n t  i n  the E u rope a n  con text .  we sha l l  do so c:.xpl ici t l y .  
I nn See W A l .l .. ·" 1·. F. O A  1 ·1-.s . FiscAL FF 1  !1·1{,\ I . JS'I  ( l 9Tl. ) .  For an extended app l ica t ion uf  
( l : J tc-,;'s n u t c h i n g  princ1 pk to argue for I he cnvirun m c n J a l  regu l a 10ry cku.: m ra l iz:J t i o n .  sec 
B 1 · n . t · R & :vhcLY. sl !J>ra note l l.-1. 
I n : See Rngcr B .  tvlverson. 1-i·tferu/ism ant! lnn't!li\'cs _;;,,. Success of DemocnnT. I ()..1 
PnL .. SCI . 3 ( 2006) ( considenng t he separa l e  dkct or how decen t ralization crc'ates i nce n ­
t ives ft1r good pol icies by givi ng local pol i t ica l  llffic ia ls  < l  chance to establ ish good reputa­
t ions t h a t  thev can then u s c  in  con ten d i n g  for  h igh..:r. n a t i o n a l  llffice): Pa u l  Sea bright .  
A ccountabi!itv and Decenlralisllliun in Go\'i'nllllt'l/1: rl l/ !ncompleJe Comraus Mudd. �0 
E 1 · 1o >. E< <> N .  R 1. v . 6 1  ( 1 991}): Jean H in d ri k s  & Ben Lockwood. Ccmrali::.wion and Pulitical 
A cmwual!ilin· ( CO R E  Discussion Paper No. 200-l/52 .  20t i-l ) .  
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a) The Possibilify of Non- Unifonn Centralized Provision 
First . the matching pr inci ple assumes that  i f  t he publ ic  good is 
provided cen tral ly ,  rather  than locally, then i t  w i l l  be provided at a 
level  which i s  un i form across j urisdict ions. The a l locat ive ineffi ­
c iency of central ized provision indeed fol lows d irect ly, on the 
matching pr incip le ,  from a presumed equ i l ibr ium in  which j u ri sdic­
t ions have varying p references ove r the publ ic good and hence 
varying optima l  levels o f  provision,  b ut the  central ized au thori ty is 
restricted to c hoosing a single level (and type) of good. 1 62 If t hi s  is 
not  true.  and the central  government  can vary t he level o f  the pub­
l ic good across j ur isdict ions and wil l  also set the l evel o f  the pub l i c  
good equa l  to tha t  demanded by the median voter  i n  each j urisdic­
t ion .  then central ized and decen t ral ized provis ion generate ident i ­
cal outcomes. Now one may doubt whether the i ncent ives fac ing a 
centra l  legis lature or regu la tor are real ly such that  the regu la to r  
w ill  se t  levels o f  publ ic good t ha t  vary opt imal ly across j u risdic­
t ions, bu t  that  is a posi ti ve quest ion ,  one that  h as been addressed in  
the l i teratur e and which  we d iscuss be low. t"J 
h) Economies of 5)cale, Preference Similarity and the Strong 
Ca.'ie _f()r Cemralizarion 
Perhaps t h e  most basic impl ic i t  assumpt ion u nderlying the 
m atching pr inc ip le and the economic argument  for decentra l izat ion 
i s  that  there are no economies of scale in  t he prov i s i o n  of the  pub­
l ic good. When s uch economies of sca le  exist ,  every person in a 
federa t ion may be better off w i t h  cheaper, a l be i t  u n i form a n d  n on ­
opt i rna l , federal provis ion t h a n  w i t h  more customized b u t  more 
expensive l o c a l  p rovis ion . 1 �>-l Moreover,  as the degree of prefer­
ence s imi lar i ty across j ur isdictions decreases - i .e . ,  as people 
become m ore s im i lar i n  the ir  tas te for the pub l ic good - th e  econo-
1 • •2 Sec 1 he Jiscu.�s1on in Wallace E.  Oatc�. A n  Essay on Fiscal Federalism. 37 J. E ro:--:. 
L r r .  1 1 :20. 1 1 2 1 - 1 1 22 ( ! 999). 
; , \  A lso. in t he Europe a n  c n v i rvnmcntal  kderal ism d iscussion . t h e:  q ucstion has arisen 
whethe r  ce n t r a l izat ion necessari ly means harmonizat ion.  An <>lwi, ,us a l terna t ive is in deed 
ro s h i ft powcrs ( for cxampk. because of econumies of seal<.! adva n t ages )  to the· Lccn tral  
kvcl .  hut [()  have the c<.:n lral  authori ty impose d i ff<.:rcnr i a tcd standards. Sec, e.g . . Akssan ­
d ra  A rcuri.  Conrro!/ing Environmollal Risk i n  Europe: The Complemcnrarv Role o f  an EC 
En ,·tronmenw/ Liabili1v Regime. in Tu ns< ' H R W I  V( )Cm l\·! JI . ILI 'AAN:-;I'RAKU IJ K I I F I IJ 37 
( :'OOJ ). 
l '"' 'Il1is is  a conscqu..:ncc of Ruger H. Gurdon. An Op1imal IiiXorion ,\ppmach ro Fiscal 
r;'rlcraltsm. l):-\ Q .J .  E\ nN. 567 ( l <)){l ).  whosc mod e l  i ncorpora tes n<ll only ecmwmic:s uf 
sc·a l c .  but  i m c r -J urisdicuon al  ..: xlcrna litics. 
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m ies  of scal e  n ecessary to j ust i fy centra l ized provision become 
smal l e r  and smal ler .  
c) !nrer-jurisdictional Exrernalities ( Trans-boundary Pollwion) 
Another  basic assumpt ion under ly ing the ma tch ing princ ip le is 
that there are no i n ter-j u risd ic t iona l  externa li t ies  in the provis ion 
of the l ocal publ ic  good. 1 h5 Air  and water pol lu t ion very often  spi l ­
love r  across j urisd ict ional  l i nes ,  however,  and so the case for 
decen tralized po l lu t ion regu la t ion w i l l  depend i n  large part on  
whether or not one be l i eves tha t  local j ur isdict ions can  t hemse lves 
resolve such externalities. Now were one to assume that local 
j ur i sdictions are funct iona ll y  ide nt ica l to p rivate parties .  t hen  the 
Coase Theorem 1M  would seem to imply tha t  even \Vi t h  in te r-j uris­
d ic t iona l  externa l i t ies .  the case for decentra l ization remains stro ng. 
A fter  a l l ,  if the costs and benefi ts of pol l ut ion  control are exper­
ienced local ly .  then i t  wou ld  seem that local j urisdict ions have the 
best i n format ion about and abi l i ty to  con t rol  such pol l ut ion.  and so 
are best posi t ioned to bargain w i th  one another over pol l u t ion 
reduct ion.  1 117 
ln addit ion to the obstacles to e ffic ient  private barga in ing over 
pol lut ion reduct ion ,  1 68 however, the re are a number o f obstacles to  
i nter-jurisdictional bargaining. Fundamentally. t hese aU have to do 
e i t he r  w i th the cost and complexi ty o f  i nter-j urisdict ional  con­
t ract ing or with the l ack o f  l ocal po l i t ica l  i ncent ives to actua l ly  
e ngage i n  such transact ions :  can one rea l ly  i magine a loca l  po l i t i ­
c ian ask ing for  h ighe r  taxes to purchase a pol lu t ion reduct ion com­
m i tment of dubious c red ib i l i ty from a neighboring j ur isdict ion '? 1 o'l 
r n  th is l ight. cen tra l ized pol l ut ion regulat ion is necessary because i t  
i s  on ly  wi th in  t h e  context o f  centra l ized pol it ica l  i nst i t ut ions - such 
Ih5 S .: .:  Oates. A n  Essay on Fiscal Federalism. supra note  1 62. at 1 1 22. 
r "'' R . H .  Coas.:. The Problem of Sociul Cos1. 3 J . L. L\: EcoN. I ( 1 \J()! } ) .  
1<•7 See. e.g . . M a rk A .  Cohen.  Commenr o n  rhe Subsidiari1y Principlt' i n  European Envi­
r<JI!II!ciHal Law: An Economic Analysis. in L,,w A;<.;ll Eco:-.;OM!CS nF TUE E:-.;,·wt J;<.;l.tFsr 
1 67 ( Er l i ng EiJe & Roger van den Bergh .:us . . 1 996).  
' ''� P.:rhaps most imponan1 ly .  i ncomplete i n l'ormatiun abo u t  th.: costs and b.:ncfits or 
p<.l l l u l ion reduct ion.  See Ian Ayres & Eric Ta l ley. Solomunic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal 
Emillemcm UJ /·;u:ilirate Coasean Tr111/e. 1 0� YALE L..J . I 027 ( I  \)').'i ) : Robert C<lU t c r .  The 
Cnst of Co as e. I I  J. Ll ' <  ; .·\ 1 S 1 t · I > .  I ( 1 982) :  Joseph FJ rrc l l .  Injiml!itlion unrl th,· Cou."· 
Theurem. J .  EcoN. I'ERSl' . . Auwmn ! 9X7. at ! ! 3: Jason Scott Johnstnn . Bargaining Under 
Rules Vl'rsus Swndards. l l  J .  L. En >N. & OR\; .  256 ( 1 ')95 ) .  
16'' On t he con t n1ct ing d i fficul t ies. s e c  ' ) ()re E l lingsen. Exrcmaliries l't'I'SIIS lnrernalirics: A 
;'vfotlel of Political lm<'grcuion. 6X .J . Pt •n .  E, ·nN. 25 1 . 253 ( i 'NX ) :  C.-Y.  Cvn t h i a L i n .  Hot�· 
Shoulrl Stunrlards Be S("{ und Met:': !In lncomplerc Comracting Approach to Delegation in 
Rt:.t;ulaliun ( Apr. 1 �. 2006 ) ( u npubl ished prel i mi n a ry d ra ft ) .  a vailahle at . h t t p://ar.: .berkc­
k v .ell uico u rscs/c n vrcs _scm in a r /1'2006/dc I ega l ion  _paper.  pJ f. 
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as cen t ra l ,  democra tica l l y  e l ected legis la t u res - t h a t  cred ib l e deals 
to reduce t ra n s boundary pol l u t i o n  can b e  struck. 1 70 
d) Barriers to !mer-Jurisdictional !V!obiliry 
As i mportan t  as i t  i s  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  assum p t i o n s  t h a t  are nec­
essary for t h e  matc h i n g  pr inc ip le  t o  h o l d .  i t  i s  j us t  as  importa nt t o  
understand t h e  re lati o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t h e  matchi ng p r i n c i p l e  a n d  
i n t e rj ursi d i c t i o n a l  res id e n t i a l  mobi l it y .  Accord i n g  t o  t h e  famous 
Tiebout  mode l , 1 7 1  b y  ' 'vo t i ng wi th  the ir  fee t "  a n d  mov i ng t o  t h e  
j ur isdict ion t h a t  offers t h e i r  i d e a l  package o f  p u b l i c  goods a n d  
taxes.  res ide n t s  c re a te com p e t i t i o n  a m o ng l o c a l  j ur isd ict ions  t h a t  
u n d e r  some c i rc u m s t ances c a n  l e a d  to a w e l fare maxi m i z i ng out­
come (j u risd ict ions  m i n i mize the  cost  o f  p rovid i n g  t h e  fu l l  range o f  
p u b l ic good - t a x  packages d e m an d e d  b y  residen t s ) .  1 72 Such p e r­
fec t  m o bi l i ty c a n  e n ha n c e  t h e  e ffi c i e n cy g a i n s  from decen t ra l izat ion 
stressed by t h e  matching p r i n c i p le . m  Converse l y, even w i t h o u t  
perfe c t  res i d en t i a l  mob i l i ty .  i f  j ur i sd i c t i o ns n o n e t h e less d i ffer i n  t he 
pre fe re nce of t h e i r  m e d i a n  v o t e rs for e n v iron m e n t a l  q u a l i t y  versus 
t axes ro fu n d  o t h er l oc a l  p u b l i c  goods, t h e n  the effic ie n t  level  of 
e nv i ro n m e n t a l  q u a l i ty w i l l  vary across j ur isd ic t ions .  t h u s  j us t i fy i n g  
dece n t ra l i z a t i o n .  However,  i t  c a n  a lso b e  t h e  c a s e  t h a t  i f  t h e re a re 
s u bstan t i a l  barrie rs to i n t e r-j u ri s d i c t i o n a l  residen t i a l  m o bi l i ty .  t h e n  
j u risd ict ions w i l l  l a c k  t h e  prefe re nce s i m i l a r i t y  i mp l i c i t l y  a ss u m e d  
by t h e  matc h i n g  p ri nc i p l e .  If,  for e xa m pl e ,  t h e re are lots  o f  people  
w ho a rc h i g h  d e m an d e rs o f  p o l lu t i o n  reducti o n ,  but  they are a s u b ­
s t a n t i a l  m i nori ty  i n  each j u risd ict ion w h e re t h e y  are fou n d .  a n d  
costs o r  legal  r u l e s  preve n t  t h e m  from m i gr a t i n g  e l s e w h e r e .  t h e n  
eve n a p r o fi t - maxi m i z i n g  j urisd ict iona l  e n trepren e ur would h ave 
no reason t o  offe r a lo\v pol l u t i o n  j ur isd ict ion.  s i nce no one w i l l  
move to i t .  Exis t i ng l o c a l  pol ic ies  s e t  v ia  maj o ri t y  r u l e  - t h a t  i s ,  a t  
t he l e v e l  favored by t h e  m e d i a n  vote r - w i ll n o t  req u i re b i g  pol l u­
t ion reduc t i o n s .  because i n  n o  j u risd i c t i o n  does the m e d i a n voter 
d e m a n d  s uc h  a red uct io n .  I n  t h i s  case.  i t  i s  possib l e  t h a t  a c e n t r a l  
m a nd a t e .  req u i ri ng a l l  j ur isd ict ions  t o  provide a t  l e a s t  some m i n i -
1 -. , :-\l thou�h. thc·n: are credibi l i t y  a n d  c n fun.:c m c n t  pr<lhlt:ms even w i th i n  such cc n l ra l ·  
t;c·d i lh t i t u ti < lllS. Co111pure Darun Accmu�lu .  Win· Not u Pu/uica/ Couse Tlu:orc111 ?: Suciol 
(. onjllcr. c,ll!llliilllt'/11. and Puliucs. J l  J .  Co:cw E< '< lN . 620 ( 2003 ) ,  �t•irh DoN.-\LI)  Wrn . 
\! .-\ -....:: , l i l l :  \ 1 \  ! H  t >F l H \ H H .kJ\ < ' I ' J {  1- ' :\ l l . t ' H I '  \\. l i Y I'! )L ! T ! ( ':\L lNSTlTUTJ0:'-0'> ;\ H. F  t-· F t· H - 11 - :"...: I 
I I  '1'1 7 ) .  
Clurks 'v ! .  Ti ..: ho u l .  A Pure Theon· of l.ocal Expendiltires. 6 4  .1 . Po1 . E< ·nN. 4 1 6  
I i '.I:'(J ) .  
, -: Oaks . . \ 11 f-. ,sm o n  Fiscal ft>dcrali.lm. supra note 1 62. a t  1 1 24. 
!d. 
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mum level  of po l lu t ion reduction, w i l l  i ncrease overa l l  global wel­
fare ( that is, we l fare over al l  j urisdict ions)Y4 
3. 1 .2. The Possibility of Inefficient Inter-jurisdictional Regulatory 
Competition: Reevaluating the Race-to-the - Bollom 
Rationale for Centralization 
As expla ined a bove. the matchi ng pr inciple presumes that  by  
imposing pressure on  loca l  governmen ts to  provide publ ic  good 
levels (such as po l lu t ion reduction) that  m atch local  preferences, 
i n ter-j u risdictiona l  competit ion is normative ly  desirable. The race 
to the bottom inve rts th i s  story, arguing that ,  far from pressuring 
local regulators to choose local ly opt ima l  levels o f  pol lut ion reduc­
tion. i n ter-j urisdict iona l  competition causes such regulators to sub­
optima l ly  degrade local  environments  in order to a ttract cap i ta l  
and the jobs i t  bri ngs .  I n  th i s  section, we crit ica l ly evaluate the  
theory and  evi dence o n  the  race to  the  bottom. 
a) Theory 
The race to the bottom posits that in  compet ing for jobs and tax 
revenues, j ur isdict ions w i l l  set ineffic ient ly wea k  environmental  
standards. As Levinson very n ice ly expla ins , 1 75 t he race to the bot­
tom is basica l ly  a version o f  Oates' c lassic argument  as to why 
redistribut ive taxes are impossib le a t  the loca l  leve l. 1 7f, Suppose 
that a local j urisdict ion attempted to impose a Pigouvian tax on  
pol l uters - a t ax  equal to  t he  harm they cause to  the local env iron­
ment - so as to reduce pol l ut ion and provide t he local pub l ic good 
of better local e nvironmental  qual ity. The at te mpt would fai L  as 
the taxing j ur isdict ion would succeed on ly  i n  i nd ucing the po l luters 
to m ove to a j urisdict ion that did not tax  away the i r  income. 
Subsequent work in pub l ic finance theory has shown that t he 
race t o  the bottom i s  in  fact not a necessary resu l t :  rathe r, there a re 
condit ions under which local env ironmenta l  regulat ion wi l l  provide 
the e fficien t  l eve l  of pol lut ion contro l .  Perhaps most notably.  
Oates and Sclnvab 1 77 showed that i f: a) a l l  o f  the  ci t izens of  a j uris­
diction work in  the po l lut ing indust ry, b )  each suffers equal ly  from 
1 74 · n1is has b e e n  demonslra tc:J h y  Tore Ellingsen .  supra n u t<.: 1 69. with in  the context of 
: 1  muck! with inter-j u risdiction a l  exte rn a l i ties. 
175 Arik Levinsnn. Em·irunmerllul Rcgul111orv Compclirion: A Slat/IS Repor! und Some 
Ne11' Evidence. 56 N td . l.. TAX J. 9 1 .  9.\ ( 2003). 
1 7•· Th..: argumen t  made in Oxrr:s. supru note l f>O. 
1 7 7  W;l l l ace E. Oa tes & Robert M. Schwab. Economic Competition A mong Jurist!iuiom: 
l:fficiotcr Enhoncing or Distortion fmlucing'. 35 J. Pun. EcoN. 333 ( l l)So ) .  
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pol lut ion,  c) l a bor is fixed in t h e  j urisdict ion,  d) capi ta l  is perfectly 
mobile but a lso compe t i ti v e l y  s uppl ied,  and fi n a l l y ,  e) local  govern­
me n ts choose the e nvi ronme n ta l policies that  maximize t he ut ility 
o f  t h e  median voter,  then local  p o l l ut i o n  taxes wil l  be social ly  o p t i­
m a l .  I n  t h i s  m odel ,  each cit izen bears t h e  ful l cost,  y e t  a lso reaps 
the  ful l  b enefi t  of reducing pol l ution, a n d  h e n c e  c hooses t h e  opti­
m a l  reduction in pol l u ti o n  (note that  tax reven ue s  are o f  course 
re turned to the ci tizens). 
O ates a nd Schwab's result  is  n o t  especial ly  robust w i t h  respect t o  
variations in  t h e i r  underlying assumptions.  For instance.  i f  a local  
public good m ust be finance d  wi t h  a pol l u t ion tax o n  m o b i l e  capi ­
ta l , then the local pol lut ion tax  w i l l  b e  too low, so as to keep capital 
from flee i ng t he juri sdict ion .  Also, i f  some c it izens work i n  the  pol­
l u t i n g  industry and others d o  not .  and i f  t h e  median  vote r  works in  
the pollut ing i ndustry, t he n  e nviron m e ntal  regulat i ons w i l l  be 
overly l ax - beca use the m ore pro-envi ro n m e n t a l  prefe rences of 
those who do not work i n  the pol l ut i n g  industry are disrega rded.  
Convers e l y .  if  t h e  medi a n  voter  does  not  work i n  the  pol lu t i n g  
industry, regulations w i l l  b e  too s t r i c t  - because t h e  m e d i a n  voter 
does not weigh the preferences of capita l - friendly l abore rs. Fin a l ly ,  
l oc<'i l governments may p u rsue goa ls o t h e r  than maximiz ing t h e  
aggregate u t i l i ty o f  t h e i r  citize n s . 1 7x These are by n o  m e a n s  t h e  
only cruci a l  assump tion s u nde rlyi ng the Oates a nd S c h wa b  re s u l t . 
As shown b y  Wel l isch . 1 79 t h e  result  a lso h i n ge s  o n  t h e  use o f  pol lu­
t i o n  taxes :  i f  l ocal j urisdict ions use direct  command and con trol 
poll ution st a ndards rather t h a n  t axes, t h e n  external capital  owners 
get considerable economic ren t s  fro m  p o l l u t i o n  and local laborer/ 
vo ters w i l l  vote to set t h e  s tandards a t  too s t ri nge n t a kve L  
By varyi ng t h e  assumptions underlying one's  mod e l  o f  decen tral­
ized environmen tal  regulatory compe t i ti o n ,  one can indeed gen e r­
a te <mythi ng from a race to t h e  bottom, where local  pol l u t i on 
regul ations are too weak - to a race to t h e  top,  where local pol l u­
t ion regulat ions are too s t r i nge nt . 1 "0 This t h e oret ica l  ambigui ty, 
i 7S This summary of t hese t h ree assumpt ion var i a t ions is  frum I . ..:vinsPn. supru note 1 75 .  
;tt 9.1-'14. 
1 79  Dictmar \Vell isch. Locarionu/ Choices of Firms and Decen£ruk�e,/ f:"IH·irunmt'lllal 
f'olic v wilh Various lnsrrumenrs. 37 J. U P.n.  b ·uN .  290 (1995 ) .  
lou See Joh n D Wilson. Capiwl Afohilitv and Environmemal S!{Jnr/artls: Is Tl�t·re " Th<'o­
rrticul Basis ji;r a !<ace to the Bortom :'.  in 1 F ,, 1 R TR.·\llE .-\:--iD H .-'.1{\H > N L I  ..-\. I I u N :  PH FRE<J· 
U I S ITES H J K  FREE TR.AIJE 39.1 (Jagctish N. B hagwati & Robert E. H udec eds .. l 9911 ) :  James 
R.  Markusen et al.. Compctilion in Regional Environmenw/ Policies Wizen 1'/an/ Localrons 
A re Endogenous. 56 J. Pu fl. [, ON. 55 ( i 995 ). See generally Dl lc n.L\.R W<u t S C i l .  THIORY 
' lF  PI i ll!  JC Ft:"'/\NCE IN A FEDERAl  s I XTE (200\l) .  
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whi le  to be expected, is somewhat unsa t isfactory. The race to t he 
bottom has been an important a rgument  used to j us t i fy American 
federal (and European ) environmenta l  legis la t ion . 1 " 1  Legal  schol­
ars cont inue to debate whether the race-to-the-bottom rationa le  
j ust i fi es environmental  regulatory federal izat ion ,  wi th  law and eco­
nomics scholars tending to stress the benefi ts  of compet i t ion  
between states o r  local i t ies , 1x2 whi le o ther  legal scholars tend to 
be l ieve i n  the val id i ty of the race-to- the-bottom rat ionale for  cen­
t ra l izat ion. 183 G iven the poten t i a l  signi ficance of  the race to the  
bottom as a rat ionale for environmenta l  regul atory central iza t ion  
and as  a normative guide for when such central izat ion i s  economi­
cal ly desirable, the theoretical ambiguity suggests looking to the 
emp i rical evidence on whether or not  s ub-nat ional (state and local )  
governments can i ndeed attract industry by set t ing len ient  envi ron­
mental standards. 
h) Empirical Evidence 
The race to the bottom is a normat ive s tory a bou t  t h e  dange rs of 
decentral ized env i ronmenta l  regu la t ion ,  bu t  i t  i s  a normat ive story 
whose key assumptions - t h a t  cap i ta l  moves i n  response to vari a­
t ion  in local env i ronmental  regulat ions ,  and that local regu lators 
take such movements i n to account  i n  se t t i ng regula t ions - v i rt ua l ly 
demand empirical i n vest iga t i o n .  For qui te  some t ime .  the  empi ri ­
ca l  ev idence o n  t h e  race to t h e  bottom was a t  best weak and  i ncon­
c lus i ve .  About ten years ago. Jaffe et al .  summarized  the em pi r i c a l  
l i terature .  finding that  the e ffects of environmen tal regu lat ions 
were · ·e i ther  smal i ,  sta t is t ica l l y  i ns ign i ficant or  not robust to tests  of  
model specificat ion. ' " � �-.� I n  the i r  review. Jaffe e t  a l .  suggested tha t  
1.>! Tht: argum<.: n t  was expressly raised b y  fcdt:r�.d legislators Jur ing dchate over the 
A merican Clean Air and Clean Water Acts,  fur example. Set• Jc lhn ,\ . List & Sh..:lhy Gerk· 
ing. Regulawrv Federalism and U.S. Environmenwl Policies. -HJ  J .  Ru ; t ( )N .·\ 1 .  Sn. 453 
( 200 0) .  
' �' See Richard L. Rcvcsz. Federalism and Em·ironmenrul Regulmion: ,.\n OI'CtTinv. in  
ENVIHPNi\cENT,,L Lw>. c H E  E, < JNO:»t Y.  AND St  srA I N A HIE Dr:v t·. c ' >1'\l t ' ." r 3 7  ( Rich a rd 1 . . 
Rcvcsz c t  al. eds . . 2000 ): Revesz. Fi!deralism and fnterswte r-:n ,·iron/lli"IIW! E.rlenwlities. 
supra nutc 1 22: Richard L. Revesz. Rehabililming lmcrsta/i' Compt:tiJion: Re;lcinking 1hc 
··  f?an·-tcHhc- Boll om ·· f?(/fiona!e }i >r Fedaaf Em·irottll/ell llll Regulllliun . 6 7 0. Y . l .' . L. REV. 
1 2 1 0  ( 1 9lJ1) .  
' ' ·; See Dan i.:l C. Esty & Damien Gerad i n .  Em·irunmenrai Pr01eoion and inrernurionai 
Com[H!Iitil·eness: A Concepl!iul Frame11·ork. 32 J .  \NORLD THADF 5 ( 1 998) [!Jc,rc i n a ft e r  Esty 
6.: Geradi n .  Environmenra/ Protecrion J : Dan i e l  C. Esty & Damien Gcrad i n .  ;Vfarker 1\ ccess. 
Compl'titivcness, and Harmuni;;aJion: Environmetllal Pr01ecrion in Regional Trade A gree· 
mell{s. 2 1  H .-"\RV.  ENVTL. L. REv.  265 ( 1 997) [here i nafter Esty & Geradin .  ,I!Jarker A cces.1 ] . 
ISJ Adam B. Jaffe et a l . .  En vironmenra/ Regula/ion and rhe Com{Jiolitil"fllf:'SS of U.S. Man · 
ujiiC!llring: What Does the Evidence Tell US:'. 33 J. EcoN. LITER.-\T\ ' R E  1 32 ( ! 995 ) .  
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the strin ge ncy of e n viro n m e n ta l  regulations might h ave some e ffect 
on n e w  firms in their decision to locate for the first time . 1 K5 b u t  
w o u l d  n o t  i n d uce existing firms t o  relocate. They poin te d  o u t  that  
other criteria such as  tax l e ve ls, p ub l ic service le ve ls , a nd the 
u nioniz a ti o n  o f  the l abor force h ave a much more signific a n t  
impact o n  siting decision s  tha n  does environ me n ta l  regul ation .  
Many econ omists remained somewhat skeptical o f  the empirical 
finding t h a t  enviro n me n ta l  regulation s  were n o t  a major determ i ­
n a n t  of ind ustri a l  location , 1 81i a n d  t he mos t  recen t  e m pirica l  work 
shows th a t there is  i n d eed a n  i n verse rela t ionshi p  betw·een t h e  
stringency o f  air qua lity reg u l a tions a n d  the level  o f  capital  tlows i n  
po l lution-intensive industries. The U . S .  C l e a n  Air A c t  distin­
guishes between rel a tively pristine ''a t t a i n men t "  a reas and more 
heavil y pol l uted non-attainme n t  areas b y  imposing more stri n g e n t  
pol lution sta n dards o n  the l atter. 1 :-;7 Rece n t  research has found 
th a t . even contro l l ing for other observa b l e  factors that  m ight  i n fl u ­
e n ce capita l  moveme n ts.  i n dustri a l  p l a n t  growth is significan t l y  
h in her i n  less str i n oentl v reou lated a tt a i n ment areas t h an i n  n o n -0 ::::> .I b 
attai nme n t  areas. 1 t-:K Recent work ( which a l lows for the fact that 
attainme n t  status is endogen o us with respect to p l a nt l ocat ion deci­
s i o ns .  a n d  care fu l ly com pares p laces t h a t  a re s i m i lar  in a l l  respects 
e xce pt a ttainment status) finds that bein g  out  of attain m e nt with 
fede ral standards costs an area betwe e n  0.7 a n d  1 .3 n e w  p l a nts per 
year. a h uge pe rcentage loss given t h a t  the  a verage cou n ty i n  the 
samp l e  st u died gds only  0.4 new plants per y e a r. 1 :-;" Levinson, 
however. a rgues that n otwithstan ding l a rge di tTerc nces  in state haz­
ardous wast e  d isposal t axes, t here has not been a ny pol l u ti o n  
h a v e n  e ffect . H e  provides a variety o f  exp l a n ations .  the most 
i m portant o n e  being t h at these state h azardous waste d i sposa l 
See Est\ & ( leradin.  l:"Jzviromnemal Prutection . . wpm note t :-n .  at 1 2 - 1 5 .  
1 "'' Sl'l:. e.g . . Charks D. Kolstad & Yuqing Xing. D o  Lux Em·irunmcntal F?egulmiom 
,\ macr !'(;reign ftm'stmcn('. 2 1  E N V IL. & Rlc.�< W RCE Ec< >N. l 1 2002 ) ( arguing t h a t  the 
b x i t y  uf environmental rcgulat iuns i n  a lwst euumry is a :; ignificant ckk r m i n a n t  nf fon:ign 
d i rect i twc:stm:.:nt hy t h e  U .S .  che mical i ndustry ) .  
4 2  u s.c. � 7502 ( 21)()1 ) )  
1 ·"" See Randy A .  Becker & J .  Vernon .Hender�on. Ljfects of A ir Qua/itr Rcgulmiom on 
J>ollwmg fndustril's. 1 08 J .  PoL .  EcoN. 379 ( 2000): Michael Greenstone. The !mpacls uf 
E11 1 irunmental Regulatiom on lndus!rwi Activiry: E.1·id,·nce ji"()Jil !he 1970 and 1 977 Clean 
.-\ ir 11Ct A mendmenls ancl !he c·ell.\1/S of !'vlnnu.firc!llrers. 110 J .  P< >L E< ·o;o.;. 1 1 75 (2002 ) .  
t s >J  John A .  List  <.:t a\ . .  Etjecls of Em•ironmemal f<egulariuns un Manuf(n·wring !'lam 
Birrhs: Eviclence from a Propensizy Score :\Imching Esrimaror. RS REv.  F.coN. & SrA T. 94.:1. 
948 ( 200."1 ) 
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taxes do not  i mpose l a rge employment l osses o n  industries tha t  
generate waste. 1 90 
Other recen t  e mpirica l  work has tackled the prob lem of control­
l ing for the full range of variables ( bes ides  just env ironmenta l  regu­
l a tory stri ngency ) that  a ffect  firm l ocat iona l  choice.  Work ing wi th 
a m ore deta i led dataset and aga in  employing a propensi ty score 
match ing est imator, M i l l ime t  and List made the i mportant find ings 
that  even at  the very l ocal  (U.S .  county)  leve l ,  locat ion-specif ic 
at tr ibutes such as unemployment  levels and the overa l l  level o f  
manufacturing employmen t  s igni fican t ly  impact the e ffect  o f  envi ­
ronmenta l  regul atory str ingency. 1 9 1  Indeed, perhaps paradoxically, 
Mi l l imet  and L ist found that the cost of strict env i ronmenta l  regu­
l a ti ons is lower both for count ies w i th  h igh unemployment  -
because they have relat ively abundant ,  cheap labor - as we l l  as for 
count ies with a greater concentrat ion of  employment  in manufac­
turing - because such counties generate agglomeration economies 
for manufactur ing firms. In summary, by us ing panel da tasets, and 
con t ro l l i ng for unobserved he terogene i ty and regu l at ory 
endogeneity ,  the new empi rica l  l iterature on the race to the bottom 
has found that  e nvironmental  regu lat ions have large , stat isti ca l ly  
s ign i ficant  e ffects on i n d ustr ia l  locat ion , 1n  e ffects that  were previ­
ously e i ther missed entirely or seriously underestimated . 1'13 How­
ever, i t  should  be s t ressed that  most o f  th i s  emp irical research 
focuses on compet i t ion between A merican states; as we w i l l  discuss 
below, the s i tuat ion may be d i fferent i n  Europe where there i s  less 
evidence (a t  least as the o ld Member Sta tes are concerned) o f  a 
race to the bot tom. 
Economists and pol itical scientists have also empirically investi­
gated another aspect of the race to the bottom story: whether 
A merican states do i ndeed compete w i th one another in set t ing 
e nvi ronmenta l  s tandards. These scho lars have explo i ted two very 
i m portant  fea tures of  American env ironmenta l  "coopera t ive feder-
I 'HJ Arik Levinson. The ivfissing Po/11/(ion !-Iaven Effecl. 1 5  ENv·n . .  8: R F;;nl f{< "E E u >:--: . 
3-B ( 2t l1 X l ) .  
1 • > 1  Da n i ..:l L. M i l l i me.:! & Jt1hn A. List. The Case of tlw :Hissing PolluTion 1-fm·en l lvpmh· 
,-sis . 26 J. R E < ; .  En >N. 239. 2-+ 1 ( 200-+ ) .  
IY: See it! . . s e c  also Lev i n�o n .  Em·ironmemu/ Rl'gulatorv Competilion: A . 1;/mus Repon 
u111i Some Nr:w Evidence. supra nnte 1 75. 
1 ''-' Sel' Tim Jcppc.:sen ct al . .  r:·n vimn!lll'nlill Regulmions and Nen· Plan/ l.ou11ion Deci­
sions: F1•idmce jiDm a tV/eta-Analysis. -12 J. R H ; IUN!\L SCI. 1 9. 2 1  ( 2002 ) ( us ing !he n:sul ts  
of  a mda-analysis of  l i tera l l y  h u n d reds of studies to show that the odd ear l ier  resu l ts - that  
the loCii t i o n a l  decisions of pol l u t i n g  and non-poilu l i n g  i n dustries were s i m i lar ly  i n !lucnced 
by e n v i ronmenta l  regulations - may h a ve been due to t he fa i lure.: of earl i e r  studies to cnn­
t ro l  for variables such as factor compos i tion a n d  moh i l i ty and lobbyin� powe r ) .  
1 
I 
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a l is m " :  I )  fede ral  e n vi ro nm e n t a l  s t a t u tes  ge n e r a l l y  set m i n i m u m  
pol l u t io n  s tandards t ha t  s ta tes  a r e  free to t o u g h e n  further  i f  t h e y  
w i s h :  a n d  2 )  states  m a y  becom e  '"a u t horized' '  t o  h av e  t he p r i m a ry 
respo n s i b i l i t y  for i m p l e me n t i ng ( t h ro u g h  p l a n t-speci fic pe rm i t s ) ,  
m o n i to r ing,  a n d  e n fo rc i n g  fed e r a l  e nv i ro n m e n t a l  regul a t i on s .  
Thus, a l t hough t h e  fed e r a l  governmen t  h as c h i e f  regu l a tory a u t h or­
i ty. t he A m e rican sys t e m  n o n e t he l ess g i ves the s t a tes  s uffic ie n t  d is­
cre t i o n  in both stan d a rd-se t t i n g  and e n forcemen t  so t ha t  s u ffic i e n t  
s t a te vari a t i o n  m ig h t  be observed i n  t hese areas  to  p e rm i t  useful  
e m p i rica l t e s ts .  Rece n t  s u rvey work does i ndeed i nd i c a t e  s u bs t a n ­
t i a l  var i a t i o n  i n  h ow s t a t e s  e x e rc i se t h e i r  d i scr e t i o n  i n  s t an d ard­
se t t i n g, i m p l e m en t a t i o n .  m o n i to r i n g. and e n forceme n t . 1 " 1  W h i le 
some s t a t e  e n v i ro n me n t a l  p o l i cy m ak e rs report t ha t  t hey fee l  pres­
s ur e  from i nd ustry to re fr a i n  from goi n g  beyond fed e r a l  s t a n da rds 
and to be forg i v i n g  ( or at l e a s t  fle x i bl e )  in t h e i r  e n fo rce m e n t  
e ffo rt s , 1 ·>s o t h e r  st a tes h ave adop ted more s t r i n ge n t  a i r  e m i ss i o n  
s t a n dards a n d  c o n d u c t e d  m o re m o n i tor i n g  t h a n  i s  fed e ra l ly 
req u i red . 1 '1" M ore syste m a t i c  e m pi r i c a l  work h a s  ro u n d  t ha t  v a r ia­
t i o n  in  s t a te e n v i ro n me n t al e n force m e n t  s t r i n ge ncy re fl ects  both 
pol it i c a l  and eco n o m i c  factors a t  t h e  s tate  leveL v a r i a t i o n  a cross 
s t a t es i n  w h a t  m;ry be ca l l ed t h e  pol i t ic a l  benef i ts  a n d  costs of e n v i ­
ron m e n t a l  regu l a t i o n . 1 "7 
As fa r as w h e t h e r  s t a te e nv i ro nm e n t a l  reg u la to rs are a c t i n g  st ra­
t egica l l y .  t a k i n g  acco u n t  of  reg u la tory s t ri n ge n cy i n  states  wi t h  
·wh ich t hey com rete  for capi ta l  and hence jobs. recen t  empi rical 
work has  fou n d  a ros i t i v e  re l a t i o n s h i p  b e t we e n  e n v i ro n m e n t :1 i  reg-
J<M ll1ert: �� a bo \ Jri:H i t.H1 in v. hcthcr qall:s  -;c..: k  a uthoriJa t inn lP � rnpk·nh .: n i .  Jnuni tdr  . 
. tnd �·n furn.: kckr: t !  ,t ; ;ndard'. Bw ,·, ·c H ilary Sigm a n .  Lertin� Stllln [),,  rl;,· /lin1· \�'ink 
.\rate Nf'.\fJOll '!ill!lir.v 6 1r  f.{'d('rd! Etn·;nnunenruf i?t'gulation. )h l\ ' I · , T -\ .'\. J_ i U7 1 2dt L\ ) 
( finding l i t t le  ev>dc ll(l' t h a t  , r ;, Ic k v e l  v:matJOn on t h iS dimension n; l kckJ ,rn v t lun,: , , , . 
tcmat ic.  < > t h c r  than  pc r h a p' t he  desire uf l arge st :l t c, --.. whu < > fkn .r rc· Ill l i  : w t hl)r i7c'd -.. W 
fr'-'<.: ride off f<..'th:raJ cnfon ..·r,;:nk'IH cffons �tnd concluding th;l!  '\ i :t l c  · ·f_.�rc·t:nnz:.-...;, ·· nh.·:t-,urt:d 
hy l ht.• Lt.::ifJh: uf  ( 'tJf1>.,..;f\ ; t t inn v�. ) tl'r:-, for the ;)Lt tc's c�nl i_:rt..''-'S iuna!  h:HJ : \  
sign1ficant impact  \ lnly un the· t i m i n� "f a u t lh>f i7at inn : stales  th e < !  s"u gh t  : r u l huri7al t ll l l  d u r ·  
r ng t h e:  Reagan presidentia l  aJminis tr:1 t iun h a d  sign i fica n t l y  h i.�:h c r  L C V  ;,cure:' t lun s t : r to 
t h a t  s < • u g h t  ; ,ut l t<Ail:r t l <lll dur i n �  t i le  C l i ntun :r d m i n i s t r<t t ion .J .  
ClLtrk"' D:t '.. ;, .. \: S;uldrd K.  l ) �t\ 1:--o . Shift' EnfurCt'lnenr uJ ;he ;.,'dt-ru/ ! ltl:JJrdufc\ \ \ i i \ f t '  
flrngra111 . .3 l p, • 1 . 1 1 Y · l'i  I ( I  'J'l':) 1 :  K i rsl!:n H .  En::eL Swte l:'l! l imnmcllial Sumdarrl- . '), ·utJ:c; J, 
Tlt�'rc tJ · ·  Ra�·e .. tuul /:; li · ·!u rhc !Jouu1n "?. -+8 fL\> 1 1 " '  j �  L .J .  :7 ! t l :y;7 } .  
� la t t b,:w Po! n-,ki .  ( -ft·;;n , \ ir Fcderah:;ln: f)o Srurrs Ri.iCt' to rite· f), ,;rntn ?.  h l  P: H 
:\ P\! I .'i . f� L \  . . �35 C.�O<H ) .  
' "�  Er ic Hel land. /: 1 / \  llli/ 1!/lt"fii!ll l 'rufrCiion I l l  rile Fet!emli.\1 .',\s tem: nw Poiiflca! 1-. t 'r i/1 
u m ;· of t\'j'! J J:S u t \  . .  \h l 1 < 't > 'J .  h<JI 'l R Y  J()5 ( l \190 ): Eric l lc l l :mcL /'he Rn t·,t!,·t! 
u/ Swre Fl '/ \s :  Stnngenn·. Lnf(,rcemenr. and Suhuwtion. y; J. E:-.. 1 1 1  r. : , ' ''-· 
c\: :VI < , \ 1 1 2·12 I l '!IIX I 
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u l a to ry s tri ngency (measured by normalized e n v i ro n me n t a l  abate­
ment costs) in comp e t i tor states . 1 9!:< Very rece n t  work finds a 
s im i larly strong pos i t i ve re lat ionsh i p  between t h e  e nviron m e n t a l  
e n forcement e fforts  o f  competitor states,  wi t h  a 1 0  p e rcent  i ncrease 
i n  a com pet i tor  state' s e n forcement  efforts leading t o  betwee n  a 5 
p e rcent  and 1 6  percent  i n crease in t h e  own s ta te 's  e n fo rcem e n t  
e fforts . 1 l)l) Contrary to t h e  race-to-t h e-bottom hypothesis .  however, 
such interstate compe t i ti o n  has  been fo und to be symmetric: s tates  
respond t o  the  regulatory beh avior o f  competitor s ta te s  not  j ust  by 
lowering t h e i r  e n fo rce ment  e fforts  to match t hose states  w i t h  weak 
e n forcement.  b u t  a l so by i ncreasing t h e i r  e n forc e m e n t  e fforts when 
compet i tor  states strengthen the irs . Thus. t he re is evidence t h a t  
s t a t e  e n v i ronm e n t a l  regul ators are somet imes  racing t o  t h e  top.  
and some t imes racing to the bottom. 
3. 1 .3. Harmonizarion of markering conditions 
The race-to- the-bottom a rgument that com pe t i t ion among j uris­
dictions for economic activ ity wi l l  be . . destructiv e "  corresponds, to 
some extent, with the E urope an legal argum e n t  that t h e  creation o f  
h armonized cond it ions of competition is  necessary t o  avoid  t rade 
dis tort ions. Thi s  a rgum e n t  \vas trad i t io nally used to ha rmon ize leg­
i s lat ion of t h e  M e m b e r  State s  i n  a var iety of  a reas.  S i m p l y  stated.  
t h e  a rgument i s  tha t  com plying w i t h  leg is lat ion i mposes costs on 
ind us t ry . I f  leg i sla t i on d i ffers between Memhcr States .  these costs 
vvoul d  there fore d i ffe r as wel l  and the condit ions of com petition 
w i th i n  the common market  would not be equal. This a rg u me n t  
apparent ly assumes that total equal i ty  o f  con d i t i ons o f  com p e t i t i on 
is necessary for the functioning of the common market .  · · Leve l i ng 
t he p l a y i ng fie ld"  for E u ropean i ndustry i s  t h e  cen tral message .21 H ) 
' ''" Per Ci. rredrikssun & D an ie l L. M i l l i m e ! .  Srrmegic /nreracriun and rhe Oerermin11111s 
of Enviromm:nllll Polin A cross u.S. Sia1C5. 5 \  J .  l ; RI < .  EcoN. \ O l  ( 1002). This finding in 
Fn.:Jriksson and ,v l i l l i m t: t  was repl icated by Lc:vinso n .  sutJra noll.! 1 75. 
l'i'! Da vid �vi .  Kon isky. Regula!Ury Compeririun a111! Envinmmenwf Enji·JrCeJIII'/1£: Is 
There a !<.ace ro rhe Borrom'!. 54( I )  A-.t. J. Pur .. Sn. X53. t\70 ( 2007) .  Note t h a t  Kon i s k y  
m e a s u res s t a t e  cn forn: rnenl effort with  ( a )  t h e  a n n u a l  n um be r  of  samrl ing inspect ions: and 
( h )  t h e  unweighkd s u m  of i n formal  a n d  f<"'rmal e n fun.:cmen!  actions. H e  alsn usc·s a vari­
ety of  defi n i 1 ion� or "com petitor" ·  states. i nc lud ing gcogr<rph ical cont igui ty  and two 
regional ccnnon r ic classifica t ion s ckvclupcd in w<>rk oy a previous a u thor and JisO by the 
B u reau of Economic Analysis thai  gruup s(;ltes in  terms of their  economic s imi larily.  
:m Sec. fm ..:xamp\e. the observati�1ns preceding Direc\ive 761464 of 4 \•l ay 1 976 ( 1976 
OJ ( Ll 29 )  23-29): "Whereas any dispari ty between t he provisions on the dischargt: of  cer·  
la in  dangerous substances i n to J h e  aquatic e nv i ronmen t a l ready appl icable or i n  prepara­
tion in the various Member States may create unequa l  con d i tions of competi tion and t h us 
di rectly a ffect the fuct i on i ng of t h e  com m on market ."  
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The re are .  however. some problems w i t h  t h e t r a d i t i o n a l  E u ro ­
p e a n  a rgume n t  t h a t  a n y  d i fference i n  l e g i s l a t i o n  betwe e n  t h e  Mem­
b e r  S t a t e s  m i g h t  e n d a nger t h e  condi t io n s  of  compe t i t i o n .  t h e re fo re 
j us t i fy i n g  harmoniza t i o n  o f  l e ga l  ru les. 201 From a n  eco n o m i c  poin t  
o f  v i e w ,  t h e  m e re fac t  t h a t  con d i t io n  o f  compe t i t io n  d i ffer does 
n o t  necessar i l y  create a r isk o f  a race t o  t h e  bot t o m .  The re can be 
d i fference i n  m a r k e t  con d i t i o n s  for a var iety o f  reason s .  a n d  i f  t he 
con d i t ions  o f  com pe t i t i o n  were i ndeed t o t a l l y  equa l . as t h e  argu­
m e n t  assumes.  t h e re would also be n o  t rade. 
A lso. E urope h a s  deve loped an e labor a t e  set of r u l e s  w h ic h  p ro­
m ote . imer alia , t h e  free flo w  of products  a n d  services202 a n d  t h us 
con t r i bute  to m a r k e t  i nt egra t i o n  w i t h o u t  t h e  necess i t y  o f  harmo­
n iz i n g  a l l  r u l e s  a nd s t a ndards.�m I n  t h i s  context .  the  case law o f  t h e  
ECJ w i t h  respect to t h e  free move m e n t  o f  goods ve rsus e n vi ro n ­
m e n t a l  protec t i o n  spr i n gs t o  m i nd . �( l.j Th is  shows t h a t  t h e  goa l o f  
m ar kd i n t egra t i o n  c a n  be a c h i e ve d  t h ro ug h  i ns t r u m e n t s  t h a t  a re 
l ess compre h en s ive t h a n  t o t a l  h a r mo nizat io n2m b u t  c a n  r e move 
h a r r i e rs to  t rade j ust  as e ffect i v e l y .  H e n c e .  one s h o u l d  m a ke a dis­
t i n c t i o n  be twee n the  pol i t ica l  idea l  u f  c re a t i ng o n e  com m o n  m a r k e t  
i n  E urope o n  t h e  o n e  h a nd a n d  t h e  ( ec o n o m i c ) race fur t h e  b o t to m  
arg u m e n t  o n  t h e  o t h e r  h a nd. ·'u" 
3 . .!. Public: Choice unt! rhe Posiri ve Polirical E'conoll z \· of  
En t '  i rr )//Il l  l '  1 1  rut Fed era li s111 
F\.: rh a ps t h e  parad i g m a t i c  e n v i ro n m e n t a l  l a vv ur regu l a t ion is o n e  
t h a t  con re rs l a rge h u t  v e ry d i ffuse bcndi t o n  � �  l a rge n u m he r  o f 
v i c t i m s  u t  pol l u t i u n .  w h i l e  i m posi ng t h e  m uc h  m ure conce n t ra t e d  
cost o f  reduci n g  t h a t  pol l u t i on o n  c a p i t a l  a n d  l abo r i n  pol l ut i n g  
i nd u s t r i e s .  S uch a l a w  t h us seems to  e p i t o m i z e  t h e  k i nd o f  p ris­
o n e r ' s  d i le m m a s i t ua t i on desc r i be d  i n  M a n c u r  O l s o n  ·s  c l : t ss ic The 
- ----· ·-----· ------
2' < '  s . .-e ,Ji.\ f l  .b�tp Spi.: r  & O!a\  A. Ha;ucn.  Fhc r:u rupl'illl (;roup 011 li •r! ! .U \V I " Ti!hun.: 
(;,.,lifl . .  } {/1/,j !he r:u rup<'illl / 'rinriples o ( li •n l .U ll '. 7 Z.t· J rS< J l !< WI I l ' J{ Et ' RI > i ' . \ I '<< ' I J J ,  
P " ! '  , 1 H I · • . , , r ·169. -17,' ( I  tJ•N ) .  
·o: Sec [ (  · Tr.:at v art'-. 2.'i-30. 
:<" Si'c' �c 'l lt'rtli/1· D a n iel  ( · .  Fslv. f':c·l lntill l l < '  lnf<·grutiun unt! th.· F:m t ronmcnr.  in T t l ! '  
( n . m .  \ 1 .  J.>; ' I I« ' ·�'! 1 "  1 · I " '  1 t 1 1  1 ;, '"'·  L. '" . A "  1 > I '• • I  1 < Y 1 <JO ( '-: nrman J .  \ ' i� & Rc:;,:i n a  S .  
·\\c· l rnd �J' . .  l lJ'>9 ) ( disc:u>;. i n g  t h e  j'l! l t t' n t i ;i l  cu n f l ic·t hc:twc:c:n trc.: l r : t ck a n d  cJH i ronm<.:n· 
ta l  prut cct lun ) .  
y • .: l1 is case: law has bcc:n discussed. See supr,, '<.:ctiun 2.6 . 
. : • l' See ulso A :-J I I I O:-J Y ! .  On • ·'· R rc; t <l.i\ I'J < )i'-<: l .r:< ;,.\1 F<>R.'I ·''" > En >:--"�"' T1 1 1  "In 
1 7 7· 79 ( .21J!)..J ): Esn· c� ( raadin. ,\/arker A ccos . .rur>ra no1c 1 8.>. at :!W.,-<><J. 
: <•· Sec also R ichard L. Rcvc:sz. Ff>drralism all(/ Environi!U'IIIcli Rt'f{IIIIIIion: 1 . < '.\Sum .fiH 
rile Furop,·,m Union and 1he lnic:maiionu/ Comm1111in·. l::\3 V,,. L. R t-. v. I 33 1 ( 1 997) ( argu .. 
in�  that  these a rc ;.c: paratc poinb which should t>c d i:.t inguishc d ). 
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Logic of Col!ecrive A crion:207 Why would anyone undertake the  
cost o f  passing env ironmental legisl at ion,  when the ind ividual  ben­
e fi t  from such legisla t ion  was  so smal l?  Moreover, h ow cou ld  they 
poss ib ly succeed, g iven  the  very strong incent ives for pol lu t ing  
i ndus t ries to f ight against  env ironmental legislat ion? 
The i n i t ia l  reaction  of  publ ic  choice theorists to  this  - what may 
be cal led the paradox of  env i ro n menta l  protection  - rellected the  
i n t e l lectual  roots  of the publ ic choice tradi t ion.  The earl iest posi­
t ive econom ic theory of  regulat ion ,  that of St ig ler,20" was very nar­
rowly economic i n  i t s  concept ion o f  both the  benefi t s  and costs o f  
regul at ion ,  and essent ia l ly  expla ined regulat ion a s  a rent-seek ing 
game i n  which some firms succeeded i n  imposing  costs on  others i n  
order to enhance the i r  own re lat ive compet i t ive posi t ion .  As 
appl ied to environmenta l  legis lat ion ,  St igler ' s  theory led econo­
mists to search for ren t -seek ing by firms who were us ing e nviron­
men ta l  legis lat ion to i mpose costs o n  the i r  r iva ls ,  and by 
env i ronmenta l  i n te rest  groups who were seeking to maximize the i r  
own membersh ip  and reve n ues.2m 
S t igler 's version  o f  publ ic choice theory is c lear ly too narrow to 
accoun t  for most e nv i ro nmenta l  and socia l  regulat ion ,  whe re the  
biggest win ners from regu l a t io n  are ge nera l ly  not  firms, but vict ims 
o f  pol lu t ion and other non- industry in terest groups (envi ronmenta l  
N G Os,  fo r example ) .  A genera lized vers ion o f  th i s  rent-seeking 
story - what Macey has called t he po l i t ical -support max imizat ion 
mode l - presumes more broadly that pol iticians and regulators 
c hoose legis lat ion a nd regul at ion  so as to max im ize the i r  ne t  pol i t i ­
ca l  s upport . 2 1 1 1 This  t heory not  on ly  he lps to expla in  regu l atory 
behavior, but a lso to expla in  the enactmen t  of environmenta l legis­
la t ion . 2 1  1 Also. the "shadow i n te rest  group" theory presented  by· 
Keenan and Rubin  explains why pol i t ic ians may e nact environ­
men ta l  regulat ion:  demand for regulat ion is  somet imes  represe nted 
by a rather vague de mand from t h e  public, rather than b y  a dis-
-'"" \L \� <  T l< 0 1 .su:-,;, T 1 1 E  Lc)( ; J c · < JF Cuu .E< 'rJ \  I ·  f\, · t J o:-.; : Punuc (ioous ,\ND 1111· 
T !I J I • J< Y  n1 C i R< > I ' J ·s ! R..:,·i�c d .  1 ')7 1 ) . 
:ux G..:"rgc .1. St igler.  The Tlu:on· of f:'unwmic Regu/miun. 2 BELL .J . Enl:-.;. :; ( 1 '17 1 )  . 
. :•r• S!!e. <' .g . .  1:3 ru<.:c Yan J k .  /Jn(){/eggers und 1Jap£is£s: Thi' Ellill'illiun of ,, Regulllfon· 
Enntrnnis!. 7 R !.: r, i t i L . \ 1 ' !0� 1 2  ( J l)S3 ) .  
' ' ' '  Fur a g:: nc.:ral \ C.:rsion ul t h i s  th..:ury. sc.:c.: Gary S .  l.kcker. A Theory of Comperi£ion 
:\nwng Prc:smr<: Grour1s j( >r [Jo{itind lnjlw:nc<' . 9K O .J .  Eco:-;.  :17 1  (,1'.183 ) .  
" '  \Vr:sLFY ;\. M,\1 ; ,\ r F r  .-\L . ,  Rl'u:.s 1 :-:  T i l E  ivh K J :>:< ; :  A S TATJs ncAL AN,\ L YSJS u r  
R u ii :L\ n l R Y  Ac ; r,:c c y  B E l t ,, V I < ll< ( 1 9X6 ): Jasun Scott Johnston. A Game Theornic A nair­
sis of ,\ !rcmarit·e lnstiuaiuns Ji;r Regulatorr Cost-Benef/1 ;\ nalysis. 1 50 U. PA. l.. R �:v. 1 343 
( 200.2 ) .  
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crete,  we l l  defined, and active i nterest group.2 1 2  However. if a n  
acciden t  (e.g. a n  e nvironmenta l  disaste r )  were t o  happen,  t h e  
shadow i n terest  group would cease to b e  a shadow group a n d  
become active and thus  have a l l  t h e  cha racteristics o f  a normal  
i nterest group.  Knowin g  that  shadow i nterest groups h a ve the 
potent ia l  to become an effective lobby, rat iona l  pol i t ic ians  w i l l  
respond to these groups i n  t h e  s a m e  w a y  t h a t  t h e y  w i l l  respond t o  
normal interest groups, even though the shadow groups have not 
organize d.2 1 3  
In  applying t hi s  gen e r a l  approach t o  develop a posi t ive t he o ry o f  
regulatory centra l izat ion,  t h e  first a n d  most i mport a n t  t h i n g  t o  rec­
ognize is  t h a t  i t  is  n o t  environ m e n t a l  regul at ion t h a t  is  to be 
expla ined but rather t h e  central izat ion ,  or  federal izat ion.  o f  envi ­
ronmen t a l  reg u l a tion.  Even i f  e nviron m e n t a l  regu la t ion  m a y  be 
seen as a p aradoxical  t r iumph o f  d i ffuse.  u norgan ized i n terests.  
central izat ion may be eas i l y  expla ined as ar is i n g  when t h e re are 
l a rge economies of  sca l e  and a gene ral ized,  m aj ori tar ian preference 
for reduced po l lut ion .2 1 -' TI1 at  i s ,  if  the m ajori ty o f  voters favor 
reducing poll u tion ,  and they h ave ( fo r  whatever reason s )  the pol i ti ­
c a l  power to get such  p o l l u t i on reduction l aws passed. and i f  there 
are poten t i a l  economies o f  scale i n  e n v i ron m e n t a l  regu lat ion ,  we 
should  expect eventua l ly  to see pol l ut ion red uction p ursued by the  
cheaper, federa l provider.  
H owever, t h is story i s  m uch too s imple and sanguine.  In both 
E urope and the U . S  . . cen t ra l ized e nv i ron m e n t a l  regul a tion h as 
genera l l y  m e a n t  the i m posit ion of min imum standards for po l lu t ion  
red uction.  For at  leas t  some j urisdictions .  both  wi th in  E ur o pe and 
the U.S. ,  s uch  m i n i m a  a re binding in  the  sense that  t hey req u i re 
more pol lut ion reduct ion t h an  t h e  j urisdict ion would req u i re on  i ts 
own.  Moreover .  as  we recounte d  above , in  both  E u rope a n d  t he 
U.S.  central ized e nv i ronm e nt a l  laws are more concerned w i t h  con­
t ro l l ing p o l l ut ion t ha t  has primari l y  loca l ,  i n t ra-j urisd ic t iona l  
impacts. rather than  pol lu t ion that  h as cl e a r  transboundary e ffects.  
2 l 2  D o n a l d  Keenan & Pa u l  H .  Rubin .  Slwr/rm· Interest Groups a n d  Safi ·t\· Rer.;ulmion. S 
1:--;( L  Rrv.  L. & Ec"'· 2 1  ( 1 <)1-\S ). 
' L' Jrf. 
2 J J  See Richard L. Revesz. lhe Race to !he But/om ami 1-i·dem/ Fm·imnmenral Negu/a­
tion: A Response to Crirics. 82 MINN.  L. RF\/. 5.\5 ( I  ')97)  ( argu i n g  t h a t  the logic of en Ike· 
rive action suggests t h a t  u nderrcprcse n t a t ion of environ m e n t a l  groups would be more 
serious at the federal  level since ! hey face !arg..:r scale free-rider problems and a loss of 
humoge n e i ty of environmental  i n t erests at  the federal level ): we also R i c h a rd L. Rcvcsz. 
Environmemal Regulation in h•daal Svstems. in l Y E..\ RH< >OK < >I E1 'R• l i 'I,\ N E'-'VIHON. 
'>I L NT.·\ L l.'\W. supra notre ! 57. <I t l .  
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Th us, t h e  goa l of the posit ive economic a n a lysis of e nv i ronme n t a l  
fe deralism i s  to  e xp la in what  may be cal led the Paradox of E n vi­
ronmenta l  Fede ra lism : the i m posit ion of u n i form federal  standards 
for t h e  red uction of  l ocal ized pol l u tion on s u b-fe d e ral  j urisdictions 
who actual ly  had quite  d ifferen t  pre ferences for e n vironm e n ta l  
protection versus devel opment,  and who would t h erefore have 
l ikely had widely varying  st a ndards for pol l ution reduction under 
dece ntral ization.  1be re are several  potent ia l  economic explana­
tions for th is  Paradox, and i t  i s  to t hese t h a t  we n o w  t u r n .  
3.2. 1 .  D evelopment a n d  the Demand for En vironmental 
Protection: The Convergence Thesis 
The posi t i ve paradox o f  e n vi ronme n t a l  federal ism rests u p o n  an  
assu m pt ion , namely tha t  different sub-federal u n i t s  w o u l d  i ndeed 
demand d i fferen t  amounts of pol l ution reduct ion , t hus mak ing  uni­
form federal standards binding on at least some ju risdict ions. The 
u n derlying q uest ion is whe t her the estab l i shment  of federa l m in i ­
m um pol l ut ion s t a n d a rds s imply h as t ens some t h i ng t ha t  wou l d  
occu r  i n  a n y  event :  t h e  convergence o f  e nv i ronmental  standards as 
a conseq ue nce of converging l eve ls  of eco n o m i c  deve lopme n t  and 
i ncome. The idea here ( esse n t i a l l y  the same as tha t  beh ind the so­
cal led e n v i ro n m e n t a l  Kuznets curve ) 2 1 "  i s  that there is  l i t r l e  
demand for environm e n tal  protection at  l o w  i ncome level s  and  
h igh environmenta l  qua l it y . but as income and pol lu t ion i ncrease 
as a j urisdict ion i n d ust r ia l izes, even tual ly the j urisdiction achieves 
an i n come l e ve l and correspond ing w i l l ingness t o  pay for e n v iron­
m e n t a l  protection ,  s uch  that  the j u risdiction req u i res cleaner tech­
no l ogi es to be used.  On t h is t heory. per capita pollut ion fa l ls 
beyond some t h reshold level  of per capita i n come. 2 1 6  In  t e rms of 
:J.< ·nJe crn·ironmcnwl Kuzncts curve is !he empirical cross-countn· relationship. 
obscrvcJ for several  i mportan t pol l u t ants. in wh ich pcr cap i t a  or  total em issions first rise 
a n d  then fa l l  w i t h  n a tional  per capita incorne.  for an overvic:w. sec S. Dasgupta e t  a! . .  
Conji-un1ing 1hc Em·inmmnua( Ku�ners Curve. 16  J .  Eco".  PFRSI'. [47 (2002 ) .  
"'' The re ar t:  various mixes or demand push a n d  tcchnologv supplv t h a t  cltl ge nerate 
such an i nvcnt:d V -,haped relat ionship betw..:cn p..:r c:1pita i ncom<.: ami p..:r-ca p i t a  P"l l u­
t ion .  Set·. e.g . .  A. John \...'\: R. Pt;cchcnlno,  An 0\·crfapping (;cncra:ions .Hodel of G'roH·ih 
und !he 1-."n vin!JIIllell l.  1 04 Ecu!". J .  1 393 ( 1 994 ): Nancy L. Stukey. A re 71tcre Unri1.1 10 
GmH"Ih:'. :;9 IN r"L Eco:--; . Rr-:v. l ( 1 'Nil ):  WiUiam A. B mck & i\."1 . Scot t  Taylor. Economic 
Grull'lh a111/ rht: Environmerll: Mmching 1he Stvli�etl FaCis ( Dc:p· r  of Econ . .  L n iv.  of Wis.­
MaLl i son. \V{)rking Paper No. 16. 2!XB ).  For the origi nal  work suggesting such an inverted 
V-shapc•d rdat i<>ll� h i p  ( t he environmental  Kuzne ls  curyL").  set' C:it:nc !\.·1 .  G rossman & i\ l:Jn 
B. Krueger. Economic Growrh and the Envirumnelll. I J ( )  O..J .  E<.o < >N.  353 ( I  �N:i ) .  
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regulat ion,  beyond some point , the wea l thier  a l oca l i ty becomes. 
the more stringent i ts pol lut ion control req uiremen ts wi l l  be.2 1 7  
3.2.2. Federal Level !'vlajoriwrian Politics 
The evide n ce from t h e  Uni te d  States reveals  t h a t  t >vo factors 
drove the grea t  1 965 - 1975 period of American environmenta l  fed­
era l iza t ion: new, i ncome-driven demand for pol lut ion reductio n  in 
the weal th iest  and most  heav i ly  developed s ta tes ,  and growi ng 
divergence between developed and less-developed regions i n  terms 
of  both per capita income and pol lu t ion levels . 2 1 K  How then to 
expla in the imposit ion of federal  m i n im um standards? 
The simplest explanat ion rel i e s  on major i tar ian po l i ti cs . Assum­
ing a very general  dist r ibut ion o f  preferred idea l  leve l s  of pol l u t io n  
con trol between sta tes \vi t h  low. med i u m  and h igh leve l s  of 
demand for such controls (where demand i s  equa l  to the preferred 
po int of  the state ·s media n  voter) .  a federal  min imum standard 
equa l  to the idea l  leve l o f  the  moderate j urisdiction  w i ll a lways 
ach ieve a m ajor i ty .  Also, s ince i t  i s  a min imum, i t  does not b ind 
the h igh-demand s tates from regu la t ing even more str ingen t ly _ 2 1 '� 
Thi s  is a str ikingly s imple but  powerful resu l t .  I t  shovvs that  there 
wi iJ be maj ori ty support for federal min imum stan dards even i f  
there are no in ter-jurisd ic t iona l  externali t ies t h a t  wou ld  j ust i fy such 
federal izat ion.  Or.  as Cre mer and Pal frey put i t . t h at such "exces­
s ive interfe rence "  at  the federal  leve l  is  a .. · normal '  consequence o f  
t he  behavior o f  voters and  a probably unavo idable feature of fed­
eral syste ms. Loca l  pol i t ica l  f ights have tendency to sp i l l  over a t  
the federal  l eveL a s  vote rs w i l l  try t o  have the i r  pre ferred pol icy 
i mposed at both levels of governmen t . ' '220 
: ; ;  Ci rnssman & Krueger. supra note ::' 1 6: B roc:k & Taylor. supra Jhlle 2 l 6. 
cts See S A:-.tU F L  P. H .\Ys. f3 F ,,l .TY . H E.\L n t  ,, :-; n  Pr:R.:-.L·\"FNt r< E N V I kt JN\lF''� •''  
PuuTtcs I N  HI F U N J T E I '  S I S ITS. 1 955- 1 91'15. 51  ( l '!X7 ) (summariz ing the factors that  
acenunteu for I 97!J 's  environmental ism anu its regiunal  differences ) .  
: ; "  For a formal uemons\ralion l h<Jt this equi l ibr ium h( ) lds both when the standard is  
chosen bv a federal rekrendurn and when i t  is chosen hv federal n.:rrL'.icn t n t i ves who vote: 
thc preferences of the median voter in their j urisdict ion.  see Jacques Cremer & Thomas R. 
Palfrc:y. Federal Munr!oles /l.v l'npular Demand. lO� J .  Pot.  E! -, >N.  '!()) ( 2(H)0). For an 
e\k nsion to consilkr the i mpact of local pol i t ica l  processes. see .htcyues Cremer & 11wma-. 
R. Palfrey. Fedf'ral M,mdiii<'S n·ifh Lu,·u/ .·\gl!nda Sellers. 7 Rtv. Ecn�. DLSl<  ;N 27lJ ( 2002) .  
I n  n n  ea rlier p<lper. Cremer and Pai t'rcy show that  ccn traiizat ion is vir tuai iy  cer t a i n  if  vot­
ers ;trc risk averse and hav<.: hcller i n form a t ion about t he federa l  median voter t h a n  about 
the median l'orer in their Jurisdict ion. and federal policy is determined bv v(l1es among 
j urisdict ional kdcral legi slators who rcprcsent the preferences of the medi a n  vnter i n the ir  
j urisdict ions. Jacques Cremer & Thomas R. Palfrey. In nr Om:> Cen!rali�<liion b v  .�-tajoritr 
V01e. -40 E u K .  Eco:--: . Rl \· . . f' ( 1 9% ). 
-�211 Cremer & Pal frey. h·dera! :\lunda1es bv f'upular Demaml. supra twt.: ? 1 9 .  at ')06. 
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A l t hough t h is model  i s  pos i ti ve - i t  expl a i ns federa l - l eve l  major­
i t y  support for federa l  m i n imum pol l u t ion  con t ro l  s tandards - i t  
h as normat ive i rTl p l icat i ons .  Note t h a t  w h i le a sys tem o f  federa l 
m i n i m a  leaves some voters worse off t h a n  t hey wou ld  be u nder  a 
s ta te - l aw sys tem ( e .g. ,  l ow  demande rs i n  j u risd ic t ions w i t h  low 
med ian  deman d ) .  i t  a lso m akes  some vot e rs bet te r  o ff (e .g., h igh 
demanders i n  j ur i sd ic t ions  wi th  l ow med i an  demand ) .  Because t h e  
federal standartis 3 rc tot; h igh ftJr a substan t i a l  prtJp{) r t ion  C) f V<J te rs 
i n  low-demand ing  j u risd ic t ions.  even  i f  federa l  s tandards provide 
economies  of  sca l e .  or h e l p  to reduce i n te rs t a te ex terna l i t i e s  (by  
red uci ng pol l u t i on  t ha t  spi l l s over  from low-demand ing  s t a tes  i n t o  
h igher-demand i ng s ta tes) .  i t  may s t i l l  genera te  a n e t  w e l fa re 
decrease re l a t ive t o  dece n t ra l ized prov is ion. 2 ·? 1  
3.2. 3. Ft:rleral Mull(/ares as Regional Industrial Prorecrionism 
The model  of Cremer  and Pal frey e x p la i n s m ajor i t y  s upport for 
federa l  env i ronmen ta l s t andards set at a l eve l pre ferred by moder ­
a te J ur i sd ic t ions  and a lso exp l a i n s  who mi):!hl  benef i t  from such 
s tandard s  ( n a m e ly .  e nv i ronm e n t a l is ts  who l ive in  p l aces w h e re 
t h e re is l i t t l e  l oc a l  demand  for po l l u t i on  reduc t ion ) .  However .  as 
pub l i c  choice t heor i s ts h ave po in ted ou t .  d ur i ng:  t he U .S. e n v i ron­
m e n t a l  era.  some fi rms and i n d ust r ies a lsn supported  env i ronmen­
t a l  regu l �t t i on . ' ' '  Such suppor t  exe m p l i fi e s  ano the r  i m por t a n t  
d ri ve r  be h t n d  kdera l i za t ion :  t h e  des i re of  o ld e r, more heav i l y­
developed and  -pul l u t ed  j urisd ic t ions ( and  i n d us t ries  \\ i t h  large 
sunk  i nves tme n ts i n  such p l aces ) to  usc fede r a l  mandates  to  l essen 
t he  cum pct l t i ve advan tage of  l ess heav i l y  dL·vc l oped a nd l ess po l ­
l u t ed  j ur isd ic t ions i n  a t t ract i ng  new i nd u s t r i a l  pi a n t s and jobs. '-' '  
By l e sse n i ng the compe t i t ive ad van t age o f  re l a t i ve l y  p ri s t i n e .  
u n pt)l l u t e d  J U risd ict ions .  fede r a l  e nv i w n m e n t a l  manda tes may 
se rve: as a n  i ns t r u m e n t  of i nd us t ri a l  p ro tect ion  ror o ldc:r. heav i l v  
po l l u ted  j u ri sd ic t ions .  For these reasons. t he  medi a n  vot e r  i n  
· : ;  !d F1 1r d more f, ,rm a l  dc:nl<mstrat ion t hat n·.: n w r r h  i n tc r - J ur !,dtL- ! Ju!l :d c:xt.:rna l i r tcs .  
fL' d c r.·d !il : ! n d �i t � �  111 : 1 �· ! t nh.:r \VLifi l f� r�Lt t i v\.· t � J  dt.'Cc' lH Ld ! lc·d pfP\'hHH1. :\ C L'  Jacque -.. 
Cr .__;uh:r \.\: i h 1 1:JL'l:\ i(.  P a i r r�y . .  ·\n E1Jllihhriun; ,\lo: !r ·l ( I I  h ·i J\-rru' \!tuuLlfcs ( " i l\' . 2:: .  �OU� ! 
( U l1 !'Ubl i-..h �,.·d j 1 f ;.: � i r n i n : � ry dr;d.l }. ,n allable tit l u ! p : /\\ \1. \\ . n > t L<.. ' J t L  
nar\  'pdl l rcy 
.':_: h •r : r  clas\tc: d i"· tb:-Ion : �ntl  c\. t<.knc.:, sec .\fichacl  I .  \ l : l iun.:y &. f<nl>cn E. .\fc( ·or-
In !tJ < .  .- \ /'o)ill \ f  u t  Fnnrontnentnl 1\:.·::.u!rlftl i!l . 2:. J. L: IW 8.: r::corL t)( )_  l OK-
i I ( 1 '1:->::' 1 
; !:or t h e  l·l;"s ic· dcmon,l r:J I !Oil nf the t ll lpurt :wcc· ul such rc,!tUIL t l  pr"lcc l t < >n ! S ll l  i ll  
c x p l : w u n g  t he Cic:m :\rr t\c't , sec B. 1\:h: r Frn :r•l l l ln< 'fiilli Rcgulmiun: II iJ , . , , . 
\·t ·(t' ln!t'tt ' "�·t'l _ - \  Ut·;nr,  !'rpt(·c:ed�-'. �.) E< -( )' . .  1 -..; < )l l J { 1  55 ! .  :;_.;,;s ( ! ' 'S5 ) . 
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vve a l t h i c r. h u t  m o re h ea v ily polluted j ur isdict ions ( G erm a n y i n  
Europe.  New Je rsey i n  t h e  U . S . ) m a y  well pre fer t ough e nv i ro n ­
m e n t a l  s ta n dards . Us i ng fed e r a l  m a nda tes t o  req u i re mure po l lu ­
t i o n  red uc t i o n  t han is locally desired i n  poorer. b u t  l ess p o l l u t e d  
j u r i :-d i c t ions ( S p a i n  or G ree ce i n  E u rope,  Georgia or  Alabama i n  
t he U . S . ) i s  a way t o  l esse n t h e  co m para t i ve disadvan t age o f  t o ugh 
pol l u t io n standards i n  t h e  h i gh deman d i n g j ur i sd i c t ions.  
3. :!.. -1. Etn·iroll lnentul Feclaa!i::.ation. Political Sym bolis111 und 
Polirical DiscreEion 
As we descr i bed e a r l i e r  i n  o u r  d i sc uss ion of the  s ty l ized fac t s o f  
E u ropea n ve rsus A me r i c a n  federal  e nv ironmen tal regu l a t ion . i n  
b o t h  t he U .S. a n d  E u rope . ce n t ra l ized e n v i ro n m e n t a l  m a n d : t tes  
o ft e n  con t a i n  ve ry vague but  a l so very a m b i t ious goa l s. For 
i n s tan ce . t h e  U . S .  C l e a n  Wat e r  Act st i l l  decla res n a t io n a l  goa l s o f  
. .  ze ro d i sc harge " o f  pol l u ta n t s  i nto t h e  "waters o f  t he U n i ted 
S t a tes .
.
. < 1nd of m a k i n g  a l l  t h ose wa t ers " ' fi s h a b l e  a n d swi m ­
mab le . · - ��  1 S uc h  s t a t u to ry goals are o ft e n  c ri t i c i zed as  u nr e a l i s t i c .  
Ye t t hey h ave a powerfu l u n der l y i n g  pol i t ic a l  l og i c t ha t  i s  i mpor­
ta n t  in u n d e rst a n d i n g  e nv i ro n m e n t a l  feJ e ra l iz a t i o n .  
T h e  l ogic i s  t h i  : p o l l u t i o n  .red uc t io n by a n  i ndus try  or l a rge n u m­
b e r  o f  fi r ms m ay con fe r  large aggrega t e  be n e fi t s  i n  t h e  form o f  be t ­
t .: r  h e a lt h  outcomes,  i m p mveJ recreat ional opport u n i t ies a n d  
perhaps < l i su i m p ro ved ecosyst e m  healt h .  b u t  t h ose b e n e fi ts arc 
t y p i ca l l y  ve ry wide l y  d i ffused a n d  so may be i n d i v i du a l l y  s ma l l .  
Th is i s  e s peci a l l y  t rue w i t h  regard to i n t e r-j u r i sd ic t i u n a l  po l l u t i o n .  
The C( ) s t s  of  pol l u t i o n  rcduct i u n ,  by con t rast, a rc t y p ica l ly concc n ­
Wt t e d  i n  pa r t i cu l ar fi rms a n J  i n du s t r ies  l ocated i n  p a rt ic u la r  s t a tes 
and reg i u n s .  H e n ce . w h i l e  t h e re is  c le a r l y  an i n c1.: n t ive for fede ra l 
po l i t i L· i �l n s  t o  p le ase vot e rs w h o  wi l l  be n e fi t from pol l u t ion rcdu c­
t iorl . t h ey m ay a l so re p rese n t  pa rt i c u l a r geogra p h i c  d is t r i c ts i n  
\\ h i L� h  COib t i t u e n ts w i l l  s u ffe r very re a l  costs from pol l u t io n  red uc­
t io n .  S u c h  p o l i t ic i a ns wou ld h ave e ve ry i nce n t i ve to pass  l egis l a ­
t i u n  t h a t :::;c t s  u p broa d l y  pnpu l ar poll u t i on reduc t io n  goal:::; , b u t  
w h i c h  s h i fts t he res po n s i b i l i t y  to o t h e r  gove rnmen t a l b ra n c h es -
:::;ub- n a t i ( ] n a l  gove rn m e n t  o r  kde r al regu la t or:-; - to act u ;t l l y  i m p le ­
m e n t  t h ose goals t h ruugh po llu tio n  sta ndards a n d  p l a n t-speci fic 
pe r m i ts t ha t  i m pose eco n o m ic cost s  on fi rms.  i nd u s t r i e s  and com­
m u n i t ies . S u c h  a system - b road and am b i t i o us s ta t u tor y po l l u t io n  
red uc t i o n goa ls . i m p le m e n ted by re gu l a tors a n d  s u b-n a t ion a l g:ov-
-- ---- -- - ----
. .  , .�_., t · s_c_ ) � �-' I t 21 iOIIJ 
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ern ment  - gives legisl a tors the ab i l i ty  to say that  they have acted 
for the environment ,  wh i le a lso reserving to them the discre t ion to 
i n te rvene in the regulatory process by l obbying against  regula t ion s  
that  w i l l  be too costly for t he i r  geographic const i tuen ts .225 
A n umber of styl ized facts about both U.S .  and E uro pean cen­
tra l ized environmenta l  law confirm th is  mode l .  First ,  and notably,  
i t  accords very c lose l y  with the very importan t  role that  American 
preside n t i a l  e lectoral pol i t ics seemed t o  p lay i n  d ri v i ng forward the 
gre a t  Enviro n m e n t a l  e ra federal enviro n menta l  l avvs.226 Second,  i t  
explains very wel l  why t he Un i ted States Congress chose to dele­
gate so much imp lemen tation and enforcement respon s i b i l i ty to 
the s tates: by so doing, Congress maximized po l i t ica l suppor t  wh i le  
tak i ng account o f  the fact tha t  the actual  costs and benefi t s  o f  fed­
eral  environmenta l s tandards vary gre at ly  from one p lace to 
another. 2 2 7  
A simi l ar story could be to ld about Eu rope as we l l :  t h e  key 
player in the European legi s la tive process, t he European Com mis­
sion, can make i tse l f  popu la r  wi th wide ly supported pol lut ion 
reduction goals .  As d iscussed be fore, i t  i s  t h e  European Commis­
s i on t h a t  t a k es the in i t ia t i ve on E uropean l egis la tive measu res such 
as environmenta l  d i rectives. The actua l  i m p l e m e n t a t ion of  the 
broad goa ls form ulated i n  a d i rec t i ve wil l  subseq uen t ly  be done at 
the national member-state leveL s ince the d i rective wil l  have to be 
t ransposed i nto member  state l aws. Typica l ly  the members of the 
European par l iament are '" greene r · ·  than the env ironmenta l  m ini s­
ters i n  the Counci l .  The elected members of  the E urope an p a rl ia ­
m e n t  may t h us have a n  ince n t i ve to prom u lga te d i rectives t h a t  ca l l  
for E urope - w ide i mprovements in  env i ronmenta l  qua l i t y ,  wh i l e  
l eav ing i mp lem en tat ion and regu la tory measures t o  t he M e m b e r  
Stat es · nat iona l  l egis latures .  
225 ll1i� model. which re l ics heavi ly n n  Ihc  w m k  <.lf poli t ic�1 l  sc icnliS!  T.:rrv MtlC.  is ,;ct 
out in Joh nston. A Game Iheoreric An airs is of A lremuril"t' Insriruriuns jiJr F<cgulutuno Cosr­
f)enejlr Analnis. supra note 2 1 1 .  
22f> Fur t his theory. S<:C E. Donald El!ioll <..'( <1 1 . .  linmrd a TJII'orv of Srawron• r·, ol/1/iOI!: 
"The Federa/i:{l (ion of En Fironmenra/ Law. I J . l . .  Eco:-o;. & OK< i . . \ 1 3  ( 1 98) ) .  
227  Fur t h is explana t ion of Col >pcrat ivc f<:dcral ism i n  cnviro nmenlal rcgul<t t ion.  see 
Jonathan R. ;\lacey. Federal Deference 10 Local N.·gufarors and rhe Economic Thcorr of 
Regti/(J{ion: liJll "ltrrl a Public- Choia· Exp/anarion o( l·i>cfcra/ism. 7o V,,. L. Rt-:v. 265 ( 1 9911 ) .  
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4. E xPLA I N I N G  AND EvALUATING E u R O PEAN vs. U .S . 
ENVI RON M E NTA L LAw I N  LIGHT oF PosiTIVE A N D  
NoRMATI VE EcoNOM IC ANA LYSIS oF 
R E G U LATO RY C E NTRA LIZAT I O N  
-f. ! .  Is the Nonnative Case for En vironmental Centralization 
Stronger in the U.S. or Europe? Some Suggesrions 
and Questions 
Whi l e  Europe cont inues to move toward ful ler  economic i nte­
grat i o n ,  t he U nited States remains m uch more ful ly  i ntegrated eco­
n om i ca l l y . cu l t ural ly ,  and po l i t ica l ly  than i ts Europe an 
cou n t e rparts.  A m e rican regions do reta in some dis� inct i ve cultural  
fea tures,228 a n d  residen ts i n  d i fferent regions vary great ly in t h e  
va l ue t hey place o n  the e n vi ronment . 229 S t i l l ,  t he re are virtual ly no  
barriers t o  capi t a l  mobi l i t y  w i t h i n  the  United S tates. Wh i le t here 
are a few barriers to labor and resident ia l  mobi l i ty, both  are rela­
t iv e l y  h igh i n  the U .S.  as welL and American states and localit ies 
act ive l y  compete in  offering varying  packages of  jobs, l iv ing stan­
dards, and e n vi ron m e nt a l  and non-environmental a m e n i t ies .  In  
E urope . by  con trast, a l tho ugh capital ha s  become m uch  more 
mobi le than i t  was prior t o  t h e  Maastrich t Treaty (Treaty on  Euro­
pean Union ) of 1 993.2'0 labor and resident ia l  mob i l i ty remam 
lower t ha n  in the U .S. 23 1 
'''' On t h e:  h i storica l origins anJ su rprisi ng pe rs istence of these . see D.-\ v 1 1 >  lL,<KE 1 -r 
FisH I-I < .  A I .H I < >:--< ·, S E e D: Fol 'R BRITISI I FoLKW.-\YS IN A.\.I E R I C.-\ ( 1 9X9). 
'''' See the d i scussion c>f regiona l  J i ffcn.:nces in e nviron menta l  concern and act i ,· ity dur­
ing the:  ll!7trs hy H . .  , ;s. surra note: 2 1 0. at  -U-5 1 .  
: ,, ,  For a discussion of the measures tak t: n  Jur ing the 1 990's to opc: n up capi t a l  flows by 
t he coun l ries of Southern. Cen t r a l  and E astern Europe. a nd i h c: i r  e ffects. sc:c Claudia M. 
l luch.  Capiwl Mnbilil_l' ami EU Enlargemenl. 1 35 REv . WoRLD Eco'-1. 62l) ( \ l)99 ) .  For a 
case study of Po l and . where F D I  i ncreased over tenfold during t h e  1 l)l)fr. . see Boleslaw 
Dt1rnansk i .  7\pes of lm·es!menl and Lucmiunal Freji'rt'llCt'S uj Europt'an. American and 
,-\sian :Hanujaouring Colllf-'lltlit'S in Poland . in p, > LI S H  En '"' > M Y  1 :-;  TRA:-;srrloN: SPATI A L  
P!-YSI' I'< - 1 1 \' E S  29 ( J..:rzcgo J .  P0:1rysek & Tadeusz S t ryjak iewicz c:ds . .  2000). 
c.JI As for reside n t i a l  mobi l i ty. one study finds that Ame ricans move near ly twice as 
often as Dutch. French. C it.:rmans or Norwegians. W. Pa u l  S trassman.  ffousing A·farkel 
lnlt'rl'flllions and 1Hohilitv: An lmemarional Comparison. 28 U1w. STliD. 75lJ ( 1 99 1  ) . 
Economists ha,-e long a rgued t h a t  h ighly persislcn t  wage d i fiercnces and relat ive ly high 
u nem ployment  indicate that  h igh harriers to in t ra -European labor mobi l i t y  con t i n ue to 
exist .  See Oliv ier  .k� n  Bla nchard & Lawrence F. Katz. Regional Emlurions .  in l BROOK· 
I S <  ; s  P .. \f'ER.> uN EcoNu�uc AC! I VITY I ( 1 992 ): Robert J. Flan agan. European Wagr 
E,;uali�mion Since 1he Trr•mv vf Rome. in LABOR AND .-\:-< I NTEGRATED E t l !HWE 1 67 
( Lloyd U lm a n  et a \ .  c·ds .. 1 9lJ3): Michael Fert ig  & Christoph M. Sch m id t . !'vlobiliry Wirhin 
Europe: The ;\ uirwl.:s uf European l'uungsrers ( RWI Essc.:n . RWI Discussion Paper No. I .  
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From the  poi n t  of v iew of normat ive economics.  these v arious 
factors combine to pai n t  a rat he r  complex picture .  B e cause capi t a l  
mobi l i ty  i s  lower w i t h i n  Europe t h a n  i n  t h e  U.S . ,  there i s  l ess  rea­
son to  fea r  a regu l a to ry race-to-the-bottom wi th in  E u rope,  and 
t herefore - other  t h ings being equa l - less  j us t i ficat ion for e nv iron­
me n tal regula tory cen t ralizat ion in  Europe than i n  the U.S. On the 
other hand, because residen t i a l  and l abor mobil i ty i s  so m uc h  lower 
w i t h i n  Europe than  in  t h e  U . S . ,  t here may be l ess reason i n  E urope 
to trust in Tie bo ut- type i n te r-j urisdict ional  compet i t ion disc i p l i n i ng 
sub-fe deral  governm e n ts to  p rovide t h e  leve l  o f  environ menta l  
ame n i ti es favored b y  t h e  median  voter. The re may w e l l  be s ign i fi ­
c a n t  variat ion across European nat ions i n  voters'  p re ferences over  
e n v i ronmen t a l  versus non-envi ronm e n t a l  publ ic  goods, but t he re i s  
a l s o  s ubstant i a l  v ar ia tion across U.S .  regions i n  voter prefe re nces 
for e n viron m e n ta l  public goods, vari a tion that is i gn ored, or rat h er 
overridden.  b y  u n i form federal  e nv ironme n t a l  s tandards. 
Of  course,  both E urope a nd t h e  U .S .  are c hanging. When t h e  
great  federal e n v i ronmenta l  l aws we re passed,  t here were l arge d i f­
ferences i n  the  level  of economic and industria l  deve lopment 
across American regions. Those d i fferences have n arrowed signi fi ­
can tly .  I n  partic u lar ,  between 1 970 and 1 990, t h e  heavi ly  i nd ustr i­
a l ize d  Northeast  and the  M id\vestern '' R ust B e l t" h ave act u a l l y  
become more rural ,  w h i l e  t h e  South  a n d  Rocky Mounta in  Wes t  
have become more urban .  ='2 Given t h e  systematic tendency for 
ambient  levels  of a i r  pol lut ion to be s ignifican t ly h igher in urban 
ve rsus rural areas .L'' a nd due to  their  increasing urbaniza t i on ,  the 
once relat ive l y  r ura l  a nd under-deve loped Southern and Rocky 
Mountain areas h ave come t o  experience pol lu tion prob lems t h a t  
t h e y  did n o t  h a v e  w h e n  t h e  federa l  environmental  laws were 
passed in  the early l l)70's .  I ron ica l l y ,  pe rh aps. w h i le u n i form fed ­
era l  environmenta l  standards may have suppressed la rge regiona l  
-� 12 ·rhe percent age o f  t h e  populat ion l i vi n g  i n  rural areas i n  t h e  Northeast i ncreased 
!rom l lJ .4 'Yu to 2 1 . 1 %  over the 1 lJ70- l l)90 period. w i th  a sma ller  increase. from 25.2'};, tu 
26'!\, . i n  the ' ·rust-be l t  .
. 
( east north -cen t ra l )  area: by cont rast. in the south .  t he r ural  per­
cen tage fe l l  from 35.2% i n  1 97() to 3 1 .4 ''.;, i n  1 990, w i t h  an even bigger fal l ,  fmm 26.9% tn 
21 l.3 'Y. • .  i n  the Rocky Mountain West .  U .S. C!'N:>us B u R E.-\ U.  URBA:-.1 ''"D RURAL PoPUI .-\· 
1 1 < > N :  i 900 TO 1 'NO ( 1 995 ) ,  <n-ai/ah/e ar ht rp://www.20 I Oce nsus.b iz/populat ion/ccnsusJatai 
urpup0090.txt.  
2J.\ For a recent study comparing ambient  levels of fine part iculate pol lu t ion in rural,  
urban (and background. nat ional  park) locat ions that finds much h i gher levels in the urban 
area in the fa l l  and winter .  due to carbonaceous aerosol particles in the urban  airshcd 
during t hose seasons. sec Rog�: r L. l�mner ct a! . .  Regional Com{Jusirion of PM: , Aerosols 
Measwed ur Urhan, Rural w1d "Background" Sites in the Tennessee Val/ev, 38 Antos. 
1'11 1 1{1<' b.;v'T 3 1 43.  3 1 47--lX ( 2! )0-l) .  
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d i fferences i n  preferences i n  1 970, regional  pre ferences may now 
be m uch more s imi lar ,  so that  i n  the U.S . ,  the case for un i form 
federal envi ronmental  l aws may be much s tronger now than i t  was 
whe n  those Jaws were passed thirty years ago . 
In Europe, en largement  of the  EU has resul ted  i n  the appl ica­
t ion of un i form E uropean pol lut ion standards to countr ies at radi­
cally d i fferen t  stages of  economic development .  During the e arly 
and mid 1980's, when E U  envi ronmenta l  pol icy exploded i n  h u n­
dreds of p ieces of environmenta l  legis lat ion, there were sign i ficant 
cross-nat ional d i fferences in l evels o f  industr ia l  developmen t  and 
pol lut ion,  but  enlargement of  the EU s ince the Maastrich t  Treaty  
has  vastly i ncreased those d itferences .23 .. Th e  wel fare conseque nce 
of having un i form E uropean e nv i ronmental s tandards apply to 
such very d i fferen t  places depends upon the answers to a number  
of  q uest ions: How s imi lar are t he  e nvironmental preferences of  
people in Poland or Slovak ia ,  for example ,  to  those of people in  
Germany and the Nether lands? What are the ambient leve ls of  
pol lu t ion i n  such  very d i fferent coun t ries? To what  ex ten t  would 
n at ional  governments in the  newly acceded countries  act to regu­
late environmental pollution i n  a way favored by the median 
voter? To what exten t  has i ncreased capital mobi li ty  w i th in  the E U  
made the race-to-the-bottom a real concern i n  the new and 
en larged EU? Answers to t hese questions wi l l  be crucial for the 
normative evaluation of future E U  environmenta l  pol icy. 
4. 2. The Paradox of Centralized Enviromnenw! Regulation for 
Local En vironmental Problems 
What we take to be the great paradox raised by both American 
and European cen tral ized env ironmenta l  regulat ion is this :  
whereas perhaps the pr imary economic motive and j ust i ficat ion for 
s uch cen tral iza tion is the need to better regulate i n ter-j u risdict ional 
pol lu t ion, in real i ty both the Un i ted S tates' and E urope's central­
ized environmental  regulations are d irected at primar i ly  local pol­
lu t ion problems - that is. pol lu t ion that does not in  fact spi l l  over 
<Kross s t a te l ines. l'vforeover, where very basic cos t-be n e fi c  eco­
nomics would dictate varyi ng pol lu t ion standards -- wi th l e ss devel-
23-l I n  1 990. for ..:xampll:, p e r  capita income i n  high ly i n dustrial ized (icTm:tny w a s  about 
55':{, h igher than in less-industrialized Greece. In 1 999. German per enpita i ncome was 
2500�, that of per capita income in Poland.  Hermine Vidovic. Srnrhesis of' Ri!CI'III Lahour 
;Harker Den·lopm.:ncs in the Central and Eastern European Cotmlries. in M t <  ;R .\TION Pou. 
u Es A!'OD EU ENL\RGEMENT: THE C.-'\SE or CENTRAL AND E .\,; rERN E L ROI'l' l3. 27 
( 200 1 ) . 
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oped . l ess pol l u te d  p laces a llowing more po l l ution (beca use 
damages from pol l ut i o n  are l e ss )  a n d  more h e a v i l y  p o l l uted p laces 
h avin g  tougher standards - U.S .  fe dera l  and E u ropea n  centra l ized 
e nv i ronmen ta l  regulat ions  general ly require u n i form p o l l ut ion 
reductions,  regard less of  local costs  a nd ben e fi t s .  How then to 
exp l a i n  t h e  emergence o f  s u c h  i n e ffic ient u n i form centra l ized 
standards? 
4.2. ! .  The Choice for Uniform Techn olog_v- Based Emission 
Standards: Regulatory Protectioni.Ym in the E U 
vs. the U.S. 
As d iscussed i n  Sect ion 3, a p owerful posi t ive force beh i n d  u n i ­
form central  e n vironm e n t a l  s tandards is  t h e  i n d ustr ies a n d  govern­
ments  o f  heavi ly developed,  heavi ly  p o l l u t e d  j ur isdict i o ns. For 
i ndus t rialized, poll uted j u risdict ions, t h e  i rn posi t i on of u ni form 
emiss ion standards upon l ess developed j ur i sd i ct i on s i s  a way to 
l essen the com p e t it iv e disadvan tage they face from clean i ng u p  
t he i r  own p o ll u t i o n .  a n d  there fore constitute a form o f  regula tory 
protect i o n ism.  
The re is powerfu l  evide nce o f  regiona l  p ro tc:ct i o n ism i n  a n u m­
ber o f  American fed e ra l  e n v i ro n me n t a l  statu tes. Th is theory fi n ds 
d ra m a t ic suppor t i n g  evidence i n  the  Preve nt i un o f  S i gn ifican t 
Deterioration ( PS D )  provisions o f  t h e  U . S .  Cl e a n I\i r  Act . ' ' '  Orig­
i na l l y  i m p l i ed i n to t he: Act b y  t h e  U .S .  S upreme Court and subse­
q ue n t ly inc luded i n  the 1 977 A me n d m e n ts ,  the PSD p ro v is io ns 
i mpose air  pol l u t i o n  control  s tan d ards o n  those regions o f  t h e  U . S .  
t hat a l ready m e e t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  a m bient a i r  q ua l i ty standa rds a n d  
which t herefore could,  were i t  not  for t h e  PS D provis ions,  a l l ow 
n e w  i ndustries to l ocate  wit h i n  the ir  borders and pol!ute a t  w i l l  
without  v io lat ing n a ti o n al s t a ndards .2:'" A s  Pashigi a n  h as demon­
strated i n  h is  c lassic s tudy o f  t h e  PS D provisions,  t h e  i m position of 
s uc h  federal  m a n dates o n  re lat ive ly  prist ine a n d  unpol l uted regions 
o f  t he U .S .  was a m aj o r  goa l  of federal  legis l a to rs from the  o l d e r  
a n d  more h e a v i ly p o l l u t e d  U.S.  states and legisl a t i ve dist ricts. 'n  
m 4 2  U .S.C. §§ 7470-IJ2 ( 2000).  
2.16 !d. 
2.'7 B. Peter Pashigian. En vironmental Regulation: Whose Self-!nteresls A re Being Pro· 
teCielf?. SLtpra note 223: see also Richard L. Revesz. f-ederalism and Environmc111al 
rion: A Public Choice A nalvsis. 1 ! 5 H.·\RV. L. REv. 553 (2(}()l ). 
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S i m i l arly.  i n  E urope,  t here have been a n umber of i nstances i n  
which i nd ustries23x i n  h e avi l y  industr ia l ized and h e a v i l y  regulated 
cou ntries such as Germany a n d t h e  N e ther l ands h ave lobbied for 
t h e  E U  to adopt t h e i r  own tough nat ional  standards as E U  stan­
da rds , so as to e n s u re that they a re not placed at a com pe t i t i ve 
d isadvantage rela ti ve to i n d ustri es i n  J ess heavi ly  regulated EU 
coun t ries such as Spain .239 I n  1 983. G ermany e n acted i ts  Large 
Combustion P l a n t  Regulation, a technology-based law sett ing 
str inge n t  l imits  on the a ir  emission of s u l fur  d ioxide a n d  n i t rogen 
dioxide from new plants  and requiring retro fi t t i n g  of  ex is t ing 
plan ts.2 -l'J On l y  after pass ing this  tough domestic l mv d i d  Germ a n y  
begi n t o  act ively pressure t h e  E C  to  adopt a d irect ive req u i ri ng 
that  G e rm a n  standards be m e t  t h roughout t h e  EC.  These e fforts 
s ucceeded in 1 988. w h e n  t h e  EC issued a directive on Large Com­
bustion P lants to reqULre country-speci fic reductions i n  <:nr 
e missions .2.1 1 
Anot her  example of such i nt e rest grou p  beh avior is t h e  E u ro­
pean Directi ve on I ntegrated Pol l u t ion Prevent ion and Co n trol  
( t h e  I PPC Direct ive) . ='-!2 Had this  d i rect i ve a imed to a c h ieve a h a r­
mon ization o f  ambie n t  e nv iron m e n tal  q ual i ty  across Membe r 
S tates, faci l i ty-speci fic e mission l i m i t  values would h ave h a d  to u i f­
fer from one cou n t ry to the next to meet  locat ion-speci fi c  c ircum­
:tanccs and s t i l l  achieve a s im i l a r leve l  of e nvironme n t a l  q u a l i t y .  
S uch a d i rect i ve \vo u l d  h ave been to t he d isadvanta ge of i n d us t ries 
i n  countri es t h a t  a l ready had strict fac i l i ty-speci fi c  em issi ons l imi ts. 
s uch as Germany.  P recisely as predicted by t h is a n alysis.  in t he 
negotiations leading t o t h e  Direct i v e .  i ndustries i n  h e a vi l y  regu­
lateu cou n t r i es such as G ermany and t h e  N e t he r l a n ds opposed a n  
a m b i e n t  e n v iro n me n t a l  qual i ty-based ap proach . w h i le t hose i n  
cou n t ries \vi t h  systemat ica l l y  d iffere n t  h yd ro-geological condi t ions. 
" '·' I n  aJJi t inn.  !!,f<.:�n N GOs w i l l  be pkas�:d w i t h  this lobby and often suppGrt the 
LkmanJ to transfer  strict nat ional  standard> to a European stanJarJ. o,, V I D  V < .!< ; r: t  .. . 
Tu,\IJL'·:z; L ' 1·: Co,-.::;1".\II.' W< , \ 'C D  E-.:'.·lli:O.'< .\:LST .. \ 1 .  R u ; u l . .c\TIO:--: :N ,\ CiuJHAI .  En >.'-'U,\ IY 
52-:'i) ( 1 9')5 )  
2."! s�e .'\lhcna i\ 1 .  Sbrag. i a .  Enl·irunmemal Policy: From Excirnnenr EO PrfJ/Jil'm-Soi\'E!Ig . 
in Puu<Y-\1""  1. '- < ;  ' ·'' rn;: E U<OPI,,\,'i L'N io.-.: ( Helen W:: l lace & \Vi l l iam \V:dl:ice cds .. -+th 
..:d. l 'J96) (cited and di�cusscd by Jord a n .  stq;ro nntc 105 ) .  
'�0 St'e :'vt iR,\ N n ,, !\ .  S n m F: U R\. E N V IRON\It: NT,\1. p, lt .rncs I N  J A!'AN. (j r. R:-.1,\NY,  A:"U 
r n r  U .'l  l T D  S I A Tr s  97-99 ( 2002 ) (not ing tha t  hy 1 992, SO; emissions had dropped hy 
more than 75 perc�nt of 1 970 levels in the former W<::st Germany ) .  
2" 1  See id. at l O l .  
242 ·nle J PPC Directive. s11pra nolt: :-l l .  Sel! also Faure & Lefev<.:rc. supra n<lte 86: 
M1chael Faure & J .G . J .  Ldeverc, The Draji {)freuive on lntegraEed Pollution Prevemion 
and Comrol: An Economic Perspec1i1·e. 5 ELR.  EN\TL. L. REv. l 12 ( 1 996) .  
I 
I 
264 Virginia En vironmenral Law Journal [Vol .  27:205 
such as t he U K ,  favored such an a p proach.2·�' As w i t h  U . S .  federal  
environmental  laws.  i n t e re s t  groups i n  more heavi ly industr i a l ized 
and heavi ly regu la ted cou n t ri e s  h ave gen e r a l l y  preva i l ed a t  the 
E u ro pean leve l ,  with the I PPC and other European directives pro­
v i d i ng for t h e  h ar mo n iza t ion of emission l i m i t  v a l ues rather  t h a n  
ambient envi ron m e n t al q ua l i ty standardsY4 
Polit ical  sc i e n ti s ts poi n t  to t h e  fact t h a t  t he EU pa r l iam e n t is 
largely in favor of st r i c t detail ed laws as a too l to constra i n  the 
Member States .2·�5 The reason is  t h a t  Member S t a tes d istrust  e a c h  
ot h e r and worry t ha t  s o m e  m ay n o t  i m plemen t e nvi ron m e n t a l  
direct ives e ffect ively.2·16 Th a t i s  a l so w hy Member S tates.  v i a  t h e  
Counci l  o f  M i n i s t e rs ,  favor increase d  a u t h o r i ty for t he Com m ission 
t o  take action be fo re the ECJ against  Mem b e r  S ta tes t hat fai l  to  
i m pl em ent Europea n e n v i ro nmen t a l  l a w  a ppropr i a t e l y .2-�7 Looki n g  
a t  t h e  economic cri te r ia for cen t ral izat ion prese n ted i n  Sec t i o n  3 o f  
t h is art ic le ,  one ge ts t h e  i m pressi on that  the fear o f  o t h e r  Me m be r  
States n o t  adequa te ly i m pl e m e n ting environmenta l  d i re c t i ves. 
t h e reby crea t i ng a co m pe t i t ive adva n tage for t h e i r  econom i e s .  i s  an 
i m portan t motivat ion b e h i n d  s upport for strict ,  precise rules  i n  
d i rect i ves t h a t  restrict  M e mbe r States '  discre t i o n ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  
p rope ns i ty  for str ict  a n d  i n c re asi n g  ac t ion s aga i n st M e m be r  States 
th a t lag beh i nd in  implementat ion .  
The pol i t i ca l -e conomic s tory t h a t  has p layed out i n  E ur o pe ove r 
t h e  choice between u n i form . i nd ustry-spec i fic  e m ission l im i ts ver­
sus am bie n t  e nv i ron m e n ta l  qua l i t y  standa rds is t h us v e ry s i m i l a r  to 
t h a t  which h a s  uecurred i n  the U.S.  One may q ue s t ion. h o we ver .  
\vhe t h e r  t h e  game had q u i t e  the h igh s t akes in  E u rope that  i t  h as 
had i n  the U.S.  f n  t h e  U.S . ,  t he re i s  a federal regulatory age ncy, 
t h e  E PA. backed by the U .S .  Depart m e n t  o f  Just ice,  w h ich is in a 
pos i t ion to take over t h e  j o b  of both w r i t i n g  and e n forc ing faci l i ty­
speci fic  pe r m i t s t hat  im p l e men t n a t iona l l y  u n i form. tec h nology­
based po l l ut io n  s t a n da rds. In E urope, t he re is no com parable 
E uropea n - leve l regu la to ry agency with t he police powe r to cond uct 
:4·1 The U K  has l a rge.  fast  lll1wing r i ve rs w i t h  h igher rcgenerat inn cap;11.: i ty . .  -\� a resul t  
the l ' K  m;1y 11\ l t  neet.l as str ingent  emission l imi t  v a l ues a s .  for cx�mrk. G.:nn anv I <> reach 
a s imi lar  c n v i ro n lll<: n t a l  q ua l i t y .  
::'-t.J See Faurt:. llurntonisa!ic ..on nf Ent:ironn:et:to.:! L:.nt· an:.! .\.!ark.et fn:cguuinn: l lurnu;nts­
ing ji>r tilt: Wrong Rcasun.1 ? .  supra not<: 1 02.  at  1 74. i\ nvthcr .:xampk is t h e  1 ')i)S d i rcct i ' ..: 
o n  large combust ion plants a n t.!  �1eit.l ra i n  t h a t  was strenuously sought by Dutch and Ger· 
man inuustrv .  Ser J,,rdan . .  \ iifJI'tl note l 05. at I X.  
2-l.' s,.,.. Keleme n .  l?egulotory l·i:dcra!ism . supra nul•; 88.  at 1 54--55.  
247  !d. 
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faci l ity-specifi c  inspect ions and t h e n  undertake e n forcem e n t  
actions i n  court.  For th is  reason. even faci l i ty-speci fic emission l im­
its may n o t  real ly  h e l p  pol l u te rs i n  t h e  most heavi ly r egu lated 
E uropean countries, since the enforcement of those sta ndards in 
Jess h e av i l y  regu lated countries is  u l t i m ate ly in t he hands of domes­
t ic,  rather than centra l ized E uropean e n fo rc e m e n t  a u t hori t ies .2·1x 
Hence, it may be that t he desire of t h e  more heavily regu l a ted 
Member S tates for such si te-specific standards may wel l  be some­
t h i ng done in the expect a t ion o f  t h e  fut u re d eve lo pment of  a cen­
tralized, European env i ronmental  regulatory agency w i t h  fu l l  
enforcement authority.  Moreover, o n e  can also understand that  i t  
would part icu l ar ly b e  t h e  more h eavi ly regulated Member States 
that  would lobby for stringent e n force ment  of  Europea n law at the 
Member State l evel. 
4.2.2. En vironmental Regulatory Centralization as an Inevitable 
Consequence of D ivergent Devefupmem in Majurir_v­
Rule Federations 
Recall  that in t h e  m od e l  of Cre m e r  and Palfrey,  federal m m t ­
m um stan dards are a m ore o r  less inevi table con s e q u e n ce of m aj or­
i ty  rule  in a federal system whe re j uri sdictions can be a rrayed as 
low, med i um or h igh demanders of t h e  p u b l i c  good in q uest ion.  I n  
both Europe and t h e  U.S. ,  centra l ized e n vironme nta l  regul a t i o n  
was a prod uct o f  precisely such m ajori ty-rule  l egis l a t i ve pol i t i cs .  
and in both p l aces , centralized regulation arose when t h e  re levant 
j urisdict ions were i ndeed q u i te d iverse in t h e i r  preferen ces for 
environme n t a l  p ro tect ion . Hence we believe t h at one part o f  the 
answer to the a ppare n t  paradox of u n i form cen t ra lized en viron­
mental m inim u m  stan dards for essent ia lly local c n v i ro n m e n t�1 l  
problems is  q u i te s i mple: beca use those m i n i m u m  reg u l atory stan­
dards were what  the median j urisdict ion wanted.  t hey vve re the  
majori t y-rule choice i n  the centra l legisl a t u re. 
ln the U ni ted Sta tes , for examp l e , when the m aj or federal a i r  
a n d  water pol l ut ion m i n i m um s t a ndards were enacted i n  t he ear ly  
1 970's.  t h e re were vast  d i fferences i n  average wages, i ncomes, and 
gen e ra l  level s  of developme n t  between d i ffere n t  n at ional  regions .  
wi t h  t h e  South east and i nterior West  st i l l tra i l ing far beh i nd t he 
o l der, more d e ve loped Northeaste rn , Midv,:estern and Pac ific 
Coast regions. On an aggregate leve l ,  t h e  evidence does ind ica te 
that  the peak years of  the American e n viro n m e n t a l  move m e n t. 
2-ki /d. il l : 56. 
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from 1 965 to 1975, m a y  w e l l  h ave been a very specia l  t ime.  I t  was a 
period when t h e  accumulated environmental  degradation c aused 
by rapid postwar industr ia l  growth became strikingly obvious,  a n d  
w h e n  p e r  capita i ncome i n  the  m o r e  developed regions of the coun­
try had reached the t h reshold level  where the wi l l i ngness to pay for 
pol lu t ion reduction was s u ffic ient ly  h igh t o  generate a demand for 
tougher e nv irorun enta l  regul at ions.249 
There were striking i nte r-jurisdictional diffe rences in "'vi l ! i ngness 
to pay for po l lu t ion  reduction when the  American federal  e nv iron­
mental  laws were passed,  however, and t h ose d i fferences have per­
sisted to a perhaps surp ris ing degree .  Overal l ,  the exis t ing 
evidence from t h e  U . S .  s hows t h a t  beyond some t h re s hold i ncome 
leve l .  state- level  demand for pollu t ion  control  does increase. B u t  
t h e  evi dence a l so i ndicates t h a t  p e r  capita  i ncome alone does not 
ful ly expla in i nt e rstate v a riat ion i n  pol lut ion .  For su lfur dioxide 
(SOJ e missions, t h e re appears to b e  a c lear inverted V -shaped 
re la t ionship,  w i t h  two categories of U.S. states:  those with low t o  
middle i ncome, where so2 emissions incre ase wi th  economic 
growth ,  and h igh  i ncome states,  where po l lu t ion begins  t o  
decl i ne .25" But  i ncome alone does n o t  accoun t for i n t e rstate varia­
t ion.  Wi th in  the set  of  rapid l y  growing states,  emissions of n i t rogen 
oxide and su l fur dioxide have peaked at q u i te wide l y  vary ing  per 
capita income leve lsY1  A l t hough they h ave grown rapid ly  since 
t he 1 970's. a d isproportionate n umber of Southern states  h ave 
passed state laws t h a t  forbid state e n vironmental  standards that  are 
tougher than federal  m i n i m a .  Whether s uch interstate h eterogene­
i ty  is  due to d i ffer ing degree s  o f  urbanizat ion.  c l i m ate ,  or  unob­
served cul tural  factors remains t o  be explained.  
A s imi lar t rend desc r ibes s i m i l ar regulat ion i n  E u rope:  most  
e nvironmental  regulat ion in  t h e  Western E u ropean states only  
e m e rged a fter  t h e  ' "golden s ixt ies . "  The ear ly  sectoral  e nvironmen-
2•" See John A.  List. flm·e A ir Po/luwn1 Emissions Converged Amung U. S. Region<> 
Evidmce fimn UniT RoOT Tests. 66 S .  EcoN . J .  1 4-t ( 1999). Btll s.:e Erwin H .  B u l tc e t  a l . .  
Regulator.,- Federalism and 1he Distribl llion of A ir Pollwam Emissions. - 17 J. R u ; JONAL SCI. 
1 5 5 (2007 ) ( suggesting that convt:rgem:c occurred only after t h e  passage of federal laws ) .  
25o '-icktarios Aslanidis & Anastasios Xepapadeas. Smooth Transi1iun Pollulion- lncome 
Pra!ts. 57 Ecot.DGICAI_ EcoN. 1 82. 1 87 ( 2006).  
25 1 John A .  List  & Craig A .  Gal let ,  The Environmenwl Ku�nels Curve: Do.:s One Si�e 
Fi1 A ll? .  3 1  EcoLOG IC:.A L Eco:-<. 409. 420 ( 1 999) (showing very different turning poi n ts i n  
per capita emissions for Tt:xas. Arizona a n d  Colorado).  l n  addition. there i s  evidence that  
i n  t he U n i ted States, s tate  level e missions per capita of sulfu r dioxide and n i trogen oxide 
fai led to conve rge unti l  the passage of the federal Clean A i r  Act. Bultc  et a! . .  supra note 
24lJ. The problem with this study is that  theoretically, what is predicted to convc::rge is 
emissions relative to per capita i ncome. not emissions relative to per C;Jpi ta populat ion.  
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tal l aws ( a im ing  at protection oL for example,  surface waters ) i n  
countries such as Be lgium, Germany, France, and t h e  Nether la nds 
date from the 1 970's.252 D ur ing that period, economic develop­
ment had apparent ly led to such a level of  weal th that a demand 
for environmental  protection  was generated. Economic deve lop­
ment  i n  Southern European nat ions was, due i n  part to pol i tica l  
i nstabi l i ty  ( for example, in Spain and G reece),  s t i l l  fal l ing far 
behind.  Only when the leve l o f  economic weal th i n  the  southern 
states i ncreased substant ia l ly ,  as a resu l t  o f  jo in ing the  European 
Union among other th ings, was a demand for envi ronmenta l  pro­
tection generated. ( O f  course, these n at ions were a lso forced to 
implement  envi ronmenta l  protection as a resu l t  of  t he E U's 
d i rectives ) .  
We expect a s im i lar pat tern for the new Member States  of  Cen­
tra l  and Eastern Europe,  where the top priori ty may be economic 
deve lopment .  As a resu l t ,  the demand for envi ronmenta l  protec­
tion measures i s  l i ke ly  low, and thus any attempt by the European 
Commission to force these new members to  augment e nv i ronmen­
ta l  regulation may be fraught w i th  di ffi cu l ty. However. one can 
equal ly  expect that as the  new Member  S tates develop, there wi l l  
be a para l le l  i ncrease i n  demand for tougher env ironmenta l  regula­
t ions.  Al ternat ively ,  the re may be an increased wi l l ingness wi th in  
the E U  context to implemen t  env i ronmenta l  d i rectives more 
serious ly .  
4.3. EU Enlargement as a Natural Experimem in the Logic and 
Umirs of Environmemal Federalism 
"ll1e en la rgement of the E U  may provide a natural  exper iment  to 
test a l ternative posi t ive theories of e nvironmenta l  regula tory cen­
tra l izat ion. One ' s  fi rst thought might be t hat the  addit ion of  re la­
t ively less developed nat ions such as S lovakia and Poland -
countries wi th relat ively cheap and abundant land, l abor and ot her 
i nputs to the product ion process - would heighten the  protect ionist  
motive for environmenta l  regul atory central iza t ion. But  such a 
conjecture depends upon the i mpl ic i t  assumption that  cheap 
resources would confe r  a competi t ive advantage upon f irms based 
in countr ies such as Pol and ,  as they competed against f irms based 
in weal th ier ,  more i nd ustria l ized countries such as Germany and 
France. This assumpt ion treats the new Central  and Eastern Euro-
2.\c See Pl_:Buc E � v iKON�-tENTAL LAw 1� THE E u KoPEAN UN ION AND THE U:-.: ITED 
SrAn:s: A Co!'-1 1'.-\KATlVE A:-.: . .x L  vs1s. supra note 2. 
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pe an E U  m e m be rs to be m ore or l ess a k i n  to t h e  Southeastern 
states  in  t he U . S .  
We d o  not  y e t  h ave ev idence w it h  w h i c h  t o  a n a lyze t h i s  t he si s .  
Wh i l e  i t  d o e s  seem a s  if c a p i t a l  i s  i n creasi n g l y  m ov i n g  fro m  o l der .  
deve loped E U  c o u n t ri e s  i n to the n e w  Membe r S t a tes - thus  t h re a t­
e n i n g  j o b  l oss a n d  d i s l oc a t i on i n  t h e  o lder .  developed c o u n t ri e s  - i t 
does n o t  appear  t h a t  t here are actual l y  new.  compe t i t i ve f irms 
form i n g  in the form e ri y  com m u n i s t  n a t i ons .  Cap i t a l  m o b i l i ty i n  
E urope - i n  part i c u l a r  be tween E as t e rn a n d  Western E ur ope h as 
i ncreased spec t a c u l a r ly .253 alt h o ugh t h e  d i re c t i o n  i s  cert a i n l y  n o t  
a l ways from Wes t  t o  East a n d  t h e  reason i s  m os t l y  n ot e n v i ro n m e n ­
t a l .  The re i s .  for e xa m p l e .  t h e  w e l l-known p h e n o me n o n  o f  
i n c reased l a bo r  m igrat i o n  from Eastern E urope a n  coun tr ies  (l ike 
Pol a n d ) to Western E uropea n  countr ies  ( l i k e  B e l gi u m  and t h e  
N e t h e rl a n ds ) :'54 a n d  t he re are s i mi l a r  s tories of Western E ur o pe a n  
comp a n i e s  m o v i ng t o  t h e E ast .  B e fore t h e  e n l arge m e n t. t h ere 
were a l ready l a rge fore i g n  d i rect  i nvestm e n ts in Eastern E ur o p e a n  
cou n t ri e s . 255 A rt e r  e n l arge m e n t ,  t h i s  p rocess h as o f  course 
i ncrease d .  and it  takes a vari e t y  of forms: for e x a m p l e .  Dutch t r ans­
port com pa n i e s  i nsta l l i n g  t h em se l ves i n  Eastern E u rope25" and 
G e r m a n  chem ical comp a n ies i nvest i ng in  Eastern E u rope.  I n de e d ,  
Wes t e rn  E ur o p e a n  fi rms ( as w e l l  as A m e ri c a n  a n d  A s i a n  ones ) are 
i nvest i n g  i n  n e w  p l a n t s  and fac i l i t i e s  in t he new E LI n a t ions .  
H ow e ve r .  t he reasons as advanced by i n d us try for t h i s  m ove 
tuwa rds Eastern E ur ope are most l y  re l a t e d  to lower t axes and 
l abor costs .  Average l abor costs in t h e  new M e m b e r  S t ates·  c h e m i ­
c a l  i nd u s t ry are o n l y  5 e uro a n  h o u r  as opposed t o  27 e u ro a m o n g  
c u rr en t  E U  m e mbers. -� 57  H owever,  t h e  run to E U  m e m b e rs h i p  
a l re a d y  s p u r re d  i n v e s tm e n t s  i n  t e c h no l ogy to faci l i ta t e  com p l i a n ce 
- -- - �---------------------
' ( ·�,p i la l  rnoh i l i t v  has ' t:rv recent ly bc·cn further encou raged hy ( \wncil  D t rcctrvc 
21 10h/ l 2.'/ E C .  �I)O(J O . J .  ( L  .l/6 ) 36. wh ich essen t i a l ly establ ishes an indiv·id u;l l  riglli tu pr1 >·  
1 ide scn 1cc·, :n . tny mcmbcr 'i;ttc ul the· Umon. 
2-'" \\\•rkc:r, from Eastc:rn E u mpc i n  8elgium arc cspcci�• l lv active in the bui lding ,ector. 
wh ich Ius led to cnnccrn abou t  "un fa i r  compe t i t ion·· arnung trade u n runs in  Belgium. See 
( i u y  V�1 1 1  ( i VL·s.  Soci,t/ Paruwrs Concerned hy Lahour Ahgraliun frum Cemrui and Ea,tem 
Lum!'"· [r ROt < •r · :--. D ( Se p t .  22. 200:'i ) . http://W\\\\.l'UftJfound.eurpp;t .eu/,�iruf21)( J:'iii l9/fc;t­
t t r rt:  beO:'iO'l.>O.'l i . h l ln l .  
255 St'l' C< >Vl� l i SS I < >r--; < >F n t r Et : HOI't- ·\N C"\1 \ll  :-- r i lES. h 1 1 '.·\< 1 u1 E:--. L .\ lH > I · "-I L N I u:--. 
h rw s m Y  ( C ·,lll rm ission S1 aff \Vork ing  Paper 2.�-l. 2003 ) . m ai!ablt' at ht tp :/h�c.europa.cul 
cntc rprisdc· n ter prise· _pulicylinJ ust ry/dc Jcisec_23-l_2003 _cn .pdf. 
c:''' Euni lt: .  A bout Us. h l lp://www.eun i te .n l ima in .php?Lmg= n l& id= l :  I l -l ( l ast visited Oct .  
I ( 1 _  21 l\Jt-i ) .  
:;- D 1  t !'.< 11 1 B.-\ :--. h Rt- :-.L .\ RCH. \V r ;. t t  RN Ct tE'\. lW.\L Cu \ t t ·,\ :--. t t  s :v!ovr: r :--. r" E.b r­
t R :--. E t  �< e ll'! ( 200:'i).  h t tp:liwww.dbn:sc.;m.:h. de/I'RO DIDBR_. I NT E R N ET __ D E- l'ROD: 
I 'RODI H H )( )I Jt l! li XKJ l  K3-l.<7 .pd t. 
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with  environmenta l  regula ti ons. Hence . a recent Deu tsche Bank 
research report argues tha t  the  i ncrease in  env i ronmenta l  stan­
dards has proved a handicap for the chemical  industry in  Eastern 
Europe,  which expla ins the i ncreased i nvestmen ts by t he German 
chemica l  industry in the new Member  S tates . ·'5" Such firms would .  
i f  anything. h ave an ince nt ive  t o  favor env i ronmenta l  regulatory 
decentralization,  so that they can take adv antage of \ax environ­
menta l  s tandards in new r-...1ember  States with s lower deve lopment .  
The q uestion is whether en largement  has  i ndeed l ed  to such a 
weakening of  s tandards. S uch a weakening could occu r  e i ther 
thro ugh formal except ions granted by the  Ell Commission for the 
. .  environmenta l  acquis"259 to new Mem be r  S ta tes, or t h rough l en i­
en t  en forcement. There is however, l i t t l e  evidence of forma l  
exceptions.  111ere are some except ions i n  the Accession Treaty.  
but most of t hese relate to issues such as free movement ,  not  to 
environmenta l  issues.260 The envi ronmen tal acquis i s  therefore. i n  
princ ip le .  appl icable t o  new Member States a s  we l l .  M oreover, 
many new Member States had a long transition period to adapt 
the i r  legis la tion to EU norms before forma l  accession. Today. a t  
2.'·' /d. 
2;•; Thx: ··�environmental acqlri�·· rdc:rs to the bn,\y ,,f European ·�no,; in1nmx:nl<1\ \ao,;o,; 
which is in �:x is t.:nce and i n  t h at sense ··acquired." 
2"l Sec. e.g .. Treaty Conce rn i ng the Accession of the Repub l ic of B ulgaria and Rum a n i a  
t n  t h e  E u ropca n U nion . .June 2 1 . 2005. 2005 O..J. ( L  ! 57 )  I I .  The principle o f  acc�:ssion c;ur 
be i l l us t ra ted by �:xarn i n in )! rhe A�et con cern ing the con dit ions of accession for t he Czech 
R�:public. the Republic ()[ E s ton i a . the Republic of Cyprus. the R�:public of Latvia, the 
Republic of Li thua nia.  t h�: Repub l i�e of H u ngary. the Repu b l ic or M a l ta. the Republ ic  of 
Poland.  the Re p ubl ic of Slovcni ; t  a n d  t he S lovak Rcpub l i �: a mi t he adj u s t rn �e n ts tu the t rca· 
t ic� on which t h e  E urnpcan ll n iu n  is fou nded (offic ia l  jou rn a l .  Sept.  2.>. 200.\ ) . .'\rt ick 24 
uf t h i s Act rd�:rs to measures l is ted in  annexes wh ich swte t hat  t hey un ly  appl v to t h x:  new 
\!embe r  S t a t �:s und�:r the con d i t ions la id  down i n  those a n nexes.  :VIoreover, Part 5 pro­
vid�:s pruv is i pns rdat in)! to t he i m p k m�en t a tion uf the Act. · 11 1e pr in ..: i p !t.:. as e m bodic·d i n  
A rt ic le 53 .  i> t lut  upon acc..:ssion . t h e  n�:w Member S t at�es s h a l l  l'e considcrccl : 1 .;  hcmg 
addr�essees of d i rcct i v�:s and cl�:cisions w i t h i n  the m e a n i ng of A r t iclt: 24<) ol the t rcatv.  
wh ich means the new .\!ember S l a tes have to com ply w i t h  e x is t i n g  d i recti ves ( the so ca!kd 
Acquis Comrn u n a u t a i rc )  in  pri n c i p l e . A l ong l t s t  of a n nexes (one fur cv·erv Member S t a tiC) 
t h e n  provides spec i fic �except ions. For example. an ne x  V. rl:la tcd to t he Czech Republ ic.  
s tates that th e  articles of the treaty concern i ng t h e  free movc:me n t  o f  workers and ot prm i ·  
sion of service;; o n l v  apply su bject to t r a d i t i o n a l  provis ion s l a i d  dow n 1 11 p aragraphs 2 to 1 4. 
No t e . however. t ha t the u n l v  e ffect of the e xceptions fur t h e  n e w  \lc m he r  State's is t h a t  1 t  
concerns the t im i nf by w h ich t hey have to  com ply IV' i t h  the en viron menta l  acq u is. rhc· 
excep t ions arc. i n  other words. s imply  transition pe riods t hat  a l l ow th�e new M e m h�.:r S t ates 
10 t ake a longer l ime to get used to t he req u irements  umk:r the e nv i ro n m e n tal  acq u is. For 
example.  as fM as i n d ustr ia l  po l l u t i on comrol a n d  risk m a n ageme n t  ar�e concerned. a nn�:x 
V provides that the Czech Republic only needs to comply with a -;pecific directive hy 
Decem ber :1 1 .  2007 rcg;mli n g  em iss ion s l i m i ts of ce r t :1 i n a ir pol l u t a n b  from l a rge combus­
t ion p l a n t s . S i m i l a r  except ions ( t ra n s i tion periods) a r�: provided for spec i fic plants  for t h e  
other  accession cnuntr ies v ia  spec i fic d i rect i ves. 
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least  forma l  norms a r e  n o t  less stringent ( as far as E U  e n v i ro n m e n­
t a l  l a w  is concerne d )  in t h e  East t h a n  i n  t he West .  
Le n i ency for n e w  members coul d  a l so arise in t he fie l d  o f  
e n force m e n t .  Howeve r ,  work b y  Borze L a s  we l l  as  a recent a n n u a l  
s ur vey o f  i m p l e m e n ta t i on and e n forcem e n t  of  European Commu­
n i t y  e n vi ron m e n t a l  law i n  2005 . show t h a t  p roceedi ngs a re e q ua l l y  
i ns t i t u ted against  o l d  a n d  n e w  M e m b e r  States .  bot h  for non-com­
m un icat i on i n fr i n gemen ts a n d  for n on -confo rm i ty i n fri ngemen ts. 2''1 
R e m a rk ably. i t  appea rs to be t h e  o l d  M e m b e r  States  ( s u c h  as 
France a n d  I ta ly)  t h a t  top t h e  l ist as fa r as i n fr i ngeme n t  proceed­
i ngs are concerned.  However, one must a l w ays be careful in i n te r­
p r e t i n g  t hese n u m be rs:  e v e n  i f  t he r e  w e re for m a l  i m p l e m e n ta t i o n  
o f  E U  e nv i ro n m e n t a l  law i n  a l l  n e w  M e m b e r  States  ( wh i c h  wou l d  
e x p l a i n  vvhy t h e y  a r e  not  con fron t e d  w i t h  m o r e  cases t h a n  against 
the older  fi ftee n  s tates) .  one has to k e e p  in m i nd t h a t  t h e  EU can 
on l y  con trol the formal  i m p le m e n t a t i o n .  i .e . . whet h e r  n a t io n a l  l aw 
comp l i es wi th  E U  e n vi ro n m e n t a l  d i re c t ives; i t  i s  m uc h  h a rd e r  for 
t h e  E U  Com m ission to con t rol  w h e t h e r  e n vi ronme n t a l  laws are 
effect i ve I y enf(nced. 2''2 I t  i s  a lso hard e r  to m easu re. In our v iew . a 
cr uc i a l q uest i o n  for furt h e r  research i s  t h e  e x t e n t  to w h i c h  t h e re i s  
actual u n i formity i n  t h e  nat ional  enforcement o f  EC e n v i ro n m e n t a l  
d i rect i ves t ha t  h ave bee n  formal ly i m p l e m e n ted i n  nat ional law. 
Moreove r. u n l i ke the era o f  e n v i ron m e n ta l  re gu l a to ry ce n t ra l iza­
t io n  - w h e n  h e a v i l y  developed j ur isdict ions in bot h  the U . S .  and 
E u rope were also h ea vily i nd ustr i a l ized. w i t h  m a ny re l at iv e l y  
l a bor-depen d e n t i n dust r ies - m a n y  o f  t h e  wealt h iest a n d  most  pro­
e n vi ronme n t a l  Europe a n  n a t i ons h ave already sh i fted a w a y  from 
l abor- i ntens ive p rodu c t i o n .  [t i s  n e i t h e r  G e r m any , nor the N e t h e r­
la nds that face a threat from t h e  c h e a p  l abor a n d  resources o ffered 
by n e w  Centra l  a nd Eastern E urope a n  M e m b e r  S t a tes ,  b u t  rat h e r  
S p a i n ,  Portugal ,  and Greece.21)·1 c o u n t r i e s  whose i n d ustries act ive l y  
co mpete i n  labor-intensive a re as w h e re t he n e w  E U  m e m be rs a lso 
:nl St'i' T,\N.I .-\ A. ll( li{ZLL.  E N \' I I<ON�IF.NT,\L LEADF RS ,\Ni l L\c . c ;.-\R I JS 1:0. EL i{Pl'L: 
\\' t t Y  Tt t l  RE Is ( i' • n J  ·' - ·sot ; n i E RN PRoBu::.t·· ( 2003 ):  Co\t\! lss ioN � >t- n n·. Et·w wt�--'" 
( ·. 1 .\ f.\ft ......... !TfES. SF\T :-.; Tf{  r\.-.....: .'.: { 'AL 5<  .' f.< \ 'CY us n { L  1 .\U'LL .\ff.:.,·T.·\ { " ! I  1 .-..: :\ .\.' ( )  r:., H HU T  .\ f F  ."< { 
( IF c. • \ 1 \ 1 1  N I I Y E:-- n  Jj{< l'. J'. H ' N  L\L L\\\' 2005 ( Comm issiun S t a l  w, ,rk in� Paper 1 1 --l.'l. 
2006 ) . ! l \  ·ai!able c1t h l t p://t:c.c un)pi:1 . ...:u/·.:n vironn1e !1 tl!a\v/pJ f/7t h_,..: n . pd f. 
2<>� Th" Cum m i s�iun docs- nut h a v e  a n y  for m a l  cnmpc:tencc 111 c• nsurc C•lm p l iance w i t h  
E u ropean e n vi ronmental  l a w  1 11 t he tr.: rr i wrv of t h e  !\!e mber S t a t e .  St'e .1 .\NS & VI:DDI R . 
. 'llfll'rl not�· 232.\ al l S l. 
'"' r\ n d rew Mnravcs ik .  europe 's lmegrwion ill Celllun· 's f:.'nd. in C E N ' ! I{.-\ I J L\ 1 1 0:--1 ()}{ 
F!<.-\i i t>. I F N T.-\ no:-;'.' : E l -H <  ) J 'L F.-\\ 'INc> Tl i E  Cf i .-\ U.LNc; !'s  UF DELl'F N l N t i .  D t \  1 H'I I Y .  -\ :--1 1 > 
D D·I< Jt .t{.-\CY l .  38 ( r\ n d rr.:"· \ lura,-c, ik  c:d . . l \IYS ) .  
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h ave a re lative advan tage. O f  course,  cou n t ries  such as S p a i n  m a y  
themse l ves h av e  b e e n  rel uc t a n t  to  ful l y  imple m e n t  and e n force t h e  
tough a n d  ostensib ly  uni form E u ropean e n viron m e n t a l  s t andards.  
Hence . the en l a rgeme n t  of  the EU creates a s i tuat ion i n  w h ic h  t h e  
protect ionist  motive for e nv i ron m e n t a l  regul at o ry centra l izat ion is  
basical ly a bsent. I f  protectionism is indeed a n  i m portan t  force 
behind t h e  movem e n t  for r e a l  env ironme n t a l  regula tory centra l iza­
tion - for u n i fo rm standards t h a t  are act ua l ly  implemented and 
e n forced uniforml y  across t h e  federat ion - then we should  see re la­
t ive ly  l i t t le  concern w i t h  lax  e n v i ro n m e n t a l  s tandards in  the new 
EU n at ions. 
5 .  CoNCLU D I NG R EMARKS 
We h ave attempted to  ana lyze e nviron m e n t a l  fed e ra l ism i n  two 
see m i ngly d i fferent l egal  systems,  t h e  U .S.  o n  the one hand and the 
E u ropean Union on t he other .  S uc h  a comparison is ,  repe a t i n g  the 
quote by Krame r  in  the i ntroduct ion,  "necessar i ly  mis lead i ng."2''4 
There are o f  course l a rge di ffe re n ces  between the  t w o  syste m s ;  
indeed.  e v e n  in  the l anguage one n o tices t h e  d angers o f  compari ­
son .  For example .  when an  A m e rican scholar  refe rs t o  ·'n a t iona l  
s tandards, " h e  refers to federal  s tandards as  opposed to  l ocal or  
s ta te  s tandards :  for a E uropean scho l a r  a "nat iona l  standard" nec­
essari l y  refe rs to  a s tandard set by the n a t iona l  Member  S ta te ,  as 
opposed to e i ther  a l oca l o r  a E u ropean stand a rd .  
Despite t hese ins t i tu t iona l  d i fferences, we be l ieve t h a t  t he com­
parat ive exercise is i n format ive  and i l l u m i nat ing. A l t h o ugh the l a w  
a n d  economics l i te ra ture has recommended t h a t  w h e n  exte rn a l i t ies  
cross s tate  borders,  i t  becomes espec i a l l y  i mpor t a n t  to  s h i ft powers 
to a regu l atory leve l wh ich has j u risdiction over a terri tory l a rge 
e nough to adequately dea l  w i t h  t he p rob lem .265 centra lized envi­
ronmen t a l  regulat ion i n  E urope and i n  the  U ni ted States  h as not 
rea l l y  been foc used on s uc h  i n t e r-j u risdictiona l  pol l u t ion p roblems.  
From an economic perspect ive .  bot h  U.S .  federa l  and E u ropean 
e nvironmenta l  l aws are m uc h  more e xte nsive than might b e  neces­
sary to cure an  i n terstate external i ty.  Hence , as  the sty l ized facts in 
Sect ion 2 showed. ce ntra l iza t ion of e nvironmenta l  m at t e rs both in 
''" Kriimer. supra n o t e  4. a t  1 55 ( .. 1 h e  Eu rope a n  U n ion ( E l })  docs n o t  e njoy t h e  pre­
f\)gat ives <lf a state: it may act only where i t  has been expressly so a u thori>ed by t h e  Trea ty. 
Any comparison Vl·i t h  Jumest ic e n vi ronrnc: n t a l  law i n  the i'vkmber S tates. ur with t h a t  of 
t h e  USA is the refor..: necessari ly mislead i n g  . .. ) . 
'"' St IS AN R< >.'>!r·A< ' K f' I{ � I A :'-1 .  RL l fi i :'-I K I :'-1<; Ti l E  PRo< ; H ! S S ! V l· A< ; F :'-I I l l\ :  Tt IE Ru uH�I  
( )! l H F  A\JFRI <  .·\ N  R F< i 1 1 l .\J ORY S T,\ !E 1 64-65 ( 1 99.1 ) .  
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t h e  U.S. a nd i n  E u rope goes m uch further t h a n  t h e  economic l i t er­
a tu re h as pre dicted.2(>(' 
As we have see n ,  i n  bot h  Europe and i n  t he U.S . . t h e  courts h ave 
s truck down as u nconst i t u ti o n a l  (or as viola t i n g  t he E u ropean 
Treaty)  state  (or n at ional  Membe r  state)  e nviro nm e ntal  laws t h a t  
impose too l a rge a b ur d e n  o n  i n t e rstate  trade. Whether  th ese j udg­
m e n ts promote effic iency d e pe nds very m uch on t h e  spec i fic cir­
c umstances. O n  the one hand, the  ECJ ' s  Dusseldorp deci si o n  m ay 
have preve n ted nat iona l a u t horit ies from s h i ft i n g  a l l  waste s t rea ms 
to o n e  monopo l i st ic waste t re atmen t fa ci l i ty , t here by prese rvi ng 
a nd promo t i ng economies o f  sca l e  and co m pe t i t ion . O n  t h e  other 
han d . t h e  U.S.  Sup re me Court 's cases rega rd i n g  t h e  i n t e rstate  m a r­
ket  in  waste h a ve a lmost s u re l y  c u t  l ocal i n ce n t i ves t o  red uce and 
recyc l e  sol i d  wast e .  Whi le  e ffi c i ency effects may be un c lear . what  
does seern c l e a r  t o  us is t ha t  by promot i ng the market  fo r  t r a ns­
bou n d a ry s h i pme n t of w aste . t he S upre me Cou r t  a n d  t he E CJ have 
made it  more d i ffi cu l t  for s ta t es (or M e m ber Sta tes) to  pursue t h e  
g o a l  of  becom i ng se l f-su ffic i e n t  i n  waste produc t ion a nd d isposa l . 
A l so ,  t he deve l opme n ts o f  e nv ir o n m e n t al fed e r a l i s m  i n  bot h  
E ur o p e  and t he U.S.  sh a re rem ar k a b l e  p a ra l l e ls:  f n s t i t u t io n a l  s tr uc­
t ures in both regi ons s uggest t h e  developmen t of more central ized.  
de t a i l ed . r u l e - based regu l a t i on s ,  w h i c h  l eave l i tt le d iscre t i o n  to 
M em be r S tates,  com b i n e d  w i t h  a l i t i g i o us approach to en force ­
m e n t .  l t  fits i n to a p a t t e rn w h ich is characte rized by Kelemen as 
" regu l < � tory federal ism . . w h e reby federa l  ce n te rs use l i t iga t i o n  to 
const rai n re l ucta n t  (Member)  s t a tes.2"7 
rfl1e pro-fede r a l izat i o n  stance of the ·u . s. cou rt s creates an o t h e r 
adve rse conseque nce:  B y  broad l y  imply ing the pre-empt ion o f  s t a te 
and l oe<1 l e n vi ronmen tal  la ws by federa l  envi ro n m e n ta l  laws, ! h e  
U .S .  federal  co urt s h ave c re a t e d  a s i t u a t i on w h e re .  w h e n  fed e r a l  
r e g ul a t ions are  not  adeq ua t e l y  e nforce d ,  t h e re i s  n o  longe r  t h e  pos­
s ibi l i t y  of state  a n d  loca i regul ators bridgin g  t h e  gap. f n  t he E U, 
t h e  reverse problem exis ts: si n ce the  E U  l1<:1S n o  E PA  w i th e n force­
ment pmvers, i t  i s  depe n de n t u po n  Member States to i m p lemen t 
a n d  e n force E u ropean law. The re fore.  t h e  dange r  i n  E urope i s not 
so m uch t h a t  Europe w o u 1 J  pre-empt  n a t io n al law, but rat he r  t ha t 
M e m ber S t a t es w o u i J  ( fo r  a va riety of reasons) decide n ot t o  
i mpleme n t  or e n force E ur opean l aw.  The fac t  t h at Euro pe a n  l aws'  
effe ct i ven ess depends on e n forceme n t by the Member States 1s 
-- - - -·- --- ---- - - -------
�"it. 'lJ infra s�•t.'l ion .�. 
)c,· Kelemen. 1\e�ula!nrv 1-i·daa!ism. wpm n ot<.: 0. 
2009) Em·ironmenral Federalism: Europe & U. S. Compared 273 
consi d e re d  by many to be t h e i r  most  s i g n i fic a n t weak n e ss today.  
1'hi s  fea t u re cont rasts  s h a r p l y  w i t h  t h e  U.S . .  w h e re the fed e r a l  E PA 
h as d i re c t  e n fo rceme n t  power a nd c a n  ( a t  l e a s t  i n  t he o r y )  d irectly 
con t ro l  e n v i ronmen t a l  q u a l i t y  i n  the s t a tes  i f  necessary.  
Our paper h as att e m p t e d  to use econ o m i c  a n al ys i s  o f  l mv to pro­
v i d e  some e x p l a n a t ions for t h e  p a radox t h a t .  bot h  i n  t h e  U . S .  a n d  
i n  E u rope.  centra l ized e n v i ro n m e n t a l  reg u l a ti o n  i s  con c e r n e d  p r i ­
m arily with local environ mental p rob\erns. W e  have argue d .  usin g  
t r ad i t i o n a l  p u b l i c  choice t h e o ry ,  t h a t  t h e  p h e nomenon c a n  b e  
e x p la i ned by t h e  re l at ive  s i ze of re locat ion costs.  Especia l l y  i n  t h e  
U . S  . .  cap i t a l ,  l abor and res idency a re h ig h l y  mobi l e .  a n d  t h e re m a y  
we l l  b e  ( as t h e  most rece n t  e m p i ri c a l  e v i dence s e e m s  t o  s ho w ) .  a 
con s i d e r a b l e  r i s k  of a race t o  t h e  bot t o m .  w h i ch m ay both  e x p l a i n  
a n d  j ust i fy to  some e x t e n t  c e n t r a l iza t i o n  i n  t h e  U .S .  T h e  s t o ry i n  
E u rope a ppears to  b e  more com p l i ca t e d :  c u l t u r a l ,  l i ng u i s t i c  a n d  ( a t  
l e a s t  i n  t h e  past )  legal  a n d  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  barr iers  l a rge l y  p re ve n te d  
inter-j urisdictional mobility of capitaL labor a n d  residency. E uro­
pean i n d us try in Wes t e r n  a nd N o rd i c  co u n tr ies  l i !-;. e  D e n m a r k  ( a n d  
to some exte n t ) , G e rm a n y .  a n d  t h e  N e t h e r l a n ds m a y  h a ve b e e n  
con fron ted w i t h  a m e d i an v o t e r  req u i ri n g  a h ig h  l e v e l  o f  e n v i ron­
m e n t a l  p rotect ion.  W h e re possi b i l i t i es for c a p i t a l  m o b i l i ty we re 
tradi t i o n a l l y  lovv i n  E u rope,  i n d ustry did n o t  h ave t h e  o p t i o n  ( as i n  
t he U .S . )  t o  move t o  a j ur i sd i c t i on w h e re t he d e m a n d  for e n v i ron­
m e n t a l  protect i o n  wou l d  be lower .  H e nce.  t h i s  l ow e r  ca pi ta l 
m o bi l i t y  a lso l eads t o  a lower  r i sk  o f  a regulatory race to t h e  bot­
tom in  E urope.  At the same t i m e ,  i n d us try i n  cou n t ri e s  w i t h  a h i gh 
d e m a n d  for e n v i ro n m e n t a l  prot ec t i on w o u l d  l obby t o  i mp ose 
tough s t a n d a rds on compe t i t o rs in o t h e r  j ur i s d ic t i o n s .  thus be n e fi t­
i n g  from t h e i r  h i g h e r  l e ve ls  o f  e n v i ro n m e n t a l  regul at io n  b y  e ffec­
t ively c re a t i n g  barr iers to e n t ry .  
H ow e ve r. we hypo t h e s ize that  wi th  t h e  e n l a rgem e n t of the  E U  
i n  2004 a nd a con t i nu i n g  i ncrease i n  i n terj urisd i c t i o n a l  mobi l i ty o f  
a t  l e a s t  ca p i t a l and l a bor .  t h e  E ur o pe a n  story m a y  be cha n g ing.  
Fa c i ng to ugh env i ro n m e n t a l  s t a ndards in  t rad i t i o n a l  M e m be r  
S t a tes ,  i n dustry  cou ld n o w  ben e fi t  from i nc re ased i n t e r- j u r i sd ic­
t io n a l  m o b i l i ty ,  for exa m p l e ,  by m o v i n g  to Eastern E u rope.  E v e n  
t h o ugh E a s t e rn  E urope a n  M e m be r  S t a t e s  a r e  form a l l y  required t o  
com p l y  w i t h  t he same e n v i ronmen t a l  acq u i s  com m u n a u t a i re s .  prac­
t ical  e n force m e n t  of e n v i ron me n t a l  law may be less t horough t h a n  
i n  t h e  olde r fi fte e n  E U  M em be r  S t ates.  If t h i s  we re t h e  case.  one 
cou ld expect a decrease o f  lobbying a ct i v i t i e s  in  fav o r  of c e n t ra l iza­
tion a t  the  E uwpea n leve l  - i n d us t ry wo u l d  now fa vor dcce n t r a l i -
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zat ion t o  t a k e  a d v a n t age of less s t r i ngen t e n v i ro n m e n t a l  s t ;l n clards 
in t h e  East. Paradoxical ly. p e r haps.  EU e n l a rgeme n t  m ::1y m e a n  
t ha t  t he i ncreas i n g  Europe a n ization of e n v iro n me n ta l  law i s  com­
ing t o  an e n cl . 
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